Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2001

Dennis V. Spencer and Linda S. Spencer v. City of
Pleasant View, a Utah municipality : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Matthew Hilton; Dexter & Dexter, LLC; Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants Dennis V. Spencer and
Linda A. Spencer.
Jody K. Burnett; Williams & Hunt; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Pleasant View City.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Spencer v. City of Pleasant View, No. 20010927 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3561

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN till " I

II

I II

Ml ,

I

I

DENNIS
LINDA 6

vs.
CITY OF PLbA
Utah municipal
Ay

Attorneys for Appellants

IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS

DENNIS V.SPENCER AND
LINDAS. SPENCER,
Appellants,

Appellate Court No. 20010927-CA
Appeal from Second Judicial
District, Ogden Department

vs.
Civil No. 980905386 PR
CITY OF PLEASANT VIEW, a
Utah municipality,

The Honorable W. Brent West

Appellee.

OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Matthew Hilton (#3655)
DEXTER & DEXTER, LLC
1360 South 740 East
Orem, UT 84097
801-225-9900
Attorneys for Appellants

Jody K. Burnett (#0499)
WILLIAMS & HUNT, PC
257 East 200 South, #500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

801-521-5678
Attorneys for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Cover page

i

Table of Contents

ii

Table of Authorities

v

Constitutional Provisions

v

Cases

v

Statutes

vii

Jurisdiction of Utah Court of Appeals

1

Standard of Review

1

Issue on Appeal

1

Determinative Law

2

Statement of the Case

3

Nature of the Case

4

Appellate Court Proceedings

4

Disposition of the Case

5

Material Facts

5

Legal Analysis

19

I. Spencers Are Prevailing Parties Because of the Material Alteration In the
Legal Relationship of the Parties

19

II. The Spencers' Request For Equitable Relief Under Federal Law Is Not Moot
By Reason of the City's Tender of the Right to Submit "Appropriate and
Sufficient Applications" for Building Permits
22

ii

III. Spencers' Damages Arising From Violation of Federally Protected Rights
Are Not Moot
23
A. The Spencers Had Property Interests Protected By Federal Law
1. Spencers' Original Variances Merit Federal Protection

24
24

a. As Written, Spencers' Variances Were Not Subject to Revocation... 25
b. Spencers' Variances Were Protected by Subsequent Statutory
Enactment

25

2. The Spencers Right of Access for Subsequent Development Was
Protected As a Matter of Federal Law

27

a.The City Denied Spencers' Due Process By Conditioning Their Right to
Apply for Development on Their Resolution of a City Created Problem 28
b. The Arbitrary and Capricious Action of the City Violated Substantive
Due Process Rights
29
(i). Actions Were Undertaken for Private Rather Than Public Good... 29
(ii). Actions Were Not Related to Rationale Proffered for Conduct

30

B. Spencers' Demonstrated Sufficient Damages By Violation of Their
Federally Protected Interests In Variances, Right-of-Way and Access to the
Opportunity to Develop, to Withstand Summary Judgment
32
IV. Spencers Are Entitled to Damages Under the Utah Constitution

33

A. Spencers Satisfy the Criteria for Damages Under Article I § 7

33

B. Spencers Satisfy the Criteria for Damages Under Article I § 22

35

V. Spencers Properly Claim Damages for Slander of Title

37

A. Compliance with Governmental Immunity Act

37

1. Spencers Gave Proper Notice to the City

37

2. Governmental Immunity Is Statutorily Waived For Quiet Title Actions.. 38
iii

3. Spencers Have Demonstrated A Prima Facie Case of Slander of Title 38
Conclusion

40

Certificate of Hand Delivery

42

ADDENDUM

43

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Constitutional Provisions
United States Constitution
Fifth Amendment

3

Fourteenth Amendment

3

Utah State Constitution
Article I § 14

2

Article I § 22

2, 35

Article I § 7

2, 33

Article XI § 5

27

Cases
Opinions of the Utah Supreme Court
Allaood v. Larson. 545 P.2d 530 (Utah 1976)

26

Bass v. Planned Management Services. Inc.. 761 P.2d 566 (Utah 1988)

40

Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990)

35

Dowse v. Doris Trust. 116 Utah 106, 208 P.2d 956 (1949)

40

Dunn v. McKay. Burton. McMurrav & Thurman. 584 P.2d 894 (Utah 1978)

32

Evans and Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n.. 953 P.2d 435
(Utah 1997)

26

First Security Bank of Utah v. Branberrv Crossing. 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989)

38

Hall v. Utah State Department of Corrections. 2001 UT45; 24 P.3d 958 (2001)....37, 38
Harper v. Summit County. 2001 UT 10, 26 P.3d 193
24
In re Estate of Knickerbocker. 912 P.2d 969 (Utah 1996)
v

32

In re Worthen. 926 P.2d 853 (Utah 1996)

33

Low v. City of Monticello. 2002 UT 90, 455 Utah Adv. Rep. 43
Nance v. Mayflower Tavern. Inc.. 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773 (1944)

1
27

Spackman v. Board of Education of Box Elder School District. 2000 UT 87; 16 P.3d 533
(2000)
34
Sprinqville Citizens for A Better Community v. City of Sprinqville. 979 P.2d 332 (Utah
1999)
34
Strawberry Electric Service District v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870 (Utah
1996)

36

Trade Commission v. Skaqqs Drug Center. Inc.. 446 P.2d 958 (Utah 1968)

33

Twenty-Second Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Oregon Short Line R.R.. 36 Utah 238,103 P. 243 (1909)

35

Opinions of the Utah Court of Appeals
Brown v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment. 957 P.2d 207, 210 (Utah Ct. App.).. 21
Opinions of Federal Courts
United States Supreme Court
Buckhannon Board and Health Care Home. Inc. v. West Virginia Department of
Health and Human Services. 532 U.S. 598 (2001)
19, 22
Carey v. Piphus.435 U.S. 247 (1978)

32

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).. 31,32,35
Dolanv.CitvofTiqard. 512 U.S. 374 (1994)

28

Farrarv. Hobby. 506 U.S. 103 (1992)

32

Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff. 467 U.S. 220 (1984)

30

Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utils. Corp.. 300 U.S. 55 (1937)

30

vi

Friends of the Earth. Inc.. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOO. Inc.. 528 U.S. 167
(2000)
22
Circuit Court of Appeals
Jacobs. Vosconsi & Jacobs Co. V. Citv of Lawrence. 927 F.2d 1111
(10th Cir. 1991)

24

J.B.v. Washington County. 127 F.3d 919 (10th Cir. 1997)

28

Statues
State Statutes of Utah
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-808-810

36

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001

37

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (2)(a)

2, 4

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-707(4)

2, 16, 21, 26, 27

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-6

2, 38

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-30)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G)

1

United States Statutes
42 U.S.C. § 1983

3

42 U.S.C. § 1988

2, 3, 4,19, 22, 40

42 USCS §§ 1981-1983,1985, 1986

3

vii

Jurisdiction of Utah Court of Appeals
The Court entered its final order dismissing all of the Appellants Dennis and
Linda Spencer's claims on October 30, 2001. A Notice of Appeal was filed on
November 19, 2001. The Utah Supreme Court took initial jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-3(j). Subsequently, the Utah Court of Appeals assumed
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
Standard of Review
Appellants ("Spencers") appeal the trial court's granting of summary judgment
for the Appellee ("City") and denial of their motion for partial summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate when 'there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and .. .the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.' . . .Whether the trial court properly granted summary
judgment is a question of law that we review for correctness, according
no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. . . . Additionally,
when reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 'we view the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party.'1
Issue on Appeal
After the City (1) tendered Spencers approval to build two residences, (2)
agreed the tender could be incorporated into an order of the trial court, and (3) later
provided a refund to Spencers of fees charged for the City's outside counsel review
of Spencers' development proposals, were there sufficient facts in the record to
require the trial court to hold that Spencers were a prevailing party for purposes of

1

42 U.S.C. § 1988, and set for further hearing both Spencers' claims for damages
and an award of attorney fees and costs?
Determinative Law
The following provisions of law are determinative of issues raised in the
Spencers' appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-707(4): "Variances run with the land."
Utah Code Ann. $ 10-9-1001 (2)(a):
Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of
the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the
decision with the district court within 30 days from the date the decision
is rendered.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-6:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the
recovery of any property real or personal or for the possession thereof
or to quiet title thereto, or to foreclose mortgages or other liens thereon
or to determine any adverse claim thereon, or to secure any
adjudication touching any mortgage or other lien said entity may have
or claim on the property involved.
Utah Const. Article I § 7: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law"
Utah Const. Article I § 14: "The right of people to be secure in their persons. . .
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated[.]"
Utah Const. Article I § 22: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation."

1

Low v. City of Monticello. 2002 UT 90 f l 4 ; 455 Utah Adv. Rep. 43.
2

42U.S.C. §1983:
Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the injured party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]
42U.S.C.S1988:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1977,
1977A, 1978,1979,1980, and 1981 of the Revised Statutes [42 USCS
§§ 1981-1983,1985,1986].. .the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs.
United States Constitution. Fifth Amendment: . . ."[N]or shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."
United States Constitution. Fourteenth Amendment: "No state shall.. .deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law."
Statement of the Case
This appeal seeks vindication of the right of a property owner to seek damages,
attorney fees and costs against a City that has illegally, capriciously, or arbitrarily (1)
delayed or impeded the granting of building permits authorized either pursuant to
previously granted variances or available under the existing City ordinances, (2)
restricted access to the City Planning Commission and Board of Adjustments for the
benefit of other private parties, and (3) after extended litigation, without admitting
3

fault of any kind, tendered to the Court the requested building approvals and a
refund of some of the objected to, unnecessary processing fees in an effort to moot
the property owners' request for injunctive relief and all of the damage claims arising
out of the delay to issue the building permits.
Nature of the Case
The trial court reviewed this case as appeal brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
10-9-1001 (2)(a) from the City's Board of Adjustment decision that denied the
Spencers' request for a variance needed to develop their property. In addition to the
statutory claim of illegal, arbitrary and capricious action, the Spencers brought
several federal civil rights claims, with related state constitutional and statutory
claims, against the City. Because the City eventually tendered the two desired
building permits and a refund on what Spencers claimed were improperly paid
processing fees, the trial court found the key issues in the case were moot, and
dismissed all of Plaintiffs' remaining constitutional and civil rights claims as being
premature and not supported by fact or law. On appeal to this Court, Spencers
claim that the trial court improperly failed to recognize Spencers as a prevailing party
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and seek remand for evidentiary hearings on attorney fees,
costs, and damages.
Appellate Court Proceedings
Except for participation in the Utah Appellate Court's mediation program, there
have been no prior appellate court proceedings.
4

Disposition of the Case
The trial court dismissed all of the Spencers' claims for damages, attorney fees and
costs with prejudice.
Material Facts
This case focuses on the relationship of the City and the Spencers during the many
years the Spencers tried to develop their property as building lots. The property in
question is shown in Figure 1.

(Record at 266) The West Parcel (on the left) contains two parcels with tax
5

identification numbers 16-023-0040 and 16-023-0042. The East Parcel (on the right)
contains the parcel with tax identification number 16-023-0004.
About 1980, in violation of City ordinances prohibiting half-roads in the City,
the City allowed the road identified by 0021 to end part way through parcel number
16-023-0025. This had the effect of land locking Spencers' East and West parcel.
(Record at 265-266) Nonetheless, on May 10, 1983, Spencers obtained a "nonexclusive right-of-way" across the land immediately south of their property that joined
the undeveloped City right-of-way above public road 0021. (Record at 266)
On July 11,1983 a variance was granted to the Spencers and their successorin-interest that allowed a right to build on the West parcel. This variance used the
right-of-way across both the East and West parcels. (Record at 267) Building on the
right-of-way instead of a public street required conformance with the following four
requirements:
(1) The building lot be 20,000 square feet, without consideration of the
right-of-way;
(2) The buildings be set back at least thirty (30) feet from the edge of
the right-of-way;
(3) The engineer's designs be provided to the City showing cuts for
utilities, grades for roads, and the design of the right-of-way for future
development in the area; and
(4) Should any future development be made, the Spencers would
participate in hard surfacing the road, installing curb, gutter and
sidewalk, and that [the Spencers would] provide an escrow in the
amount determined by the City engineer for improvement to his
property.
6

(Record at 268)

On March 31,1986 a variance was granted to the Spencers that

allowed a building to be placed on the East Parcel, using the right-of-way instead of
a public street. The same requirements to obtain a building permit that were
imposed on West Parcel in 1983 were imposed on the East Parcel in 1986. (Record
at 276-77) The requirement to join in hard surfacing the road, curb, gutter and
sidewalk "should any future development be made" indicated some potential that the
right-of-way would become a public road.
Beginning in 1988, and increasing after the death of Paul Cragun, some
members of the extended Cragun family increased pressure on the Spencers to sell
their property to them. Ray Johnson, a son-in law to [Earl] Cragun, a developer of
Cherrywood Condominiums, Inc. and Gordon Cragun, son to Paul Cragun, wanted
the Spencers property to be included in the Cherrywood development and, thereby
eliminate the right-of-way. Their offer to purchase Spencers' property for $7,500
was refused because Spencers had been offered considerably more for the same
property by others if a building permit was available. (Record at 271, 278)
On May 24,1990 the City of Pleasant View approved as "Hi Jolley, Lane Patio
Home Subdivision" a proposed development south of the Spencers' property. After
City Council approval on May 14, 1991, the City recorded Phase I of this
development, which would later be called Cherrywood Manor. (Record at 271)
During the construction of the first phase, the Spencers were threatened by Ray
Johnson that if they did not sell to Craguns, (the developers of Cherrywood), that the
7

Craguns would make sure the property was landlocked and could never be sold as
residential property. (Record at 271-72; 278-79)
On May 25, 1992, the City approved Phase III of the Cherrywood
development. It was recorded by the City on September 18,1992. The City allowed
the platted development to overlay the recorded right-of-way owned by Spencers
(and others) that the City had previously given variance approval to temporarily
serve in place of a public road. (Record at 272, 279)

Thereafter, because the

Cherrywood was allowed to create a private road bordering the Spencers' property in
lieu of further developing the public road and thoroughfare already partially built, the
right-of-way did not become part of a public road as some may have anticipated.
(Record at 271)
The variances previously granted by the City allowing Spencers to use the
right-of-way rather than a public road were revoked without hearings in 1993 and
1995. (Record at 699, page 39 line 25 - page 40, line 2) As to the West Parcel, five
months after the recording of Cherrywood Phase III, on February 8,1993 the City,
through its mayor, and on advice of counsel, told the Spencers' successor-in-interest
that a building permit would not be issued because the surrounding property use had
changed, ten years was not a reasonable time to wait to develop after receiving a
variance, and none of the stipulations were followed. (Record at 273) From August
through November of 1993, Spencers tried to close on a sale but could not because
of the inability to obtain a building permit. (Record at 273-74) As to the East Parcel,
8

on May 19,1995, counsel for the City returned to the Spencers their application to
the Board of Adjustment for a renewal of the original variance granted in 1986
because even though Board of Adjustment authority to grant "special exceptions"
was allowed by the City Code, the City had not adopted any standards to determine
what was a "special exception." Spencers were also told that "the [original] action
taken over eight years ago by the board of adjustment has no bearing on what the
current board of adjustment may do." (Record at 281, 304)
After their variances were revoked, Spencers were unable to secure leave
from the City to develop their property. Their efforts were hampered by the City in at
least three ways.
First, the City conditioned Spencers' right of access to the City for approval of
future development upon Spencers' resolution of a title problem that had been
created when the City recorded the approved plat for Cherrywood Phase III. Prior to
allowing Spencers to be heard on their request for issuance of building permits,
ministerial or policy making bodies of the City imposed on Spencers the affirmative
burden of resolving vis-a-vis Cherrywood the problems caused by the City's
recording of Phase III of Cherrywood over the Spencers' right-of-way. This occurred
on May 11,1993, (Record at 274), May 19,1995 (Record at 274), October 21,1966
(Record at 281), November 21, 1996 (Record at 274), and January 16, 1997
(Record at 282). During these time periods, both parties took action they deemed
appropriate in an effort to address the problem of the Cherrywood Phase III overlay

9

of Spencer's right-of-way.
For example, the Spencers prepared a plan with a turn-a-round specifically at
the City's suggestion. Nonetheless, on September 30, 1994, the City denied the
request to develop with a turn-a-round. (Record at 280).
Thereafter, between the November 1996 and January 1997 directives placing
the burden on the Spencers to resolve the City induced Cherrywood conflict on the
Spencers, Dennis Spencer had met with counsel for the City and thought he had
resolved matters to the City's satisfaction.
In addition, a week or ten days prior to the January 16, 1997 Planning
Commission meeting, the Spencers met with Frank Maughan, a Planning
Commission member, to discuss their concern over the actions of Teri Cragun
relative to the development of their property. Spencers understood Mr. Maughan to
agree that it seemed a conflict of interest existed because of the family connections
to Cherrywood and it would be appropriate to have another city employee make the
decisions on Spencers' development. Believing he could make the request at a
public meeting, at the January 16, 1997 Commission meeting, Dennis Spencer
asked to have Teri Cragun removed from decision-making authority over his property
because the "City had allowed Teri Cragun to use her official position to benefit her
family's development of the Cherrywood development at [Spencers'] expense." The
Spencers' understanding of their discussion with outside counsel for the City and
Frank Maughan either was erroneous or the relative positions of each had changed
10

in the interim. This is most evident by what occurred at the January 16, 1997
Planning Commission meeting: the Planning Commission still imposed on Spencers
the burden of resolving the City induced Cherrywood conflict; Frank Maughan
publicly denounced Dennis Spencer for his statements regarding Teri Cragun; and
Teri Cragun remained unwilling to define with clarity what Spencers had to do to
qualify for the issuance of building permits. (Record at 282-285)
Making the challenges needed to be worked out with Cherrywood worse, in
June of 1997, City Engineer O. Neil Smith wrote to Teri Cragun, stating that the
drawings submitted by Spencers with a retention pond would discharge water onto
the Cherrywood development and require an easement and signed agreement with
Cherrywood.

In fact, there was no City requirement that a retention pond be

provided for a lot or lots the size and slope of the Spencers' property. Furthermore,
the natural stream bed to which the retention pond would direct water exits
Spencers' property to the west and not the south towards Cherrywood. (Record at
286)
Finally, not only was there conflict between Spencers and City officials and
staff in public meetings and internal memos, but there was conflict outside public
meetings as well. On November 8,1995, the City police arrested Dennis Spencer for
vehicular trespass on the right-of-way. Despite the actual knowledge of and prior
receipt by Police Chief Rex Cragun of Spencers' recorded right-of-way, this arrest
had the knowledge and approval of Chief Cragun. Later, Dennis Spencer was

11

required to appear in Justice Court before the charges were dismissed by the City
prosecutor. No other City resident had been subjected to such treatment by the
police force. (Record at 289-91) Regardless of the source or intent of the conflict,
the Cherrywood conflict with the Spencers' right-of-way remained unresolved.
(Because of these difficulties, Spencers' former legal counsel filed an action against
the City on May 2, 1996, alleging many of the legal claims made in this litigation.
The case was dismissed without prejudice on January 15, 1999. (Record at 276,
281))
Second, notwithstanding the previous 1984 determination that the Spencers
development of the West Parcel did not have to comply with the subdivision
ordinances, (Record at 269), with an earnest money agreement in hand, on October
23, 1993, Spencers were told by the City that no building permit would be issued
because the access to the property was by right-of-way rather than a public road. As
a result of the conduct of the City, the sale was lost. (Record 273-74) Thereafter, on
February 17,1997, Teri Cragun notified Dennis Spencer that until the access way to
the two lot development was a dedicated city street, the proposed subdivision would
not be placed on the Planning Commission Calendar. (Record at 285.) Because a
private rather than public road was used in and to Phase III of Cherrywood, and that
the private, residential development around Spencers' property were accessed by
other means than a public road that had the capability to access Spencers' property
without infringing on other private property, it was impossible to comply with this

12

requirement. (Record at 699, page 32, line 8 - page 34, line 8.)
Third, on January 16,1997, the Spencers were facing a myriad of undefined
and changing requirements by the City for development. For example, the Spencers
prepared a plan with a turn-a-round specifically at the City's suggestion.
Nonetheless, on September 30,1994, the City denied the request to develop with a
turn-a-round. (Record at 280). At the January 16, 1997 Planning Commission
meeting, even when asked by a member of the Commission, Teri Cragun refused to
specify with finality what the Spencers had to do to comply with the ordinances to be
allowed to develop their property. (Record at 283-84) Thereafter, contrary to earlier
representations, on March 11, 1998 and May 14, 1998, the City Engineer Mark
Miller, advised the City that no building lot could be approved on Spencers' land.
(Record at 286)
Finally, on June 16, 1998, the Planning Commission held a hearing on
Spencers' requests, approved issuance of building permits subject to the approval of
the Board of Adjustments to use the right-of-way instead of a public road. (Record
at 287) After a hearing on July 14,1998, on July 28,1998 the Board of Adjustment
denied the variance because it (1) disagreed with a factual finding made by the
Planning Commission and (2) found there was no reason why a public street could
not be built to access and provide frontage to the Spencers' property. (Record at
239-40.)
On August 6, 1998 an appeal was filed with the Second District Court
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challenging the illegal, arbitrary and capricious nature of the City's conduct. The
complaint also made various constitutional and common-law claims under state and
federal law, reserving the right to file a notice of claim under the Governmental
Immunity Act. (Record at 1-82) On May 28,1999 the Spencers' filed a motion for
partial summary judgment asserting that their rights to the original variances were
protected as a matter of federal law. (Record at 101-103; 106-121.) On July 27,
1999 a Notice of Claim was filed on behalf of the Spencers with appropriate City
officials and their counsel. (Record at 594.) On December 20,1999, the City gave
notice of its tender of two building permits to the Spencers and suggested mootness.
In this notice, the City specifically disclaimed a legal duty to issue the building
permits or any liability for not having done so in the past. (Record at 196.)
Thereafter, both the Spencers and the City filed cross motions for summary
judgment. On July 12,2000, during oral argument, counsel for the City stated that
"the issuance of the two transferable building permits for the two parcels can be
incorporated in an order to the court." (Record 699, page 20, lines 7-11; see also
page 5, line 23 - page 6, line 7.) Counsel for Spencers specifically requested that
the Court incorporate the building permit question into the trial court's ruling or order.
(Record 699, page 50, line 5 - page 51, line 2) Post-hearing information was
submitted in support of and against the claim of the Spencers to a refund of $1,260
from the City that had been tendered as a fee for outside counsel review of
Spencers' submissions to the City after the variances had been vacated. (Record at
14

487-502.) The City agreed to a refund of those monies as well. (Record at 496-502.)
On November 28,2000, the City's motion for summary judgment was granted
and Spencers' remaining claims dismissed. In the court's decision, the trial court
addressed the issuance of the building permits as follows:
The first issue, in both motions, is Plaintiffs' request for the issuance of
two building permits. Since the Defendant has agreed to issue the
requested building permits, that issue is now moot.
As to the refund of $1,260.00, the trial court said as follows:
The eighth issue, raised in the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment, is that Plaintiffs' were inappropriately required to pay
$1,260.00 in attorney fees on behalf of the Defendant. The Defendant,
although critical of Plaintiffs scarcity of proof on the issue of payments
and receipts, has agreed to reimburse the Plaintiffs the $1,260.00.
Therefore, the issue is moot.
Finally, as to Spencers' constitutional claims, the trial court found that they "are
premature and have no factual or legal basis to support them." The Entry of
Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal entered on November 28, 2000
incorporated the Court's Decision of October 2, 2000. (Record at 508-511)
As the November 28,2000 order did not dispose of all parties to the litigation,
on March 5, 2001, Spencers filed a motion to revise the Court's previous entry of
summary judgment. On September 28,2001, the trial court filed a decision denying
Spencers' motion.

15

While addressing this motion to revise the earlier decision, the trial Court
clarified various aspects of its original opinion. While the trial court recognized that
the Spencers' due process and equal protection claims arose from Pleasant View
City's refusal to issue building permits, the trial court said the tendering of the
permits by the City made "the plaintiff's constitutional claims now premature," and
eliminated the requirement to address the impact of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-707(4)
on the variances previously granted by the City to the Spencers.
The trial court also found that "[s]ince the City of Pleasant View offered to
issue the permits to the plaintiffs, there was no evidence alleged that would support
a finding that the plaintiffs had been otherwise damaged." In doing so, the Court
overlooked the pleadings, Affidavit of Dennis Spencer, and memoranda that
specifically recited damages that arose because of the conduct of the City and their
employees.
Besides alleging that "numerous sales were lost for all of the parcels in
question because of the inability to obtain building permits and the specific
representations of City employees that no building permit would ever be issued,"
(Record at 292), the Spencers specifically identified two sales that were lost because
of the City's revocation of the original building permits.

On or about October 16,

1993, the Spencers had a written earnest money agreement to sell a portion of
parcel 16-023-0004 for $24,900. On October 23,1993, a special meeting was held
with the City and Spencers. The City indicated that no building permit would be
16

issued because the access to the property was by a private right-of-way rather than
a public road. As a result of the conduct of the City, the sale was lost. (Record at
273-74)

Thereafter, in 1996, Spencers were orally offered $148,000 for the

properties.

The sole requirement to memorialize the offer in writing was a

representation by the City that a building permit could be obtained. "The failure of the
City to allow that any person owning the property could comply with the terms of the
variance that had been previously granted cost me the sale." (Record at 292)
In addition, the Spencers documented the following special and general
damages:
[0]ver [$15,000] in legal fees and $390.00 in court costs trying to clear
title and protect our property interests to the variances previously
granted by the City to the parcels in question but subsequently
slandered to the Spencers, Parkers, and prospective builders of
purchasers by the City, its staff, their counsel and other employees;
[R]epurchas[ing] of both parcels originally purchased by Parkers on the
reliance of the City's promised building permit for Parcel # 1, at a cost
of approximately $10,000 more than we had sold the original parcel for,
all because of the inability to obtain a permit for the same from the City.
[Spencers] are paying principal and interest at this time for this
obligation;
$1,260 under protest to the City for additional time [the City's] attorney
spent creating obstacles to our efforts to overcome the City's postvariance slandering of our property;
[0]ver $8,700 in engineering costs [above the $1,000 that would have
been spent in securing normal course of approval] trying to comply with
repeated changes requested by the City and its post-variance staff; and
[Thousands of hours of time, thousands miles [of travel], in addition to
experiencing significant emotional distress as a couple and family, all
because of a fifteen year inability to develop property on which a
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variance had already been granted, which inability has damaged us in
an amount to be shown at trial.
(Record at 291-93).
As to a claim for equitable relief to force the City to issue the permits on
grounds of denial of due process and equal protection, the trial court found "[o]nce
those permits were issued, those claims became moot." The Court overlooked
Spencers' assertion that the tender and claim of mootness "is not applicable
because the Spencers have not yet received the two building permits indicated in the
City's filings." (Record at 238) Relying on the prior determination that there was no
factual or legal basis to support Plaintiffs' constitutional claims, "there were no
constitutional claims to be addressed that arose from the variance issue."
Attorney fees were not applicable because the Spencers were "not prevailing
parties."
A final order again dismissing Spencers' claims was filed October 30, 2001
and incorporated by reference the trial court's memorandum decision of September
28, 2001. (Record at 677-79.)
On November 19, 2001, this appeal was filed by the Spencers. (Record at
687-91)

18

Legal Analysis
Notwithstanding the trial court's determination that claims for damages,
equitable relief, attorney fees, and costs were not applicable because of the City's
tendering building permits and monies to the Spencers, a careful examination of the
record shows that (1) the court documents provided a "material alteration in the legal
relationship of the parties", (2) it is not clear that the trial court will not yet have to
enforce the agreement of the parties, and (3) Spencers' claims for damages are
valid as a matter of federal and state law. As a result, as prevailing parties,
Spencers are entitled to fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and an opportunity
to present evidence as to their damages.
I. Spencers Are Prevailing Parties Because of the
Material Alteration In the Legal Relationship
Of the Parties2
The United States Supreme Court has allowed award of attorney fees to be
made under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 when there is a "material alteration of the legal
relationship of the parties".3 Where there is no judgment on the merits, the Court
has held
that settlement agreements enforced through a consent decree may be
the basis for an award of attorney fees... .Although a consent decree
does not always include an admission of liability by the defendant, ...it
2

This issue was referred to in the Spencers response to the City's postargument citation of the Buckhannon Board and Care Home case, infra, footnote
3. (Record at 592-93.)
3
Buckhannon Board and Health Care Home. Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Services, 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001).
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nonetheless is a court-ordered "change in the legal relationship
between [the plaintiff] and the defendant."4
At oral argument before the trial court, the City specifically agreed that "the issuance
of the two transferable building permits [approvals] for the two parcels can be
incorporated in an order to the court." (Record 699, page 20, lines 7-11; see also
page 5, line 23 - page 6, line 7) Counsel for Spencers specifically requested that
the Court incorporate the building permit question into the trial court's ruling or order.
(Record 699, page 50, line 5 - page 51, line 2.)
On November 28,2000, the City's motion for summary judgment was granted,
dismissing Spencers' claims.

However, in the court's decision, the trial court

addressed the issuance of the building permits as follows:
The first issue, in both motions, is Plaintiffs' request for the issuance of
two building permits. Since the Defendant has agreed to issue the
requested building permits, that issue is now moot.
As to the refund of $1,260.00, the trial court said as follows:
The eighth issue, raised in the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment, is that Plaintiffs' were inappropriately required to pay
$1,260.00 in attorney fees on behalf of the Defendant. The Defendant,
although critical of Plaintiff's scarcity of proof on the issue of payments
and receipts, has agreed to reimburse the Plaintiffs the $1,260.00.
Therefore, the issue is moot.
The Entry of Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal entered on November 28,
2000 incorporated the Court's Decision of October 2, 2000. Thus, at this stage of
the litigation, by reference in the order of the trial court, the City's tendering of the

4 jd.
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building permits and refund of certain monies as explained in the October 2, 2000
memorandum were made part of the order of the trial court.
As the November 28,2000 order did not dispose of all parties to the litigation,
on March 5, 2001, Spencers' filed a motion to revise the Court's previous entry of
summary judgment. In the trial court's decision of September 28, 2001 addressing
this motion to revise the earlier decision, the trial Court continued to base significant
portions of its rulings on the agreement of the City to tender the building permits and
disputed funds. The trial court said the tendering of the permits and funds by the
City made "the plaintiff's constitutional claims now premature," and eliminated the
requirement to address the impact of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-707(4) on the
variances granted by the City to the Spencers.

"Since the City of Pleasant View

offered to issue the permits to the plaintiffs, there was no evidence alleged that
would support a finding that the plaintiffs had been otherwise damaged." As to a
claim for equitable relief to force the City to issue the permits on grounds of denial of
due process and equal protection, the trial court found "[o]nce those permits were
issued, those claims became moot." A final order again dismissing Spencers' claims
was filed October 30, 2001 and incorporated by reference the trial court's
memorandum decision of September 28, 2001.
Thus, (even though for reasons cited below, the trial court erroneously
concluded that Spencers had not stated a federal constitutional claim for equitable
or monetary relief,) because both orders of the trial court relative to Spencers' claims
21

incorporated by reference the memoranda of the trial court where the agreement to
tender the building permits and the reimbursement of the disputed monies was
judicially acknowledged, the Spencers obtained a material alteration in their legal
relationship with the City that was not present when the litigation began.
As such, they are "prevailing parties" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
II. The Spencers' Request For Equitable Relief Under Federal Law
Is Not Moot By Reason of the City's Tender of the Right to Submit
"Appropriate and Sufficient Applications" for Building Permits5
In 2000, the United States Supreme Court reviewed as a matter of federal law,
how cessation of a challenged practice may moot a present proceeding:
It is well settled that 'a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged
practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the
legality of the practice.' . . .'If it did, the courts would be compelled to
leave 'the defendant.. .free to return to his old ways.' In accordance
with this principle, the standard we have announced for determining
whether a case has been mooted by the defendant's voluntary conduct
is stringent: 'A case might become moot if subsequent events made it
absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not
reasonably be expected to recur.'.. The 'heavy burden of persuading'
the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to
start up again lies with the party asserting mootness.6
The trial court's assumption that "[sjince the Defendant has agreed to issue
the requested buildings permits, that issue is now moot" overlooks three things.

5

This issue was referred to in the Spencers response to the City's postargument citation of the Buckhannon Board and Care Home case, supra,
footnote 3. (Record at 592-93.) This case reviews Friends of the Earth as binding
precedent when no damages have been claimed by a plaintiff and the defendant
ceases the complained of practices. See footnote 3, supra, at 609.
6
Friends of the Earth. Incorporated vs. Laidlaw Environmental Services
(TOO. Inc., 528 U.S. 167,189 (2000).
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First, the City "decided to grant Spencers permission to build on the two parcels and
to obtain the necessary building permits upon submission of appropriate and
sufficient applications." (Record at 197-98)

Second, the Spencers specifically

raised the issue that the Notice, Tender and Suggestion of Mootness was not
applicable at all because "the Spencers have not yet received the two building
permits indicated in the City's filings." (Record at 238)

Third, a case can only

become moot when it is "absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could
not reasonably be expected to recur." Based on (1) the prior claims by Spencers of
the illegal, arbitrary and capricious conduct of the City, and (2) the trial court's failure
to either set the matter for evidentiary hearing or find a legal basis for equitable
relief, and the City has not met its "heavy burden of persuasion" to show that it is
"absolutely clear" that illegal, arbitrary or capricious conduct of the City could not
begin anew.
For all of the foregoing, the Spencers' claims for relief under federal law are
not moot by reason of the City's tender of the permits only after receipt of
"appropriate and sufficient applications".
III. Spencers' Damages Arising From Violation
of Federally Protected Rights Are Not Moot
The trial court erroneously concluded that because the City's conduct may
have mooted equitable relief sought by the Spencers that damages were also not
shown. "[S]o long as the plaintiff has a cause of action for damages, a defendant's
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change in conduct will not moot the case."7 "To make a claim for deprivation of
property without due process of law under the United States Constitution, a plaintiff
must both show a property interest and a deprivation of that interest by the State
without the required legal process."8
A. The Spencers Had Property Interests Protected
By Federal Law
The Spencers were entitled to protection under the United States Constitution
for both their property interest in the original variances as issued as well as their
interest in the property that the variances were to serve.
1. Spencers' Original Variances Merit Federal Protection
To show entitlement to protection under the United States Constitution, the
Spencers must show that the City was limited in what it could do after having granted
the original variances to Spencers.
A property interest protected by the due process clause results from a
legitimate claim of entitlement created and defined 'by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source, such as state
law.'... When analyzing whether a plaintiff presents a legitimate claim
of entitlement, we focus on the degree of discretion given the decision
maker and not the probability of the decision's favorable outcome
Appellants must therefore demonstrate that there is a set of conditions
the fulfillment of which would give rise to a legitimate expectation....
Otherwise, the city's decision making lacks sufficient substantive
limitations to invoke due process guarantees.9
7

Id
Harper v.Summit County. 2001 UT 10 f30; 26 P.3d 193
9
Jacobs. Vosconsi & Jacobs Co. V. City of Lawrence. 927 F.2d 1111,
1115-1116(10th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted.)
8
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Spencers can show these "substantive limitations" in two ways. First, the variances
contained no limitation to their use. Second, intervening state law provided that
variances would "run with the land."
a. As Written, Spencers' Variances Were Not Subject to Revocation10
On the face of the granted variances, there are no time or performance
constraints limiting their application to the Spencers' property. No City ordinance,
state statute, or judicial opinion indicated a City was required to place a time
limitation on a variance that was being granted.
[Bjecause zoning ordinances are in derogation of a property owner's
common law right to unrestricted use of his or her property, provisions
therein restricting property uses should be strictly construed, and
provisions permitting property uses should be liberally construed in
favor of the property owner.11
Because the need to request a variance was in derogation of the Spencer's common
law rights, the granting of the same and its terms should be strictly construed against
the City. Since the City imposed no time limit on the variances, none should have
been imposed unilaterally by the City at a later date.
b. Spencers' Variances Were Protected by Subsequent
Statutory Enactment12
In 1991, the State of Utah revised the state statutes that governed the Board

10

This argument was made in Record 239-41 and 545-56.
Brown v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207, 210 (Utah Ct.
App.), (citation omitted), cert, denied 982 P.2d 88 (1998).
11

12

This argument was made in Record 239-242.
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of Adjustments. In the statutory amendments, a provision was included which stated
"[vjariances run with the land."13 At no time prior to the effective date of the statute
did the City indicate to Spencers that their variances would have to be re-applied for.
There is no case law in Utah determining whether or not the legislative
judgment that "variances run with the land" applies to variances that were in force at
the time of its effective date. However, in this case, there is a "clear and unavoidable
implication that the statute operates on events already in the past,"14 i.e. there is no
distinction made between variances presently in existence and those that are
allowed after the adoption of the amendments. The statement that "[vjariances run
with the land" states a principle: any variance in effect at that time or granted in the
future ran with the land.
This interpretation finds support in precedent that that broadly interprets
statutes that directly or impliedly limit the authority of a City to take action.
[A]ny fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of the
power is resolved by the courts against the corporation (city) and the
power denied; grants of power to the cities are strictly construed to the
exclusion of implied powers
[T]he state may always invade the field
of regulation delegated to the cities and supercede, annul, or enlarge
the regulation which the municipality has attempted. It may modify or
recall the police power of the city as it may abolish the city itself.15
13

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-707(4). Similar language was included with the
provisions governing variances granted on a county level. See Utah Code Ann. §
17-27-707(4).
14

Evans and Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n.. 953
P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1997).
15

Allqood v. Larson. 545 P.2d 530, 531-532 (Utah 1976).
26

"If there is a reasonable doubt concerning the existence of a particular power, that
doubt should be resolved against the city, and the power should be denied."16
As state law established that variances were to run with the land, the City's
conduct in revoking the previously granted variances to the West and East Parcels
not only violated Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-707(4) but also violated the provisions of
the Supremacy Clause of the Utah Constitution, Article XI § 5. (Because the City
violated a mandatory statute that directly impacted a property interest of Spencers,
the Spencers had standing to seek equitable enforcement of Article XI § 5 against
the City.)17
Based on all of the foregoing, the City's discretion to unilaterally revoke the
variances granted to the West and East Parcels was non-existent under state law.
2. The Spencers Right of Access for Subsequent Development
Was Protected As a Matter of Federal Law
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the right to a variance
without requiring a "taking" of one's property.18 Unfortunately, the conduct of the City
after the revocation of the original variances demonstrated direct interference with
Spencers' due process rights regarding their recorded right-of-way and their right to

16

Nance v. Mayflower Tavern. Inc.. 106 Utah 517, 520; 150 P.2d 773, 774

(1944).
17
18

See cases cited in footnotes 15-16, supra.
See Dolanv. Citvof Tiqard. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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have access to the City entities charged with supervising the development of the
West and East parcels. This can be shown in three ways.

a.

The City Denied Spencers' Due Process By Conditioning
Their Right to Apply for Development on Their
Resolution of a City Created Problem

On May 25, 1992, the City approved Phase III of the Cherrywood
development. It was recorded by the City on September 18,1992. The City allowed
the platted development to overlay the recorded right-of-way owned by Spencers
(and others) to which the City had previously given variance approval to serve in
place of a public road. Because of the use of a private road by Cherrywood, the
anticipated public road over Spencers' right-of-way did not materialize.
Once the original variances were unilaterally revoked by the City, prior to
allowing Spencers to be heard on their request for issuance of building permits,
ministerial staff or policy making bodies of the City imposed on Spencers the
affirmative burden of resolving vis-a-vis Cherrywood the problems caused by the
City's recording of Phase III of Cherrywood over the Spencers' right-of-way. This
occurred officially at least five times between May of 1993 and January of 1997, and
indirectly through the conduct of Police Chief Rex Cragun, a policy maker for the
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Chief Cragun is a policy maker for the City because he maintains the
same authority as a county sheriff within City limits. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-913.
The authority of a county sheriff has been interpreted as making the Sheriff a
28

Thus, whether the City would have granted Spencers a variance or not, or
approved a proposal for development, the Spencers were denied procedural due
process of law in that their right of access to the City procedures for approval was
denied until the Spencers resolved the City-created problem between their property
and that of Cherrywood.
b. The Arbitrary and Capricious Action of the City
Violated Substantive Due Process Rights
Besides being illegal, the Spencers objected to the arbitrary and capricious
actions of the City that denied them substantive due process of law.20 This can be
shown in at least two ways.
(i). Actions Were Undertaken for Private Rather Than Public Good
Spencers were consistent in their claim that the "City had allowed Teri Cragun
to use her official position to benefit her family's development of the Cherrywood
development at [Spencers'] expense." (Record at 284.) The City's requirement that
Spencers resolve the City's error of platting over Spencers' right-of-way - and
denying them the right to be heard until they did - denied them due process of law
by limiting their access to the City procedures for securing developmental approval.
The same conduct, however, also infringed on Spencer's right to use their deeded

policy maker of the County. See J.B. v. Washington County. 127 F.3d 919, 924
n.5 (10th Cir. 1997).
20
This claim is stated in the complaint because Count II alleging a denial of
due process under the United States and Utah constitutions incorporates by
reference the allegation in Count I, of arbitrary and capricious decision-making by
the City. (Record at 13)
29

and recorded right-of-way solely because the City had allowed the Phase III plat t<
be recorded over Spencers' property interest, all for the benefit of private rather thai
public purposes.
The United States Supreme Court has held that "[a] purely private taking cou|
not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimati
purpose of government and would thus be void."21 "[0]ne's person property may nc
be taken for the benefit of another private person without a justifying public purpose
even though compensation be paid."22 Not only was no compensation paid, but th
nullification of Spencers' right-or-way (without or without the variance approval) wa.
null and void because it benefited a private rather than public purpose.
(ii). Actions Were Not Related to Rationale Proffered for Conduct23
After unilateral revocation of the variances, the Spencers were required to n
submit a variety of alternate proposals for development. Besides the constar
requirement that the Cherrywood Phase III plat problem be resolved prior to ar1
hearing on Spencers' requests, the additional requirements were impossible
perform or were and are arbitrarily ever changing.
For example, directives were given to Spencers that they had to put a publ
road in for their development even though all of the adjoining properties were eith<
accessed by a private road or the entrance to the property was from a different sic

21

Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 220, 245 (1984).
Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937).
23
This argument was made in the Record at 248.
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of the property than that available to Spencers. Not only was the requirement
inconsistent with the area, but with existing development, it was impossible.

Furthermore, changing and undefined standards for development are by their
nature arbitrary and capricious. In January 1997, even when asked by a Planning
Commission member too do so, Teri Cragun refused to specify with finality what the
Spencers had to do to comply with the ordinances to be allowed to develop their
property. Thereafter, in the spring of 1998, contrary to earlier representations, the
City Engineer advised the City that no building lot could be approved on Spencers'
land. By the summer of 1998, the Board of Adjustments acted arbitrarily and
capriciously when it sought to reverse a factual finding of the Planning Commission,
(an act outside its authority), and again imposed the burden of an impossible act on
the Spencers.
In 1999, the United States Supreme Court upheld damages awarded by a jury
to a developer that repeatedly submitted plans, and modified plans, and re-submitted
them to meet the changing demands of the City when all of the efforts over a period
of years resulted in no issuance of any building approval.
[T]he jury. . .was not asked to evaluate the city's decision in
isolation but rather in context, and, in particular in light of the tortuous
and protracted history of attempts to develop the property. . . .[T]he
question submitted to the jury on this issue was confined to, whether in
light of all the history and context of this case, the city's particular
decision to deny Del Monte Dunes' final development proposal was
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reasonably related to the City's proffered justifications.

Like the developers in Del Monte Dunes, the Spencers similarly qualify for a factual
evaluation by a trier-of-fact of their efforts and the City's illegal, arbitrary and
capricious refusal to issue them a building permit under any condition.
B. Spencers' Demonstrated Sufficient Damages By Violation of Their
Federally Protected Interests In Variances, Right-of-Way and Access
to the Opportunity to Develop, to Withstand Summary Judgment
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that nominal damages are
appropriate when no evidence of damages has been submitted25 or a violation of
duty occurred without causing actual damage.26 Nominal damages are available for
due process violations of the United States Constitution when there is no evidence of
actual injury.27 Because the record showed the City violated Spencers state and
federal constitutional rights, nominal damages were available to the Spencers. A
litigant can be a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 with only a showing of
"nominal damages."28
The $1,260 repaid by the City was a portion of the damages claimed by
Spencers, damages which never would have arisen had not the City denied
24

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 706

(1999).
25

In re Estate of Knickerbocker. 912 P.2d 969, 961 (Utah 1996).
Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurrav & Thurman, 584 P.2d 894, 896 n.7
(Utah 1978).
27
Carey v. Piphus. 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978).
28
See Farrarv. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103,113 S.Ct. 556121 L.Ed.2d 494,
26
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Spencers their federally protected right to the original variances.
Besides alleging that "numerous sales were lost for all of the parcels in
question because of the inability to obtain building permits and the specific
representations of City employees that no building permit would ever be issued," the
Spencers specifically identified two sales in 1993 and 1996 that were lost because of
the City's revocation of the original building permits. Spencers also alleged the
various specific and general damages flowing from the City's illegal, arbitrary and
capricious conduct. All are sufficient to show the existence of damages that the
Spencers suffered by reason of the City's revocation of and subsequent refusal to
issue the variances that were needed to develop Spencers' property.
IV. Spencers Are Entitled to Claim Damages Under
the Utah Constitution
The trial court found that the City had not raised governmental immunity as a
defense to the Spencers' claims of violation of the Utah Constitution. (Record at

598.)
A. Spencers Satisfy the Criteria for Damages
Under Article I § 7
"Utah's constitutional guarantee of due process is substantially the same as
the due process guarantees contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution."29

(1992). This issue was raised at Record at 699, page 42, lines 14-19.)
29
In re Worthen. 926 P.2d 853, 876 (Utah 1996).
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Due process of law in each particular case means such an exercise of
the powers of the government as the settled maxims of law permit and
sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual
rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the
one in question belongs.30
In 1999, the Utah Supreme Court determined that those seeking to show a failure of
a City to follow mandatory law must also show that
they were prejudiced by the City's noncompliance with its ordinances
[or state law] or, in other words, how, if at all, the City's decision would
have been different and what relief, if any, they are entitled to as a
result.31
In denying the Spencers or their predecessors in interest building permits when they
were requested, Spencers were damaged by reason of loss of sales, the expenses
of re-petitioning and seeking redress from the City and this litigation, as well as the
emotional trauma that they were required to go through.
In 2000, the Utah Supreme Court announced a three part test to obtain
damages under the due process clause of the Utah Constitution. First, there must
be a "flagrant" violation of 'clearly established' constitutional rights. Second,
equitable remedies do not address injuries suffered. Third, equitable relief was and
is wholly inadequate to protect plaintiffs' rights or redress his or her injuries.32

30

Trade Commission v. Skaqqs Drug Center, Inc., 446 P.2d 958, 965
(Utah 1968) (footnote omitted).
31

Sprinqville Citizens for A Better Community v. City of Sprinqville. 979
P.2d 332 (Utah 1999).
32

See Spackman v. Board of Education of Box Elder School District. 2000
UT87;16P.3d533(2000).
34

Spencers have satisfied all three tests. First, previous citations to federal and
state case law and statute that prohibit the actions of the City vis-a-vis the Spencers,
demonstrate a "flagrant" violation of 'clearly established' constitutional rights.
Second, the evidence of specific and general damages suffered by Spencers show
that equitable remedies do not address injuries suffered. Third, as shown by the
"tortuous and protracted history of attempts to develop the property,"33 equitable
relief was and remains wholly inadequate to protect Spencers' rights and redress
their injuries.
B. Spencers Satisfy the Criteria for Damages Under
Article I § 22
In 1990, the Utah Supreme Court found that the provisions of Article I § 22
were self-executing.34 The protections afforded by Article I § 22 afford "perhaps even
more [protection than its federal counterpart] due to its more expansive language."35
Spencers satisfy the two step analysis required under Article I § 22.
First, the Spencers demonstrate "some protectible interest in property."36 As
noted heretofore, the Spencers have an ownership right in the West and East
Parcels and the variance that allowed the use of a right-of-way instead of a public
33

See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, supra, at 526
U.S. at 706.
34

See Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990).
Strawberry Electric Service District v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870,
877 (Utah 1996).
35

36

Qfi.cit. at 625.
35

road directly south of their property. As an easement qualifies as property subject to
constitutional protection,37 a variance to use a right-of-way should similarly be
protected.
Second,
the [Spencers] must show that the interest has been "taken or
damaged" by governmental action. A "taking" is "'any substantial
interference with private property which destroys or materially lessens
its value, or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in
any substantial degree abridged or destroyed.'"38
The City's on-going refusal to issue a building permit has constituted a "permanent
or recurring interference with property rights." This has occurred because instead of
correcting its erroneous platting of Phase III of the Cherrywood development, (as
allowed by Utah Code Ann. § § 10-9-808 - 810), the City has chosen to impose on
Spencers the burden of correcting the errors. As Dennis Spencer told the Planning
Commission, such conduct has the effect of benefiting the Cherrywood development
and its owners, the Cragun family, at the expense of the Spencers. In addition, the
City has imposed a requirement of a public road when the City's prior approvals of
development in the area have made Spencers' fulfillment of such a requirement
impossible to perform. Finally, the ever changing nature of requirements imposed
on the Spencers prevented the development of both their right-of-way and residential
37

Twenty-Second Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Oregon Short Line R.R.. 36 Utah 238, 247,103 P. 243, 246 (1909).
38

Strawberry Electric Service District v. Spanish Fork City, supra. 918 P.2d
at 876 (citations omitted.)
36

properties.

V. Spencers Properly Claim Damages for Slander of Title
A. Compliance with Governmental Immunity Act
In addition to violating Spencers' rights under the Utah Constitution, the
Spencers claim that the City slandered the title of their variances and their right-ofway and their variances. To bring this claim, Spencers need to give the City proper
notice by filing a timely claim and allege conduct that regarding which immunity is not
preserved.
1. Spencers Gave Proper Notice to the City
By statutory constraint, the Spencers are compelled to file an appeal from a
municipal land use decision within thirty days. (See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001).
When Spencers filed their complaint appealing the decision of the Board of
Adjustments requiring them to have a public road as frontage to their property, the
complaint pled that the actual notice of the claim would be filed within the one-year
deadline. It was alleged in the complaint that the City acted negligently. Notice to the
City was given within the one-year time limitation. No response was given by the City
within the ninety-day period or thereafter. The parties proceeded to brief the
Plaintiffs' slander of title claim.

No claim of non-compliance with the notice

requirement was made.
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After the briefs were submitted on the trial level, in the case of Hall v. Utah
State Department of Corrections, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the
Governmental Immunity Act as requiring that
[o]nce a plaintiff's notice of claim is filed, the Act continues to bar its
initiation in court until the state either denies the claim in writing or fails
to act for ninety days. . . .[Failing to do so,] deprive[s] [the City] of the
opportunity to assess his allegations, and to decide, as required by the
statute, whether to approve or deny the claim.39
Unlike the time frame allowed in Hall where the Plaintiff could have both filed a
notice of claim and pursued judicial redress under the six month filing requirement of
the Whistleblower's Act, the Spencers had to file their litigation within thirty days.
Were Spencers' to file Notice of their Claim, wait the ninety days for the City to
respond, and then file their complaint, the thirty day statute of limitations under Utah
Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 would have expired, and the City's decision would have
been unchallengeable. The procedure followed in this case preserved the policy
reasons advocated in Hall and at the same time met the practicalities of the limited
scope and nature of review afforded appellants from municipal land use decisions.
2. Governmental Immunity Is Statutorily Waived For Quiet Title Actions
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-6 provides that "[i]mmunity is waived for. . .any
property real or personal.. .to quiet title thereto."
3. Spencers Have Demonstrated A Prima Facie Case of Slander of Title
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that

Hall v. Utah State Department of Corrections. 2001 UT 45 fflj 22, 26; 24
38

[t]o prove slander of title, a claimant must prove that (1) there was a
publication of a slanderous statement disparaging claimant's title, (2)
the statement was false, (3) the statement was made with malice, and
(4) the statement caused actual or special damages.40

The Spencers have shown that many times the City, its officials, counsel, or
staff denigrated the validity of the Spencers' right to use the non-exclusive right-ofway south of their property, the variance granted by the City as a pre-condition to the
obtaining of a building permit, and any future right to obtain a building permit.
Together, these "collective City statements" denigrated the validity of Spencers' real
property.
The collective City statements that Spencers could not use the recorded rightof-way, obtain a building permit, and that their variance was invalid were false.
Taken in context, the collective City statements that Spencers have identified
raise the likelihood that the statements were made maliciously.
Malice may be affirmatively proven or implied. Affirmative proof
requires a showing that the wrong was done with an intent to injure, vex
or annoy. Malice may be implied when a party knowingly and wrongfully
records or publishes something untrue or spurious or which gives a
false or misleading impression adverse to one's title under
circumstances that it should reasonably foresee might result in damage
to the owner of the property.41
Finally, Spencers have shown special damages have arisen by reason of the
P.3d 958 (2001).
40
First Security Bank v. Banberrv Crossing. 780 P.2d 1253,1256-1257
(Utah 1989).
39

false, collective statements of the City regarding their real property.
Special damages are ordinarily proved in a slander of title action by
evidencing a lost sale or the loss of some other pecuniary advantage...
[or] a specific monetary loss flowing from a slander affecting the
saleability or use of the property.. . .
Spencers have claimed the conduct of the City has cost them "numerous sales" and
specifically one in 1995 for one of the three parcels in the amount of $27,000 and
one in 1996 for all three parcels in the amount of $138,000. As the litigation in both
1996 and 1998 were filed to remove the cloud the City had placed on Spencers'
ability to use their variances and right-of-way, attorney fees are recoverable as
special damages.43
CONCLUSION
The City's tender to Spencers of the right to obtain two building permits for the
West and East Parcels and partial refund of fees paid to the City does serve to moot
some claims of the Spencers, it does not prevent Spencers from being a prevailing
party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 or prevent Spencers from a being entitled to a hearing
on their claims for damages, attorney fees and costs.
Because the City's tender was incorporated into the decisions and orders of

41

id-at 1257.

42

Bass v. Planned Management Services. Inc.. 761 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah

1988).
43

Dowse v. Doris Trust. 116 Utah 106,111 -112, 208 P.2d 956, 958-59

(1949).
40

the Court, the Spencers are prevailing parties for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Because the City failed to carry its burden to show that it was clearly evident
there would not be a repeat of previous problems between the Spencers and the City

as Spencers secured the proffered building permits, the Spencers' request for
equitable relief is not moot.
Because the Spencers property rights in the right-of-way, variances and the
West and East Parcels were protected by non-discretionary constraints on the City,
their property rights were protected by the United States Constitution's due process
clause. They were also protected from arbitrary and capricious conduct regarding
their property, such as conditioning their right of future development on their
resolution of a problem caused by the City with Cherrywood, engaging in conduct
that benefited private rather than public parties, and being free from years of an ever
changing set of criteria and plans.
Because Spencers placed in the record sufficient material facts to show
nominal, special and general damages they incurred by reason of the conduct of the
City that violated their federally protected rights, those protected by the Utah State
Constitution, and properly pursued a claim against the City for slander of title, their
claim for damages should not have been dismissed.
Based on all of the foregoing, the trial court should be reversed and Spencers'
claims for damages, attorney fees and costs should be heard.
41
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DATED and EXECUTED this 9xn day of October, 2002.
DEXTER & DEXTER
r. Matthew Hilton
By:
Attorneys for Spencers
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 9 day of October, 2002, under my direction the
foregoing OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANTS was hand delivered in appropriate
quantity to the following persons:

Paulette Stagg
Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State Street, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230
(Seven copies and one original)
Jody K. Burnett
WILLIAMS & HUNT, PC
257 East 200 South, #500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
(Two Copies)
DATED and EXECUTED the 9th day of October, 2002.
DEXTER & DEXTER

By: Matthew Hilton
Attorneys for Spencers
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Matthew Hilton (#3655)
MATTHEW HILTON, PC
Attorney for Plaintiffs
1220 North Mam Street # 5A
P O Box 781
Spnngville, UT 84663
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY

bUG 0 j

2549 Washington Blvd
Ogden, UT 84401

—oooOooo—
DENNIS V SPENCER AND
LINDAS SPENCER,
COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs,
vs

Case No

CITY OF PLEASANT VIEW, a
Utah municipality, CHERRYWOOD
MANOR, INC , a Utah Corporation,
CHERRYWOOD MANOR HOME
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC , a
Utah corporation, JOHN AND JANE
DOES l-XX, individual defendants in
their private capacities,

C

\%QC\C^3Z'S

^

Judge _

Defendants

JURY TRIAL REQUESTED
—oooOooo—

COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, and complain of
the Defendants as follows
I. INTRODUCTION
1 This is a dispute that has arisen because of the Pleasant View City, its official
members of the City Council, Planning Commission Board of Adjustment, unidentified
1

official employees, (hereinafter referred to as "City"), have refused to allow a building
permit to be issued pursuant to lawfully granted variances for development of specific
property within the confines of the City and damaged Plaintiffs in other ways. Plaintiffs
allege that the City has failed to apply its ordinances in accordance with the black letter
of law of the City Code, the statutory and constitutional requirements of the State of Utah
and the United States of America, and has sought to hold Plaintiffs responsible for major
mistakes and errors the City has made in their development plans.
2. This action has been filed within thirty days of July 28, 1998 when the City
denied the appeal of the Plaintiffs to be allowed to develop their property in accordance
with requirements of law and variances allowed by the City to other property being
developed within City limits.
3. This action is filed seeking de novo review because Plaintiffs contend that as a
matter of city, state and federal law the action of the City was arbitrary, capricious and
illegal and the individually named Defendants need to be enjoined and restrained from
such further conduct. Where relevant, all of the Defendants need to be required to pay
Spencers' for the damages, costs, and attorney fees incurred by reason of their illegal and
unconstitutional conduct.
II. JURISDICTION
4. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under the statutory provisions of § 78-331 et. seg. U.C.A. and Article I, §§ 1 and 11 of the Utah Constitution that allow citizens to
petition courts for a redress of their grievances, and Article VIII § 5 of the Utah Constitution
which provides this court is a court of general jurisdiction, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2

III. VENUE
5 The property that the Plaintiffs have sought for years to develop is located in the
City, Weber County, Utah Upon information and belief, all Plaintiffs and all Defendants
reside in this judicial district All claims arose in this judicial district, where venue of this
proceeding properly lies
IV. PARTIES
6 Plaintiffs Dennis V Spencer and Linda S Spencer, (hereinafter referred to as
"Spencers") own real property located in the municipal boundaries of the City of Pleasant
View, Weber County, Utah They are also residents and taxpayers of Weber County
7 The City of Pleasant View (hereinafter referred to as the "City") is a municipality
recognized under Utah law and is located in Weber County
8

Cherrywood Manor, Inc, a Utah corporation, and Cherrywood Manor

Homeowner's Association, Inc, a Utah corporation, are owners of properties directly south
of Spencers' properties and have interfered with Spencers' duly recorded right of way
These entities and their members have slandered the title of Spencers' to their right of
way
9 John and Jane Does I - XX are those individuals that will be named for civil rights
violations and injunctive relief if it is found that private persons and officials or employees
of the City have been acting in violation of federal or state constitutional law, or with fraud
and malice as to the Spencers or their property during the time periods in question

3

V. FACTUAL BACKGROUND REGARDING LACK OF DEVELOPMENT
OF SPENCERS' PROPERTIES IN THE CITY
10

The property of the Spencers in the City that the City has refused to allow a

building permit to be issued are identified on plat map attached hereto as Exhibit A and
incorporated herein by this reference "West Parcel" is tax identification number 16-0230040 and 16-023-0042, and "East Parcel" is tax identification number 16-023-0004, all
located in the City
A. History of the West Parcel1
11 On the 5th day of May 1971, Spencers obtained ownership of the West Parcel
12 On May 10, 1983, from the property owner to their south the Spencers received
a conveyance a non-exclusive right-of-way for ingress and egress and utility installation
to the south of the West Parcel This document was recorded with the Weber County
Recorder on or about May 17, 1983 at Book 1424, Page 2443, a copy of which is attached
hereto as Exhibit B and incorporated herein by this reference
13 In 1983, the Spencers sold the eastern one-half of the West Parcel to John R
and Lola P Parker contingent upon the purchasers being able to obtain a building permit
On or before July 11, 1983, John Parker and Dennis V Spencer approached the City of
Pleasant View and the Board of Adjustment to obtain a vanance and right to build on

1

The West Parcel is made up of identifiable tax parcels The parcel on the west
of the west parcel was purchased by Spencers in 1971, conveyed to Winwards in 1981,
conveyed to Perkins in 1989, and back to Spencers in 1996 These conveyances are
not material to the issues raised in this litigation as no Board of Adjustment approval
was given for this portion of the West parcel independent of the eastern parcel of the
West Parcel
4

eastern one-half of the West Parcel. At that time, a variance was granted to Mr. Parker
and Mr. Spencer with four (4) provisions:
A.

Mr. Parker have a twenty-thousand (20,000) square foot lot left without

consideration of the right-of-way.
B. That the buildings be set back at least thirty (30) feet from the edge of the rightof-way.
C. That engineer's designs be provided to the City showing cuts for utilities, grades
for roads, and the design of the right-of-way for future development in the area. (The
necessary designs were prepared for this criteria thereafter.)
D. That Pleasant View City was going to secure a legal opinion from their City
Attorney as to whether the City could control future requests for variances on undedicated
roads. This perspective did not place a burden on the Parkers or Spencers; nor did it
negate the past and future approvals by the Board of Adjustments allowing future
development for building on private roadways or right-of-ways in the City.
E. Should any future development be made, the Parkers and Spencers would
participate in hard surfacing the road, installing curb, gutter and sidewalk, and that Mr.
Spencer was to provide an escrow in the amount determined by the City engineer for
improvement to his property.
A copy of the minutes from the July 11,1983 meeting is attached hereto as Exhibit C and
is incorporated herein by this reference.
14. The sale of the West Parcel to the Parkers from the Spencers closed when the
Board of Adjustments approval was given.
5

15. Between July 28, 1983 and February 21, 1984, the City studied and thereafter
determined in accordance with the requirements of law that the division of Spencer's lands
in the City that led to the creation of the West and East Parcel was not a subdivision and
did not have to comply with the laws governing the creation the of a subdivision. The
records of the City regarding this decision are attached hereto as Exhibit D and are
incorporated herein by this reference.
16. From July 28, 1983 through February 21, 1984, the City refused to issue the
a building permit for East Parcel on the erroneous grounds that a subdivision ordinance
applied. On or about February 21, 1984, the Planning Commission voted to allow the
building permit to be issued on West Parcel as previously approved by the Board of
Adjustments.
17.

Some time after May 24, 1990, the City approved the development of a

development commonly known as the Cherrywood Condominiums ("development") to the
south of this property. Phase 3, which adjoins the Spencers property, was recorded on
September 18, 1992. Among other things, the City erroneously:
A. Allowed the development to overlay the right-of-way held by Spencers (and
others) that bordered the south of West Parcel;
B. Allowed the placement of a private road for the development to infringe on the
property located in West Parcel;
C. Did not require curb and gutter to be placed by the development when placing
the private road on the south of West Parcel;
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D. Did not require the development density plan to follow the twenty-thousand
(20,000) square feet per residence requirement.
18.

On January 7, 1993, the Parkers were represented before the Planning

Commission and requested a building permit prior to placing the land on the market.
19. On February 9, 1993, the City responded indicating that no building permit
would be issued. A copy of the denial of this request is attached hereto as Exhibit E and
incorporated herein by this reference.
20. On October 23, 1993, a special meeting was held with the City and the
Spencers. After initially advising Spencers the issue over development was the issue
regarding subdividing (resolved nine years earlier), the City indicated that no building
permit would be issued because the access to the property was by a private right-of-way.
21. On February 16, 1995, Parkers request for a building permit was denied by the
Planning Commission of the City on the alleged grounds of the subdivision issue.
22. On May 11,1995, the Spencers made an application for an appeal to the Board
of Adjustments asking for recognition of the variance previously granted in 1983. On May
19, 1995, the Spencers were advised in a letter from the City that the earlier granting of
the variance of the Board of Adjustment would not be recognized due to an alleged failure
of the City to provide adequate standards to the Board of Adjustment to take such action.
A copy of the letter received by the Spencers is attached hereto as Exhibit F and
incorporated herein by this reference. No action was taken by the City to repeal or require
conformance of others that had been granted variances under the same ordinance in the
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past.2 It is significant that the City sought to make Spencers responsible both legally and
financially to correct the City's previous errors in approving the Cherrywood Manor plat
that failed to conform with City ordinances. A copy of the correspondence sent to Spencers
by counsel for the City is attached hereto as Exhibit G and is incorporated herein by this
reference.
23. In 1996, Parkers conveyed the eastern one-half of the west parcel that they
owned to Spencers.
B. History of the East Parcel
24. On the 5th day of May 1971, Spencers obtained ownership of East Parcel.
25. On May 10, 1983, from the property owner to their south the Spencers received
a conveyance a non-exclusive right-of-way for ingress and egress and utility installation
to the south of East Parcel. This document was recorded with the Weber County Recorder
on or about May 17, 1983 at Book 1424, Page 2443, a copy of which is attached hereto
as Exhibit B and incorporated herein by this reference.

2

Before July of 1983 when Mr. and Mrs. Parker were granted a variance to build
a home on a right of way, four other interested parties were granted building permits on
private roads or right-of-ways. On June 26, 1978, Timothy Blackbyrn was allowed a
variance for a building permit on a home built upon a right-of-way. On July 28, 1980,
Mr. and Mrs. Rod Cragun were granted approval for a building permit on a private,
undedicated road. On August 17, 1981, Mike Humphries was granted a variance for a
building permit on a right-of-way. On February 17, 1983, Mr. Tony Cross was granted
a building permit. After variance was granted to the Parkers, on February 1, 1988, Neal
Ballif and Floyd Barrett were granted approval and variances for building permits on a
private road. On September 29, 1989, Mr. Leonard Grassli was given authority to have
a building permit of property existing on an undedicated roadway. On February 3,
1992, Mr. Richard Diamond was given building permits even though the only access to
his property was by private road.
8

26. Between July 28, 1983 and February 21, 1984, the City studied and thereafter
determined in accordance with the requirements of law that the division of Spencer's lands
in the City that led to the creation of this Parcel was not a subdivision and did not have to
comply with the laws governing the creation of a subdivision. The records of the City
regarding this decision are attached hereto as Exhibit A and are incorporated herein by
this reference.
27. On March 31,1986, the Spencers were granted a variance for a building permit
under the following conditions:
A.

Spencers have a twenty-thousand (20,000) square foot lot left without

consideration of the right-of-way.
B. That the buildings be set back at least thirty (30) feet from the edge of the rightof-way.
C. That engineer's designs be provided to the City showing cuts for utilities, grades
for roads, and the design of the right-of-way for future development in the area. (The
necessary designs were prepared for this criteria thereafter.)
D. Should any future development be made, Spencers would participate in hard
surfacing the road, installing curb, gutter and sidewalk, and that Mr. Spencer was to
provide an escrow in the amount determined by the City engineer for improvement to his
property.
28.

Some time after May 24, 1990, the City approved the development of a

development commonly known as the Cherrywood Condominiums ("development") to the
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south of this property. Phase 3, which adjoins the Spencers property, was recorded on
September 18, 1992. Among other things, the City erroneously:
A. Allowed the development to overlay the right-of-way held by Spencers (and
others) that bordered the south of East Parcel;
B. Allowed the placement of a private road for the development to infringe on the
property located in East Parcel;
C. Did not require curb and gutter to be placed by the development when placing
the private road on the south of East Parcel;
D. Did not require the development density plan to follow the twenty-thousand
(20,000) square feet per residence requirement.
29. On October 23, 1993, a special meeting was held with the City and the
Spencers. After initially advising Spencers the issue over development was the issue
regarding subdividing (resolved nine years earlier), the City indicated that no building
permit would be issued because the access to the property was by a private right-of-way.
30. On May 11, 1995 Spencers requested that the variance previously issued be
granted. On May 19, 1995, Spencers were notified by counsel for the City that their
request would be denied because the Board of Adjustments had no standards to hear the
request of the Spencers. A copy of this letter is attached hereto as Exhibit E.
VII. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF RELATED CITY CONDUCT
AGAINST SPENCERS
31. On November 8, 1995, the City officials including the Chief of Police and other
officers facilitated a citizen's complaint for trespass against Dennis Spencer when he was
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using the recorded right-of-way. After being ordered by the City to appear at City Offices
and accept the citation under threat of arrest and placement in jail, on November 22, 1995
Dennis Spencer appeared at the Justice of the Peace court at the assigned time when the
charges were dismissed.
32.

Thereafter, after negotiations during 1996 between the counsel for the

Spencers and the City failed to bring any matters to resolution, Dennis Spencer appeared
before the Planning Commission on January 16, 1997, requesting action on his request
for approval filed the previous November. (A copy of the minutes of the -Planning
Commission Meeting of January 16, 1997 is attached hereto as Exhibit F and is
incorporated herein by this reference.) After the Terri Cragun refused to provide a binding
list of what had to be done to complete development on the property, Dennis Spencer
stated that Ms. Cragan should be removed from consideration of his development because
of personal animosity towards him over the previous five years and family ties to the
development in the Cherrywood development. The Planning Commission refused to do
so on the grounds that declaration of ethical conflicts could only be initiated by the
government official involved. Commission member Frank Maughan censured Dennis
Spencer for criticizing Terri Cragun and indicated that the only proper place for such action
was in a court of law. (Ever amicable, the Spencers have followed through on Mr.
Maughan's directive.)
33. In the same meeting, the Planning Commission refused to grant approval to
develop Spencers' property on the grounds that it failed to comply with the subdivision
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ordinances, and a number of requirements outlined in various letters, all of which are
attached hereto as Exhibit G and incorporated herein by this reference.
34. Thereafter, after continued efforts to resolve matters through the retention of
private counsel were fruitless, Spencers went to Craig M. Call, the private property
Ombudsman for the State or Utah, for assistance. After extended correspondence, the
Planning Commission forwarded on the request of Spencers for approval to the Board of
Adjustments so that the right-of-way could be approved.
35. On July 28, 1998 the Board of Adjustments notified Spencers their request to
develop their property and use the right-of-way of record was denied. A copy of this notice
is attached hereto as Exhibit I and is incorporated herein by this reference. A copy of the
minutes of the meeting is attached hereto as Exhibit J.
36. The basis for the denial by the Board of Adjustments was that (1) the Board did
not feel that the evidence submitted by Dennis Spencer to the Zoning Commission had not
demonstrated to the Zoning Commission that the development of his property was in the
best interest of the "public welfare" and (2) there were no physical restrictions that
prevented Spencers from including a "dedicated public street" on his land, thereby not
causing unnecessary hardship on other unidentified property. No complete recording was
kept of the meeting.
37. A timely appeal to the Second Judicial District Court followed this decision.
38. Plaintiffs will file a claim under the Governmental Immunity Act after this
complaint is filed.
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COUNT I
APPEAL DE NOVO FROM THE CITY'S ACTION
39. Paragraphs 1-38 are incorporated herein by this reference.
40. The actions of the City in denying Spencers the right to use or develop their
property has been arbitrary, capricious, and illegal, damaging the Spencers in an amount
to be shown at trial and indicating the need to restrain the City from further prohibited
action.
COUNT II
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW
41. Paragraphs 1-40 are incorporated by this reference.
42. All of the foregoing demonstrates that the City has denied the Spencers due
process of law as required by Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, damaging the Spencers in an amount to be
shown at trial and indicating the need to restrain the City from further prohibited action.
COUNT III
DENIAL OF UNIFORM OPERATION AND
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
43. Paragraphs 1-42 are incorporated by this reference.
44. All of the foregoing demonstrates that the City has denied the Spencers the
benefit of uniform operation or equal protection of the laws as required by Article I § 24 of
the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
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damaging the Spencers in an amount to be shown at trial and indicating the need to
restrain the City from further prohibited action.
COUNT IV
DENIAL OF RIGHT TO PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
AND EXERCISE OF FREE SPEECH
45. Paragraphs 1-44 are incorporated by this reference.
46. All of the foregoing demonstrates that the City has either denied or interfered
with the Spencers the right to petition government for redress of grievances, all as
protected by Article I, §§ 1 and 15 of the Utah Constitution and the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, damaging the Spencers in an amount to
be shown at trial and indicating the need to restrain the City from further prohibited action.
COUNT V
CONDUCT IN VIOLATION OF STATE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
47. Paragraphs 1-46 are incorporated by this reference.
48. All of the foregoing demonstrates that the City has violated state law, all in
violation of Article XI § 5 of the Utah State Constitution, damaging the Spencers in an
amount to be shown at trial and indicating the need to restrain the City from further
prohibited action.
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COUNT VI
FALSE ARREST AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
49. Paragraphs 1-48 are incorporated by this reference.
50. All of the foregoing demonstrates that the City violated Article I § 14 of the Utah
Constitution and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution,
damaging the Spencers in an amount to be shown at trial and indicating the need to
restrain the City from further prohibited action.
COUNT VII
TAKING AND DAMAGING OF PROPERTY
51. Paragraphs 1-50 are incorporated herein by this reference.
52. All of the foregoing demonstrates that the City violated Article I § 22 of the Utah
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution,
taking and damaging the Spencers' property in an amount to be shown at trial and
indicating the need to restrain the City from further prohibited action.
COUNT IX
UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND
UNETHICAL CONDUCT
53. Paragraphs 1-52 are incorporated herein by this reference.
54. The provisions of City Code § 17.20.021 provides that attorney fees and other
professional costs are to be paid by the subdivider seeking approval of a subdivision.
Notwithstanding the City's decision on February 21, 1984 that building on Spencers'
property was not subdivision, the City has charged, and required Spencer to pay
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significant amounts of attorney fees, engineering fees and other professional costs, all in
an amount to be shown at trial.
55. All of the foregoing demonstrates that the Plaintiffs may raise what they believe
are ethical violations of City employees in relevant meetings and that requiring Spencers
to pay the attorney fees of City attorneys involved in approving an allegedly labeled
subdivision application violates the due process, conflict of interest rule approved by the
Utah State Bar, damaging the Spencers in an amount to be shown at trial and indicating
the need to restrain the City and their professional agents from further prohibited action.
COUNT X
SLANDER OF TITLE
56. Paragraphs 1-55 are incorporated herein by this reference.
57. Because of the written and public statements slandering the title of Spencers
to their right-of-way and the West and East Parcel made by Defendants Cherrywood
Manor, Inc. and Cherrywood Manor Homeowner's Association, Inc., and its members, and
the City, and its officials, employees, and agents, the Spencer's ability to receive approval
from the City was delayed, the title to their right-of-way has been slandered, and ability
to market their property seriously injured, all damaging the Spencers in an amount to be
shown at trial and indicating the need to restrain Defendants from further illegal action.
COUNT XI
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING
MUNICIPAL OFFICERS' AND EMPLOYEES'
ETHICS ACT
58. Paragraphs 1-57 are incorporated herein by this reference.
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59. Because Dennis Spencer was censured because of a City claim that the only
way a refusal to continue because of ethical concerns could be made would be a claim
disclosed by the City employee, Spencers desire a declaratory ruling that such objections
to the ethics of any employee may be raised in writing by any person under U.C.A. § 10-31311 or raised in any public meeting pursuant to rights guaranteed by Article I, §§ 1 and
15 of the Utah Constitution.
WHEREFORE, FOR ALL OF THE FOREGOING,
1. Plaintiffs pray that they will be awarded against Defendants damages in an
amount to be shown at trial for the taking and damaging of their property by Defendants,
for unlawful and unnecessary expenses they have had to incur because of the conduct of
Defendants, and for the emotional and mental harm suffered by the Plaintiffs;
2. Plaintiffs pray that the Defendants will be enjoined from continuing their unlawful
and unethical conduct;
3. Plaintiffs pray for an award of award of attorney fees, costs, and damages under
whatever theory, statute or relevant law would allow for the same; and
4. Plaintiffs pray for any other equitable relief allowed by this court.
DATED this 6th day of August, 1998.
MATTHEW HILTON, P.C.

J
Matthew Hilton
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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JIT CLAIM DEED
BOOK 1 4 2 4 PAGE2443

PAUL B. CRAG UN INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Utah l i m i t e d
grantor of
QUIT CLAIM

Pleasant
to

.County of

Weber

partnership,
, State of Utah, hereby

DENNIS V. SPENCER and LINDA S.SPENCER, husband and w i f e ,
as j o i n t

tenants,

giantce
of P l e a s a n t View, County of Weber, S t a t e of Utah,
for the sura of ONE DOLLAR AND OTHER VALUABLE CONSIDERATION ( $ 1 , 0 0 )
the following described tract
of land in
Weber
County, State of Utah:
A n o n - r e x c l u s i y . e - r i g h t j ? f _ w a y for purposes of i n g r e s s , e g r e s s and u t i l i t y i n s t a l l a t i o n
and maintenance over and across* the f o l l o w i n g *descHY^~T,WcV'of Iffffil1,1 lo^wl'tt*
k p a r t of t h e Southwest Q u a r t e r of S e c t i o n 19, Township 7 N o r t h , Range 1 West,
S a l t Lake Base and M e r i d i a n , U. S, Survey: BEGINNING a t a p o i n t North 30° 20 f E a s t
179.45 f e e t and 120 f e e t , more or l e s s , North 59° 40 f West from the i n t e r s e c t i o n of
the Ve^t l i n e of 950 West S t r e e t with t h e North l i n e of 3650 North S t r e e t , s a i d p o i n t
being a t a c o r n e r of the p r o p e r t y conveyed t o Town of P l e a s a n t View for r o a d ; r u n n i n g
'-litnce North 33°02 v East 60 f e e t along said p r o p e r t y , t o t h e North l i n e - o f r i g h t of
%ay conveyed by deed recorded i n Book 1121 of R e c o r d s , Page 288; thence North 59° 40 1
vest a l o n g s a i d r i g h t of way 66 f e e t ; t h e n c e South 83° 0 2 ' West 45.00 f e e t a l o n g s a i d
n g h t of way; thence South 77° 19° 06" West 7 4 . 4 1 f e e t a l o n g s a i d r i g h t of way; t h e n c e
South 88° 35* West 50.00 f e e t along sair* - i g h t of way; t h e n c e North 78° 25' West
.39 f e e t , along s a i d r i g h t of way to t h e E a s t l i n e of p r o p e r t y conveyed t o Orson A.
^inward and w i f e , by deed r e c o r d e d in Book 1263 of R e c o r d s , Page 849; thence South
!4° 32* 20" West 60 f e e t , more o r l e s s , t o t h e South l i n e of s a i d r i g h t of way; t h e n c e
Jouth 78° 25 1 E a s t along s a i d r i g h t of way 175 f e e t , more or l e s s ; thence North 77°
9° 06" E a s t 85 f e e t , more or l e s s , al*«g-ea4^-yigfe4-«e£-vfty T t o West l i n e of p r o p e r t y
»f John E. Malraberg; thence N o r t h 30° 20T E a s t a l o n g said p r o p e r t y t o the N o r t h w e s t
orner t h e r e o f ; t h e n c e South 59° 40* East 80 f e e t , more o r l e s s , t o t h e p l a c e of
•eginning.
'his r i g h t of way s h a l l t e r m i n a t e , for purposes of i n g r e s s and e g r e s s , when t h e r e i s
d e d i c a t e d road a b u t t i n g p r o p e r t y of the g r a n t e e along t h e North l i n e of s"aid r i g h t
f way.
/1TNESS. the hand
of said grantor , this
10th
day of
May
A. D. 19 83
Tl A TTT
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11 JULY 1983

Members Present:

George Wilkey
Paul Butterfield
Gladys Evans

Visitors
John Parker
John Malmberg
Dennis Spencer
Elmer Bailey

ITEMS DISCUSSED:
1. George Wilkey opened the discussion on the property owned by Dennis
Spencer and the parcel that John Parker has requested permission to be
granted a varience to build a home on a private road. George Wilkey
brought them up to date on the filing of the petition and the reasons it
has been delayed.
2. A question was raised as to whether if we grant a varience to Mr.
Parker are we setting a presidence that may cause some problems by
having to deny others the same priviledge and still maintain control the
on undedicated roads.
3. Paul Butterfield made the motion that they grant Mr. Parker a varience
with the following stipulations:
1.

That Mr. Parker has a 20,000 ft lot after the right-of-way has
been granted.

2.

That the building must be set back at least 30 ft from the edge of
the right-of-way.

3. That Mr, Parker & Mr. Spencer will provide an Engineers design
showing cuts for utilities, grades for the road, and the design
of the right-of-way for future development in the area.
4.

That we secure a Legal Opinion from the City Attorney as to whether
the City can control any future requests for variences on undedicated
reads if they grant Mr. Parker a varience at this time.

5. That should any future development be made that Mr. Parker participate
in hard surfacing the road, curb & gutter and sidewalks, etc „
Gladys Evans 2nd the motion, motion carried.
4.
Paul Butterfield stated that it is our job to help Mr. Parker if
possible but if any of the above stipulations are not met with an affirmative
answer then the Board of Adjustments should reassemble and see what the next
step is before a varience is granted.
5. Mr. Bailey and Mr. Malmberg both stated they did not want to deny anyone
the priviledge of building in Pleasant View but that we should see to It that
it is done correctly and properly according to the Zoning Ordinances so that
down the road a few years we do not create any problems.
Adjournment at 7:25 P. M.

RICHARD R. MEDSKER
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ATTORNEY AT LAW
2910 Washington BUd . buite 100
Ogden. Uah 84401
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Telephone W-0822

February 6, 1984

PLEASANT VIEW CITY
PLANNING COMMISSION
ATTN: LEROY HARRIS
PLEASANT VIEW, UTAH
RE:

SPENCER SUBDIVISION QUESTION

Dear Leroy:
This will verify that through an oral conversation with
Michael McCoy, the Attorney for the League of Cities and Towns.
I was informed that, in his opinion, the sale of property by
Denny Spencer to John Parker, which we have been discussing,
would not constitute a subdivision and, therefore, would not
have to comply with the cities subdivision ordinance.
The proponents of the subdivision question relied on the
definition of agricultural land but Mr. McCoy pointed out that
that definition is attached to the zoning ordinance and not the
subdivision ordinance. He said that his position has always
been that if the purchasers of the land do not build and indicate
that it is not their intention to, that it is an agricultural
purpose.
Obviously, it would be preferrable to have this written
opinion from Mr. McCoy, but since it has taken so long to get
even an oral one, I'm certain that we can rely upon on this.
If you have any questions, feel free to give me a call.
I have informed Mr. Spencer's Attorney, Bob Echard, of the
decision and he indicates that they will be attempting to get
this back on the calendar for our next meeting which %I told him
would be the 21st day of February.
Yours very truly,

RICHARD R. MEDSKER
Attorney at Law
RRM:ml

raxnuiaa ur
HELD 20 MAI

MEMBERS PRESENT:
<P> o i

r LLA&AJN l V1CW fLAJNNllNU LUNMli
1 9 8 4 . MEETING COMMENCED AT 7:

Leroy H a r r i s , Chairmaa
Leon Jones
Kenton Barker
/— Joyce Humphries

I'N MEETING
P . ML.

'/£

Pete R u s s e l l
Paula Graven
/ * * ^
Gene Mortensen
Hayward Wride ( C i t y C o u n c i l )

INVOCATION:

Kenton Barker

MINUTES:

The minutes were approved with the f o l l o w i n g
(item #3 be changed from RE-20 to A-l)

ITEMS DISCUSSED:

1,
20
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

#1 D e n n i s Spencer
Property

D i s c u s s i o n was p r e s e n t e d on Actorney McCoy's o p i n i o n and
the f i n a l d e c i s i o n was t h a t the Planning Commission would
abide by McGoy's d e c i s i o n . His d e c i s i o n was t h a t i t does
not c o n s t i t u t e a s u b - d i v i s i o n . Pete R u s s e l l made t h e
motion t h a t t h e y l e t him go ahead and s t a r t b u i l d i n g and
i t i s not n e c e s s a r y t o go back to the Board of A d j u s t m e n t s .
Leon J o n e s 2nd t h e m o t i o n . Voting was unanimous i n t h e
affirmative.

#2 M r . J o n e s
3 1 d g . Permit

Mr. J o n e s a p p e a r e d r e q u e s t i n g permission t o a p p l y f o r a
Bldg. P e r m i t n e x t door to Orson Winwards p r o p e r t y .
It
was d i s c u s s e d t h a t t h e r e was some homes i n t h e a r e a t h a t
have s i d e w a l k s , i t was s t a t e d t h a t Mr. J o n e s i n t e n d e d t o
i n s t a l l s i d e w a l k s . I t was a l s o d i s c u s s e d as t o who would
be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e a s p h a l t between t h e road as i t now
e x i s t s and the c u r b . Kenton Barker made t h e motion t h a t
Mr. Jones r e q u e s t t o apply for a Bldg. P e r m i t be g r a n t e d ,
Pece R u s s e l l 2nd t h e motion, voting was unanimous i n t h e
affirmative.

#3 M r . Toone
B l d g . Permit

Mr. Hansen a p p e a r e d r e p r e s e n t i n g Mr. Toone r e q u e s t i n g
p e r m i s s i o n t o o b t a i n a Bldg. Permit for a new home
d i r e c t l y e a s t of M r . J o n e s . I t was noted t h a t Mr. Toone
a l s o i n t e n d e d t o i n s t a l l s i d e w a l k s . Leon J o n e s made t h e
motion t h a t Mra Toone be given approval t o o b t a i n a B l d g .
Permit, P e t e R u s s e l l 2nd the motion, v o t i n g was unanimous
in the a f f i r m a t i v e 3

#4 Mayhew
P . V. Drive

Mr. Mayhew a p p e a r e d r e q u e s t i n g p e r m i s s i o n to r a z e t h e old
home a t 948 West P l e a s a n t View Dr. and b u i l d a new home.
I t was d i s c u s s e d t h a t Mr. Mayhew's l o t was l a c k i n g t h e
130 f t . f r o n t a g e b u t t h e r e has been a home t h e r e many y e a r s
and e x i s t e d b e f o r e t h e zoning was put i n t o e f f e c t and would
be an improvement t o t h e ar^-i, ^irh t h i s t h o u g h t i n mind
P e t e R u s s e l l made t h e motion t h a t they approve Mr. Mayhew's
r e q u e s t t o ' o b t a i n a B l d g . Permit, Kenton Barker 2nd t h e
motion, v o t i n g was unanimous in the a f f i r m a t i v e .

correction

Dennis Spencer P r o p e r t y
Jones 31dg 0 P e r m i t
Toone B l d g . P e r m i t
Mayhew 31dg 0 P e r m i t
Rezoning p r o p e r t y from A-5 to A - l .
White Barn P r e s e n t a t i o n
Ted B u r r e l l - Gas Pumps.

February 8, 1993

Mrs, Lola Parker
£819 No. 10£5 E.
North Ogden, Utah 84414
Re: property
Dear

I.D.#' s Q040 and 0043

Lola:

This letter is in regards to the
attached copy of the
Adjustments meeting dated July 11, 1983.
Our city attorney, Richard Medsker, has
due to the following reasons:

provided

(1)

The surrounding

(£)

10 years is not a reasonable time.

(3)

None of the stipulations were followed.

Board of

an opinion that

property has changed.

Therefore, the city of Pleasant
View will not
permit for a dwelling on your property.
If you have any questions

please feel free

issue

a building

to call me.
Sincerely,

d). :dWr /w^-D. Brent
Mayor
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LAW OFFICES

HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

AMERICA FIRST BUILDING
4768 HARRISON BOULEVARD
OGDEN, UTAH 84403-4305
JACK C. HELGESEN
R. SCOTT WATERFALL
RICHARD W. JONES
MICHAEL V.HOUTZ
KEITH M. BACKMAN
LUCILE KELLY LOWREY

FAX
(801) 479-4804
TELEPHONE
(801) 479-4777

May 19, 1995

Dennis Spencer
P.O. Box 2220
Ogden, Utah 84412-2220
RE: Application for Appeal to Pleasant View City
Dear Mr. Spencer:
As you are aware this office represents Pleasant View City. Pleasant View City has
delivered to me a copy of Your Application for an Appeal to the Pleasant View City
Board of Adjustment. With that application you also submitted a check for $50.00.
Enclosed is the check for $50.00 which is being returned to you for the reasons set forth
below.
In your application you indicated you were requesting a special exception to the
ordinance, i.e. a renewal of the variance granted March 31, 1986. The Board of
Adjustments cannot legally address this issue for the following reasons. Utah Code
Annotated §10-9-706 grants to a board of adjustment the authority to hear and decide
special exceptions, but states that it is only authorized to do so if permitted in the local
zoning ordinance and only according to the standards contained in the local zoning
ordinance. While the Pleasant View City zoning ordinance does permit special
exceptions, the City has not adopted any standards upon which a special exception may
be granted. Therefore the board of adjustment is without authority to grant special
exceptions. In addition the action taken over eight years ago by the board75T
adjustment has no bearing on what the current board of adjustment may do or should
do.
If you would like to apply for a hearing before the board of adjustment based on some
other provision of the law which would permit the board of adjustment to hear and
decide your case, then you should reapply to the board for such a hearing.
You should also be aware that it is not the role of the board of adjustment to intervene
and decide a dispute between two private property owners. From what I ndw about this
situation from our prior discussions'it appears there is a private property owner with
whom you need to resolve a dispute regarding the scope of your right of way. That
i c c i i o Hruac nr\+ a m n o o r *r\ h o o m o + f o r \A/hir^h t h o P i t \ / c h m iIH o H o m r \ + +/^
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Dennis Spencer
May 19, 1995
Page 2
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The City hopes that you will find a method wherein you can resolve this issue and
obtain the results that you desire.
Very truly yours,
Richard vY^ones
RWJ/lgc
cc: Pleasant View City
enclosure

LAW OFFICES

HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

AMERICA FIRST BUILDING
4768 HARRISON BOULEVARD
OGDEN, UTAH 84403-4305
JACK C. HELGESEN
R. SCOTT WATERFALL
RICHARD W. JONES
MICHAEL V. HOUTZ
KEITH M. BACKMAN
KELLY LOWREY

FAX
(801) 479-4804
TELEPHONE
(801) 479-4777

November 5, 1993

Dennis and Linda Spencer

993 W. 3800 N.
Pleasant View City, Utah 84414
RE: Spencer Subdivision
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Spencer:
You sent a letter to Pleasant View City dated October 27, 1993. Pleasant View City has
asked me to respond to that letter.
It appears the purpose of your letter is to further your efforts to create a subdivision. As
I indicated to you during our recent telephone conversation, Pleasant View would like to
see your property developed. In order to develop your property you will need to comply
with all the City subdivision ordinances and follow the procedure outlined in the City
ordinances. The City is awaiting your proposals to resolve some of the difficulties that
have been addressed in the prior meetings. When those proposals are received the City
will consider them in light of the ordinances and requirements stated in the City
Ordinances. Until that time the City will take no action.
One of the apparent impediments to approval of your subdivision is the lack of access. ?
While it is clear you have a right-of-way to enter onto your property across Cherrywood
property, there is nothing in the documents submitted to the City stating you can dedicate
a public road across Cherrywood's privately owned property. This is a situation you will
need to resolve with Cherrywood.
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November 6, 1993

Mr Richard W Jones
Attorney for Pleasant View City
4768 Harrison Blvd
Ogden, Ut 84403
Dear Mr Jones:
Again we find it necessary to respond to your letter, dated November 5,
19S3, regarding Spencer Subdivision.
You state, and we quote: There is nothing in the documents submitted
to the city stating you can dedicate a public road across Cherrywood!s
privately owned property, unquote.
You know full well that a public road is impossible, as Pleasant View
City granted Cherrywood a private road on the right-of-way provided
and planned for a public road, by the late Paul B Cragun. For this
reason, we have requested a variance and the same consideration granted
to Cherrywood and many others, in Pleasant View, which is: to create a
one lot subdivision accessed via our right-of-way. This would create
a semi-private road at the extreme northeast corner of Cherrywood!s
access road. We have no intention of entering Cherrywood's residential
area.

Another alternative would be for Pleasant View City to complete
annexation of 3700 North to the west end of thn corner lot. This
should have been done when said lot was developed. This road was
allowed to end half way through the property. This annexation would
bring the public road to our property.

If Pleasant View City is truely interested in seeing* our property
developed, as you claim, a solution will be reached without delay.
Time is of the essence, please respond immediately.
Very sincerely,

isi.
Dennis V aim Linda S Spencer
993 West 3800 North
Pleasant View, Ut 844 14
cc: Pleasant View City Officials

(y^^L &k>?7kz/
LAW OFFICES

HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

JACK C. HELGESEN
R. SCOTT WATERFALL
RICHARD W . JONES ,
MICHAEL V. HOUTZ ^
<E!TH M. BACKMAN
.UCILE KELLY LOWREY
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AMERICA FIRST BUILDING
4768 HARRISON BOULEVARD
OGDEN, UTAH 84403-4305

I ^

(801)479-4804
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TELEPHONE
479-4777
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May 19, 1995

Dennis Spencer
P.O. Box 2220
Ogden, Utah 84412-2220
RE: Application for Appeal to Pleasant View City
Dear Mr. Spencer:
As you are aware this office represents Pleasant View City. Pleasant View City has
delivered to me a copy of Your Application for an Appeal to the Pleasant View City
Board of Adjustment. With that application you also submitted a check for $50.00.
Enclosed is the check for $50.00 which is being returned to you for the reasons set forth
below.
In your application you indicated you were requesting a special exception to the
ordinance, i.e. a renewal of the variance granted March 31, 1986. The Board of
Adjustments cannot legally address this issue for the following reasons. Utah Code
Annotated §10-9-706 grants to a board of adjustment the authority to hear and decide
special exceptions, but states that it is only authorized to do so if permitted in the local
zoning ordinance and only according to the standards contained in the local zoning
ordinance. While the^fleasant View City zoning or^ancdNJoes permit special
exceptions, the City Kas~riot adopted any standards uporTwnjch a special exceptk)njriay
bejjranted. I herefore the board of adjustment is without au^jorit^jg^grant special]
§xcegti£ns_. in addition the action taken over eight years ago by the board of
adjustment has no bearing on what the current board of adjustment may do or should
^do.
If you would like to apply for a hearing before the board of adjustment based on some
other provision of the law which would permit the board of adjustment to hear and
decide your case, then you should reapply to the board for such a hearing.
You should also be aware that it is not the role of the board of adjustment to intervene
and decide a dispute between two private property owners. From what I now about this
situation from our prior discussions, it appears there is a private property owner with
whom you need to resolve a dispute regarding the scope of your right of way. That

Dennis Spencer
May 19, 1995
Page 2

The City hopes that you will find a method wherein you can resolve this issue and
obtain the results that you desire.
Very truly yours

Richard VQLJbnes
RWJ/lgc
cc: Pleasant View City
enclosure
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RAYMOND B. ROUNDS
ATTORNEY AT LAW

2650 WASHINGTON BLVD., SUITE 102
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
(801) 621-4015
October 8, 1996

Richard W. Jones
Helgesen, Waterfall & Jones, P.C.
America First Building
4768 Harrison Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84403-4305
Re:

Dennis Spencer v. City of Pleasant View

Dear Richard:
After our meeting on September 24, 1 996, I received copies of
the Pleasant View City ordinances dealing with subdivisions, storm
sewer and zoning applicable to the issues at hand. I have reviewed
such documents and have again consulted with my client regarding a
building permit that he would desire on land owned by him*
The first contention of the City appeared to me to revolve
around the ability of Dennis Spencer to have adequate access to
utilities to service a proposed building on his lots, I will break
down the issues into categories and then address the resolution of
those questions.
1. First; I direct your attention to a quitclaim deed duly
recorded with Weber County at Book 1424, Page 2443, wherein Paul B*
Cragun Investment Company, a Utah Limited Partnership, as signed by
Paul B. Cragun, General Partner, deeded to Dennis V. Spencer and
Linda S. Spencer the right-of-way which is in question. I direct
your attention to the beginning of the metes and bounds description
of the right-of-way itself wherein the right-of-way includes "a
non-exclusive right-of-way for purposes of ingress, egress and
UTILITY INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE over and across the following
described tract: of land, to wit:M (emphasis added) According to
my reading of this right-of-way there would be no need for Dennis
Spencer to access any private property exclusive of his right-ofway in order to connect to appropriate utilities. All discussions
about gaining permission from private land owners on the north or
south of the right-of-way are therefore pointless.

Richard W. Jones
October 8, 1996
Page 2

/

2- Culinary Waterlines, Apparently as far back as May 16,
1977, when Lot No. 0025 was developed by James G, Laughter and John
and Janet Malmberg, the issue of waterlines running along the
northern edge of that property became a question. According to
Exhibit B, attached for your perusal there was an agreement between
affected parties on improvements, which included water.
The
document was duly recorded at Book 1212, Pages 27, 28, 29 and 30 at
the Weber County Recorder's Office. Particularly, when John and
Janet Malmberg purchased the property from James G. Laughter, there
were agreements as to cost of extension of the waterline to the
western boundary of that property. As you recall from our personal
investigation of the property, the Malmberg properties' west
boundary is directly across the street from the Spencer property.
Apparently the Malrobergs were required to pay one-half (1/21 of the
cost of extending the waterline to the west end of their property
and Elmer K. and Melba M, Bailey were required to pay the other
one-half (1/2) of the cost of extending the waterline to the west
end of the Malmberg property. This document was duly signed by all
of the parties involved and recorded. Mr. Spencer, being aware of
this particular situation, tells me that the clear intention of the
parties during the negotiation of this process was to extend
utilities to the west end of the Malmberg property anticipating the
possibility of development on the north side of the road and rightof-way. The waterline does extend under the roadway to the west
end of the Malmberg property and then continues on under the rightof-way to service Cherrywood Condominiums.
This is not an
exclusively owned waterpipe by Cherrywood Condominiums, the
Malmbergs, or their predecessors in interests, or the Baileys, but
simply a waterline to access properties around this area. Mr.
Spencer therefore has access to culinary water within an acceptable
distance from the lot in question.

3. Storm Sewer Ifflprpvement. Mr. Spencer indicates to me that
storm sewer improvements have been made to the land in order to
deal with runoff both on property to the north of his and for the
Cherrywood Condominiums. Mr. Spencer states that the runoff that
would come through his lots has been improved to deal with movement
of water through the land, and there is a storm sewer collector on
the south end of the property which goes under the roadway and
moves water away from the condominiums. These improvements have
already been accomplished and I read nothing in the Pleasant View
ordinances, Chapter 13.08, which would prohibit a building permit
based on any criteria contained therein.
4.
Sanitary Sewage. A survey of the land indicates that
there is a sewage line extending under Pleasant View's road and
under the roadway which ends inside of the property owned by Dennis
Spencer. Apparently the sewer system was put in place to deal with
sewage from buildings just north of the Spencer property and his
ability to access sanitary sewer lines is not questionable.

( Gy' V 4/o
Richard W. Jones
\^
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October 8, 1996
Page 3
5- Utilities. Electricity and telephone transmission lines
exist on a pole in the northwest corner of the Malmberg property.
There would be absolutely no problem accessing these utilities by
simply having them cross the right-of-way and enter into Spencers'
property.
6. Fire. There is a fire hydrant on 950 West Street, just
east of the Malmberg property, by which the fire department can
access all areas surrounding the right-of-way. Additionally, as I
recall, there is a fire hydrant on the west side of the right-ofway near Cherrywood Condominiums which would have direct access to
the Spencer property.
Despite Terry Cragun's assertions that this was never done,
Mr. Spencer states unequivocally that in 1993, when Pleasant View
City determined that Mr. Spencer was a one lot subdivider, Mr.
Spencer consulted engineers and surveyors at a cost of nearly
$3,000.00 to address the questions which now seem to be arising
again. Mr. Spencer appeared on the Saturday morning meeting of the
Planning Commission after having previously provided thirteen (13)
separate copies of all of the actions that he had done in order to
demonstrate utility hookups and compliance with the subdivision
ordinance of the City of Pleasant View. He gave all thirteen (13)
copies to Terry Cragun for dissemination to the Planning
Commission. Although the Planning Commission, for what reason 1
cannot discern, determined that they would not review the matters
presented by Mr. Spencer, the City of Pleasant View should have
copies of all of the actions he took regarding this matter, unless
they were discarded arbitrarily and capriciously.
It is interesting for me to note that after seven (7) months
of dealing with this case, I new learn that there is no explicit
prohibition in obtaining a building permit on a piece of property
simply because the property is fronted by a right-of-way and not by
public access. After leaving ycu on September 24, 1996, I obtained
a copy of Title 17 of the Pleasant View City Ordinances entitled
Subdivisions. I read much to my surprise, as indicated by you in
your fax to me dated September 24, 1996, that Provision 17.16,040
allows a building permit on a piece of land on a private right-ofway if:
.,

2. The area of the right-of-way shall be an addition to the
minimum lot area requirements of the zone in which the lot is
located;
3. The grade of any portion of the right-of-way shall not
exceed fifteen percent (15%>;

Richard W. Jones
October 8, 1996
Page 4
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4. Lots so created shall be large enough to comply with all
yard and area requirements of the zone in which the lot is located.
In the case at hand the Planning Commission has not extended
the public street to serve the lot. The RE-20 Zone would not be
violated by the building permit on the property owned by Dennis
Spencer. The grade at no portion of the right-of-way exceeds
fifteen percent (15%) and any building can clearly be in compliance
with all yard and area requirements of the zone. Having taken this
additional step of review, I see no reason whatsoever for denial of
a building permit to Dennis Spencer nor do I feel that a special
exception has to be granted him in order to accomplish this task.
Mr. Spencer can and has complied with all city ordinances and Utah
State law which I have reviewed on the matter.
Please review the materials provided to you and respond within
ten (10) days so that I can adequately advise my client as to his
next step.
If you have any questions or concerns regarding this matter
please contact me at the above-captioned telephone number or
address.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Very truly yours,

Jfaf"+u£'&
/
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Raymond B. Rounds
Attorney at Law
RBR/zao
Enclosures

Mr. Raymond Rounds
October 21, 1996
Page 2
can correct my understanding of Utah law, I will recommend to the City that the issues
surrounding access be resolved between Cherrywood and Mr Spencer prior to
approval being granted. I am nopefu! Cherrywood will cooperate with Mr. Spencer
since it seems he has a night to use Cherrywood's property to gain access to his
property. If Cherrywood is not willing to work with htm, I am not aware of any ordinance
or power the City has to force them to cooperate with Mr. Spencer to clarify the access
issue. If I am wrong, please halp me understand why you might fee! differently.
I assume Mr Spencer will follow the course outlined above unless I hear differently from
you.
Very truly yours,

RWJ/lgc
cc: Pleasant View City

RichahJW Jpnes
\ ^ '
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ATTORNEY AT LAW
2910 Washington Blvd , buitc MX)
Ogden. Utah 84401
Telephone

W-0822

February 6, 1984

PLEASANT VIEW CITY
PLANNING COMMISSION
ATTN: LEROY HARRIS
PLEASANT VIEW, UTAH
RE:

SPENCER SUBDIVISION QUESTION

Dear Leroy:
This will verify that through an oral conversation with
Michael McCoy, the Attorney for the League of Cities and Towns,
I was informed that, in his opinion, the sale of property by
Denny Spencer to John Parker, which we have been discussing,
would not constitute a subdivision^ and, therefore, would not
have to comply with the cities subdivision ordinance.
The proponents of the subdivision question relied on the
definition of agricultural land but Mr. McCoy pointed out that
that definition is attached to the zoning ordinance and not the
subdivision ordinance. He said that his position has always
been that if the purchasers of the land do not build and indicate
that it is not their intention to, that it is an agricultural
purpose.
Obviously, it would be preferrable to have this written
opinion from Mr. McCoy, but since it has taken so long to get
even an oral one, I'm certain that we can rely upon on this.
If you have any questions, feel free to give me a call.
I have informed Mr. Spencer's Attorney, Bob Echard, of the
decision and he indicates that they will be attempting to get
this back on the calendar for our next meeting which I told him
would be the 21st day of February.
Yours very truly,

RICHARD R. MEDSKER
Attorney at Law
RRM:rffflJ

ION MEETING
MINUTES 0'
JE PLEASANT VIEW PLANNING COMM
HELD 20 MAKCH 1 9 8 4 . MEETING COMMENCED AT 7: 03 P . M.
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Pete Russell
Paula Craven
Gene Mortensen
Hayward Wride (City Council)

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Leroy Harris, Chairman
Leon Jones
Kenton Barker
Joyce Humphries

INVOCATION:

Kenton Barker

MINUTES:

The minutes were approved with the following correction
(item #3 be changed from RE-20 to A-l)

ITEMS DISCUSSED:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

#1 Dennis Spencer
Property

Discussion was p r e s e n t e d on Attorney McCoy1 s o p i n i o n and
the f i n a l d e c i s i o n was t h a t the Planning Commission would
abide by McCoy's d e c i s i o n . His d e c i s i o n was t h a t i t does
not c o n s t i t u t e a s u b - d i v i s i o n . Pete R u s s e l l made the
motion t h a t t h e y l e t him go ahead and s t a r t b u i l d i n g and
i t is not n e c e s s a r y t o go back to the Board of Adjustments
Leon Jones 2nd t h e m o t i o n . Voting was unanimous i n t h e
affirmative,,

P^^

Dennis Spencer P r o p e r t y
Jones 31dg 0 P e r m i t
Toone B l d g . P e r m i t
Mayhew 31dg 0 P e r m i t
Rezoning p r o p e r t y from A-5 to A - l .
White Barn P r e s e n t a t i o n
Ted B u r r e l l - Gas Pumps,

a

#2 Mr. Jones
Bldg, Permit

Mr. wTones a p p e a r e d r e q u e s t i n g permission to a p p l y for a
Bldg. Permit n e x t door t o Orson Winwards p r o p e r t y .
It
was d i s c u s s e d t h a t t h e r e was some homes in t h e a r e a t h a t
have s i d e w a l k s , i t was s t a t e d t h a t Mr. Jones i n t e n d e d t o
i n s t a l l s i d e w a l k s . I t was a l s o discussed as t o who would
be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e a s p h a l t between the road as i t now
e x i s t s and the c u r b . Kenton Barker made the motion t h a t
Mr. Jones r e q u e s t t o a p p l y for a Bldg. Permit be g r a n t e d ,
Pete Russcill 2nd the m o t i o n , voting was unanimous i n t h e
affirmative.

#3 Mr. Toone
Bldg. Permit

Mr. Hansen a p p e a r e d r e p r e s e n t i n g Mr. Toone r e q u e s t i n g
permission t o o b t a i n a B l d g . Permit for a new home
d i r e c t l y e a s t of Mr. J o n e s . I t was*noted t h a t Mr. Toone
a l s o intended t o i n s t a l l s i d e w a l k s , Leon J o n e s made t h e
motion t h a t Mr a Toone be g i v e n approval to o b t a i n a B l d g .
Permit, Pete R u s s e l l 2nd t h e motion, v o t i n g was unanimous
in the a f f i r m a t i v e 3

#4 Mayhew
Pa V. Drive

Mr, Mayhew a p p e a r e d r e q u e s t i n g permission t o r a z e the old
home a t 948 West P l e a s a n t View Dr 0 and b u i l d a new home.
I t was J . i s - u s s e d t h a t Mr. Mayhew's l o t was l a c k i n g the
100 f t 0 f r o n t a g e b u t t h e r e has been a home t h e r e many y e a r s
and e x i s t e d b e f o r e t h e z o n i n g was put i n t o e f f e c t and would
be an improvement to t h e are-i, ^inh t h i s thought i n mind
Pete R u s s e l l made the m o t i o n t h a t they approve Mr. Mayhew's
•request to o b t a i n a B l d g . Permit, Kenton Barker 2nd the
motion, v o t i n g was unanimous in the a f f i r m a t i v e .

LAW OFFICES

HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

AMERICA FIRST BUILDING
4768 HARRISON BOULEVARD
OGDEN, UTAH 84403-4305
JACK C. HELGESEN
R. SCOTT WATERFALL
RICHARD W. JONES
MICHAEL V.HOUTZ
KEITH M. BACKMAN
LUCILE KELLY LOWREY

FAX
(801) 479-4804
TELEPHONE
(801) 479-4777

May 19, 1995

Dennis Spencer
P.O. Box 2220
Ogden, Utah 84412-2220
RE: Application for Appeal to Pleasant View City
Dear Mr. Spencer:
As you are aware this office represents Pleasant View City. Pleasant View City has
delivered to me a copy of Your Application for an Appeal to the Pleasant View City
Board of Adjustment. With that application you also submitted a check for $50.00.
Enclosed is the check for $50.00 which is being returned to you for the reasons set forth
below.
In your application you indicated you were requesting a special exception to the
ordinance, i.e. a renewal of the variance granted March 31, 1986. The Board of
Adjustments cannot legally address this issue for the following reasons. Utah Code
Annotated §10-9-706 grants to a board of adjustment the authority to hear and decide
special exceptions, but states that it is only authorized to do so if permitted in the local
zoning ordinance and only according to the standards contained in the local zoning
ordinance. While the Pleasant View City zoning ordinance does permit special
exceptions, the City has not adopted any standards upon which ,a special exception may
be granted. Therefore the board of adjustment is without authority to grant special
exceptions. In addition the action taken over eight years ago by the boarcToT
? adjustment has no bearing on what the current board of adjustment may do or should
l^do.
If you would like to apply for a hearing before the board of adjustment based on some
other provision of the law which would permit the board of adjustment to hear and
decide your case, then you should reapply to the board for such a hearing.
You should also be aware that it is not the role of the board of adjustment to intervene
and decide a dispute between two^private property owners. From what I nSw about this
situation from our prior discussions, it appears there is a private property owner with
whom vou need to resolve a dispute regarding the scope of your right of way. That
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Dennis Spencer
May 19, 1995
Page 2

The City hopes that you will find a method wherein you can resolve this issue and
obtain the results that you desire.
Very truly yours,

Richard W^Jbries
RWJ/lgc
cc: Pleasant View City
enclosure

MINUTES OF THE PLEASANT VIEW CI TV PLh-lNUlN& COMMISSION
J-'EGULHR

MEETING HELD JANUARY

16.

:^?

Chairman .John Shepherd called the meeting to order at &: ©i3 P.M.

Members Pr esent:
John Shepherd, Chairman
Frank Maughan
Russ Chatelain
Lynn Smith
Bill Dodgson
Kenton Barker, CC Rep.
John Janson. City Planner
Debbie Jones, Secretary
T e r n Cragun, Community Development
Coordinator

Uisifcrs Present:
Lincoln S. Nelson
Shir lee Nelson
Stephen Bond
Curt 1s Wo 1th1 us
Jim Chamber1 in
Lucille Ch a m b e r1In
Scott Budge
David Sheen
Sam Love
Jerry Lars en
James Thorsted
Edr 3 z Thorsted
Wayne Kinney
Barb Kinney
Brent he 11er
Denr<3 s Spencer
Brent Marriott
Glen Dick, em ore
Tom Murrav

THE AGENDA CONSISTS OF THE FOLLOWING:
INVOCATION:

Kenton Barker

Motion was made to approve the minutes as amended of the meetings
held
December 5,
1996 and
January
c!, 1997 by Frank
Maughan.
Motion was seconded
by Russ Chatelain.
Voting
was unanimous m
favor.
BUSINESS:
(1) Election
of Planning
Commission
Chairman
and
Vice
Chairman for the year 1997.
Frank Maughan made to motion
to table the agenda item until
a full
quorum was present.
Motion was seconded by Bill Dodgson.
Voting was unanimous in favor.
<E') Paul Mackley
- Request to
Conditional Use Permit for a shed in
r— . _ _
I.
K.4_..
L_ _
_ __l _
J_ l_
__.!-_
an
maae
-cne
motion
Frank
Maughan
made
the
for a Conditional
February E'0, 199 7
, ^ was
••— seconded
bv
CP-3 Zone.
Motion
unanimous in favor.

set
for
»c^ a
« Public
r u u n u Hearing
the CP-3 Zone.
.L. _
_ _ X.
f~ I . . U. 1 -.
to
set
a— Public
Hearing for
Use Permit for a shed in the
Russ Chatelain.
iin-*-n«n ^IOC
Voting
was

(3) Public
Hearing to consider amending
the- Master Road
Plan in the MP-1 Zone.
Lynn Smith made a motion to open the Public Hearing.
Motion
was seconded by Frank Maughan.
Noting was unanimous in favor.
Frank
Maughan asked the question
why the road was;, proposed
there in the first place? Terri Cragun said that was th.e way the
city engineer
drew the master road plan for
the MP-1 Zone.
She
said that a public hearing was held and the
commission voted to
accept the engineer's drawingsBert
Smith said he was opposed
to the road going along the
east side
of the
railroad tracks.
He
felt like
there is
no
property to
be landlocked in the area and that the property gets
too narrow at the north end that a road would take up too much
land.
He felt a road
is not necessary
if the area
is planned
ri ght.
Jerry
Larsen said there is no need
for a road on the east
side of the railroad tracks.
He
said that the land only goes in
from the highway 500 feet at the mos.t. He said that the property
owners could apply to Highway 89 for access if they needed it.
Scott Budge said he understood
that the road would be right
up the middle of the
whole area.
He said that there
is no need
for two roads in the area.
John
Shepherd told the audience of Parkland Business Center
and their plans for improving
the west master road through their
property at the west end of the MP-1 Zone.
David Skeen. another property owner stated that he felt
the
road was not necessary on the east side of the railroad tracks.
John Shepherd said
that it looked like the
majority of the
audience would like
to see the road deleted from the master road
plan.
Lynn Smith made
a motion to go out of the Public
Hearing.
Frank Maughan
seconded the
motion.
Voting
was
unanimous in
favor.
City
Frank Maughan
made the motion
to
recommend
the
Council
to amend the Master Road Plan
by deleting the road that
goes along
the east
side of the railroad
tracks.
Motion was
seconded by Russ Chatelain.
Voting was unanimous in favor.
(4) Public Hearing to consider amending the Master Plan by
changing the MP-1 Zone to a CP—3 Zone.
the Public Hearing.
Lynn
Smith
made the
motion
to open
Voting was
unanimous in
Motion was
seconded by Frank
Maughan
favor.
Jerry Larsen asked the commission what the :one change would
do to the tax base and if it would affect property taxes?
Frank Maughan
said that
historically the
county says
the
change of a zone shouldn't change the tax base until the land use
is changed.
Lincoln Nelson said he recently bought property in that area
with the intent for animals and a shed.
He asked if hre could put
a shed on the property if the zone changed?
Mr. Nelson was told that he could still have agriculture.
Bert Smith said
that his property is currently
in M-i, M-£
Zones and he needs the heavy
zoning there for his business.
He

also
wcinl s to oricourciLjfc a good tax
base for i hi- :.tv.
He asked
if tr.e c 11 v changed to CP- 3. ct n d a m a ri u ^achu-j n t> tas*r,pss can e
along,
could the
people ask for
a rezone
cgam"'.
HL< sajc he
would like to see his property stay MP-1.
John
J an £ on brought
up the
fact
that
Pa-"Klano BusintLs
Center has
just received
final approval from
the c:itv, and it
would
be to their
benefit
if
they h^d
the
option for
more
commere1al zoning.
Kenton Barker agreed.
He
said Parkland would like
to tee
CP-3 zoning
because it would
give them more options.
Plus the
city would get more sales taK from a commercial zone.
Paul
Mackley said that he manufactures
trusses in the CP-3
Zone,
but manufacturing has become n.ore restrictive for him from
MP-1 to CP—3.
He says the developer goes through so much more in
terms
of too many
steps and too
much time loss.
He felt like
there was no
good reason to
make zoning more restrictive.
He
said he would have held out to
stay MP—1 if he could
go back
three years.
LeRoy Harris
said he feels
the city
needs to look
at the
long range plan
with vision.
He said the city
needs to set
a
tone as to what we want in the way of long term benefits.
David Skeen said he would recommend leaving the zone at MP-1
and not change anything
until the city is requested to do so by
individual property owners. He would rather have the area remain
MP-1 for his small business.
Jerry Larsen would like to see everything stay the same zone
as it is now.
Frank Maughan made
the motion to close
the Public Hearing.
Motion was seconded
by Russ Chabelain.
Voting
was unanimous in
favor.
John Jans-on told the commission it was his opinion that tney
had se*p,al options. They could change the peripheral
to CP and
keep the inner MP.
They could also change the MP to allow nore
CP businesses.
Lynn Smith said that he felt the
CP Zone is appropriate to
the west
side of the tracks.
He
said that would
preserve the
integrity of the general developer.
He said
Parkland Business
Center has in mind commercial uses in their development.
Frarik Maughan made the
motion to
recommend
to the
City
Council
that portion
of the MP—1
Zone, west
of the
railroad
tracks,
excluding Brill Manufacturing, be redesignated from MP-1
Zone to CP—3 Zone on the Master Plan.
Motion was
seconded bv
Lynn Smith.
Voting was unanimous in favor.
(5) Dennis
Spencer
- Request
preliminary
approval
for
Spencer Acres Subdivision.
Mr. Spencer discussed with the commission
the status of his
proposed subdivision.
He said
he submitted all the materials to
the city in November and he felt
like at that time we (the
city
and Mr. Spencer) had
passed the hurdle
on letting
Mr. Spencer
build on right of way.
Russ C h a t e l a m asked Mr. Spencer why he
thought that hurdle
1
had been passed"
Mr. Spc-ncer said
that the city attorney haid cigrtrbd that he
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can build on a right of way.
John Shepherd said
that the ordinances
state, in order
to
have
a subdivision,
there has to be a public
street that
is
dedicated
to the city.
Mr. Spencer told the c:«ran;i ss i on that
there
never will be a road
dedicated
to the city.
because
Cherrywood
encroached on
the right
of way.
Mr.
Spencer said
there is a road there but it will
never be a public road.
Mr.
Spencer said that all this was covered in the November meeting
and that there never will be a public, dedicated street in front
of his property.
John
Shepherd
asked
Terri Cragun what
else
Mr. Spencer
needed before he could get preliminary approval.
Terri said that
last night
(January
15, 1997) the
city
received a drawing
for Mr. Spencer's storm water and that needs
to go the city engineer for approval.
Terri also read a
letter
from
the city attorney.
Rich Jones, addressed
to Mr. Spencer's
attorney, Raymond
Rounds, with stated that Mr. Spencer needs to
work out an agreement with the
owners of Cherrywood and do
what
the city ordinances require of him.
Mr.
Spencer
said
that
he
doesn't plan t o
encroach
on
Cherrywood
in any way.
He said he will set t h e home
at any
perimeters the city tells h i rn to.
He wants tc a c c e s s b o t h
lots
h
i
s
p
r
o
p
o
s
e
d
s
u
b
d
i
v
i
s
i
o
n
by
d
r
i
v
i
n
g
a
c
r
o
s
s
t
h
e
p
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
on
lot
on
1.
J o h n Shepherd
asked Terri i f
s h e w o u1d g i v e M r
S pencer a
list of exactly
what he n e e d s
t o do so
he c a n g e t
pre 1i m i n a r y
approval.
c r >
Terri said iy-f* Mr, ij?~«enceir .has all thr? information ho neecjs
,r 0
*Vftlt tVllW'lflft* m ' ^
' ^^jfe^Av4.'--- Sl p s*->T l f r f\arj <yU staff
depart: nle'ftt*. * •rc:-i>pC'^ i s f *- ^ ml ftriv di ty attorney
to )~i£ _ citu-,,fij'"
rtLjdre %z i r.^ what he needs to do.'
She said she doesn't feel right
a'tioiii" itemizing a list for Mr. Spencer, because it may not be all
inclusive, that the city engineer
may come
up with
something
else, or the city attorney.
Terri
felt like Mr. Spencer has all
the information he needs
and he should take some
responsibility
to see that he does what the city is requiring of him to do based
on the information he has.
Mr. Spencer
said that Terri
should be removed from
being
involved in the approval
of his subdivision.
He said
she has
fought
him for five
years.
He
claimed
she
is against
his
subdivision because she has a personal interest in Cherrywood. and
owns pr ope rt y there. He said the city has allowed Terri Cragun,
her
family, and Cherrywood Condominiums to
encroach upon
the
right of way
of Mr. Spencer.
He also said that there will never
be a dedicated road in his subdivision because Pleasant View City
allowed Cherrywood to encroach on his right of way. , ^
John Janson said that it is
up to the individual to say
if
they have a conflict of
interest and apparently Terri feels like
she has no conflict
of interest.
He also stated
that there has
not been a subdivision application given to the city so if there
is not an application, then
basically there is no subdivision to
be considered for approval.
Frank Maughan
made the motion to table the discussion until
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everyt hi n g
t h at i &
in
Mr S p e n c e r' s h a n d
i & take n ca r e
of.
M o t i o n died for lack of a s e c o n d .
Lynn Smith made the m o t i o n to deny p r e l i m i n a r y
approval for
Spencer
Peres
Subdivision
based
c^n
the
city
subdivision
ordinances,
Rich J o n e s '
l e t t e r dated
18/£l/96, N o r t h v i e w
Fire
D e p a r t m e n t ' s letter dated 1 / 1 0 / 9 7 , staff report d a t e d 1/7/97, and
N e i l Smiths m e m o r a n d u m d a t e d 1/6/97.
Rust C h a t e l a i n s e c o n d e d t h e
motion.
Voting w a s u n a n i m o u s in favor.
Russ C h a t e l a i n
told M r . S p e n c e r
that b e c a u s e h e
is a s k i n o
f o r approval for a s u b d i v i s i o n ,
then Mr. S p e n c e r n e e d s to F o T T o w
t h e city s u b d i v i s i o n o r d i n a n c e s .
He said the city is not
asking
f o r him to do a n y t h i n g m o r e t h a n they r e q u i r e of all s u b d i v i d e r s .
Frank Maughan
told M r . S p e n c e r
that he is o f f e n d e d
at h i s
a t t a c k on a staff m e m b e r and that
Mr. S p e n c e r was t o t a l l y out of
j r r g p r ^ — He
would m o v e
that
the c o m m i s s i o n
take a
stand
and
c e n s u r e Mr. S p e n c e r .
He s a i d that
"this body does not
need to
d i scu s s any m e m b e r
of t h i s body or staff
with personal attacks.
If you. Mr. S p e n c e r , need to make a n - a c c u s a t i o n , t h e r e is a court
of
law.
This
body will n o t
allow personal a t t a c k s .
You h a v e
o f f e n d e d the body, t h e c i t y and the s t a f f . "
John S h e p h e r d
told Mr.
S p e n c e r that
the c o m m i s s i o n
would
a p p r e c i a t e r e s p e c t , for^
t h e c o m m i s s i o n , for Mr. S p e n c e r
and for
t h e staff.

(6) To n? Murray — Request pre 1i m i nary appr oval for R i dg e v iew
Subdivision, Phase I.
Request preliminary approval for Ridgeview
Subdivision, Phase II.
Mr.
Murray told
the commission
that he
felt he had
submitted
everything.
The commission
reviewed
the memorandum,
from the city engineer, Neil Smith, dated January 15, 1997.
Di scussion fol1 owed.
Lynn Smith made
the motion
for preliminary approval
for
Phase I of Ridgeview Subdivision
with the understanding that the
retention
basin is
in compliance
with the
100 year
storm for
runoff and runoff
easement is received if engineer
states it is
necessary (see Reeves letter dated
iS/19/96, item # 5 ) .
Motion
was seconded by Frank Maughan.
Voting was unanimous in favor.
Mr. Murray asked
about
getting
preliminary approval
for
Phase II of his subdivision.
Mr. Murray has
no secondary water
for the second
phase of his
subdivision.
Mr. Wolthius, Mr.
Murray's attorney, suggested
that Mr. Murray be able
to sign an
agreement with the city that was written
by Rich Jones, the city
attorney, to allow the start
of preliminary even though there is
no secondary water.
Terri Cragun
said that
the City Council
has not
seen the
agreement
written by
our
city
attorney.
She
felt that
the
council should review the agreement and get their approval before
anyone signs anything.
(7) Floyd
Uloodfield
Request
preliminary approval
for
Grand Legacy Subdivision, Phase II.
Brent
Marriott
was
representing
Mr. Uloodfield
for his
subdivision.
Mr. Marriott stated that they
will need to sign an
agreement with the city because they also do
not have secondary

wat e r a v a i 1 ab 1 e t o t h e ni f o r t h e i r s ubd -:. v i L> i on.
Mr . M a r r i u 11
that Mr. W o o d f i e l d paid S 5 S , Q'30
for his share of secondary wat e
to be brought into his-, s u b d i v i s i o n .
Discussion f o l l o w e d .
F r• a n k M a u g h a n made
t o m otic n t o g r a n t
p r e 1 i IT; i n a r y a p p r o
to
Grand Legacy, P h a s e I I , subject to c o n c e r n s n o t e d by the cit
engineer
in m e m o r a n d u m d a t e d
wTanusiry 6. 1997 and provided t h a
secondary
water
d e l i v e r y is guaranteed
by W e b e r
/ Box E l d e
Conservation
D i s t r i c t and t h e agreement that Rich J o n e s p r o p o s e
is
approved by
the C i t y
Council and
signed by
Mr. Woodfield
M o t i o n was
seconded by
Bill Dodgson.
Voting w a s
unanimous i
favor.
The
m e m o r a n d u m from
Neil Smith
notes
that M r .
Woodfiel
n e e d s to have
s e c o n d a r y w a t e r a d d r e s s e d and show
h o w the s y s t e
will be installed and a l s o r e q u e s t s a t e m p o r a r y c u l - d e - s a c at th
east end of 4(350 N o r t h S t r e e t .

(6)
Jim
Chctmberlin
Request
preliminary
approval
fo
Pheasant Hill S u b d i v i s i o n .
Mr. C h a m b e r l i n a l s o
n e e d s secondary w a t e r f o r
approval fo
his
subdivision.
He
said he
would
be
w i l l i n g to
sign
th
agreement a f t e r t h e c o u n c i l a p p r o v e s it.
Mr.
C h a m b e r l i n said that Mr. W o o d f i e l d said h e would gran
M r. C [
"
i a m ber 1 i n an e a s e me n t
f o r h i m t o r u n t h t- s t o r rn r u noff w a
off
of P h e a s a n t
Hill,
as
soon
as
Mr.
Woodfield
receive'
preliminary a p p r o v a l f o r P h a s e II of Grand L e g a c y .
K e n t o n Barker
s u g g e s t e d that the city reoeive
that agreemc-n
before p r e l i m i n a r y a p p r o v a l is given.
Terri C r a g u n e x p l a i n e d to the C h a m b e r 1ins that t h e qity doe
need
a written
easement
(reviewed by
t h e city
a t t o r n e y ) thai
states M r . W o o d f i e l d is
w i l l i n g to let
P h e a s a n t Hill
run it''
storm w a t e r r u n o f f o n t o M r . W o o d f i e l d ' s p r o p e r t y .
Frank
M a u g h a n m a d e t h e motion to t a b l e p r e l i m i n a r y approval
for P h e a s a n t Hill
S u b d i v i s i o n to F e b r u a r y £Ci, 1 9 9 7 ,
Motion wa«
seconded by Russ C h a t e l a i n .
Voting w a s u n a n i m o u s in favor.
(9)
Discussion and/or action to clarify the definition of i
service station.
John
Shepherd
told
the
Planning
Commission
about
Cit}
Council meeting that was held January 14, 1997.*
Kenton Barker said
that he doesn't want the service statioT
there.
He
feels like there
are more
appropriate place in
the
city for that type of a.business.
He said that he
talked to the
city attorney and asked him
to define 'auto repair' and 'service
station' according to our city ordinances.
John
Shepherd made
a motion
to hold
a Public
Hearing or
February E'0, 1997
to discuss amending
the ordinance to
include
automobile
repair as
a Conditional
Use
in CP-1.
Motion
was
seconded by Bill Dodgson.
Voting was unanimous in favor.
(10) Discussion

and/or action to consider apartments

in the

city.
Terra Cragun told the commission that as far as she can tell
there are
approximately eight (3)
apartments that have
been in

7<Ht
the city twenty five years or moreShe said that there are more
recent ones that have
been built in the past few
years that may
be affected by the ordinances.
John
Jan son led
a discussion
with
the commission
on why
consider allowing accessory apartments in the city, what types of
apartments would
they feel
would be acceptable,
and
what the
issues would and could be.
Discussion followed.
Frank Maughan made the motion that the
Planning Commission
come prepared
to the February
£0, 1997 meeting, to discuss the
subject of ancillary living space in
single family dwellings and
be prepared
to reach consensus on that subject and to schedule a
combined work session with the City Council.
Motion was seconded
by Bill Dodgson.
Voting was unanimous in favor.

MINUTES CP THE BCARD OF ADJUSTMENT? MEETING HELD
31 March 1986

MEMBERS PRESENT:

VISITORS

Gladys Evans (Chairperson)
Glen Anderson
Vaughan Larsen
Pete Russell

Dennis Spence:
Ron Horton
John Malmberg
Gordon Cragun
John Parker

ITEMS DISCUSSED:
1. Dennis Spencer appeared requesting a varience to build a home on
a private R-O-W. The Board of Adjustments discussed the need to plan for
future development for property owners beyond Mr. SpenceCs.
The need for a temporary cul-de-sac for a turn around for Emergency
Vehicles was discussed• Mr, Spencer stated that they would like to keep
it as private as possible and he could net see the need for a pul-de-sac.
After reading the stipulations given to Mr. Jcnn Parker at I the 11 July
1983 Beard of Adjustments Meecing/ Gladys Evans made a motion that Mr.
Scencer be granted a varience if: MrT Spencer agreed to following
stipulations:
a-

A 20,000 ft let still exists after the R-O-W has been granted,

b.
That the building must be set back at least 30 ft from the
front let line,
c. That an Engineers design shewing cuts for utilities!* grades for
tne roads, and the design of the R-O-W for future development in
the area be furnished the City.
d. That should any future development oe made/ that the property
owners participate in hard surfacing the road/ curb and gutter and
sidewalks and tne Mr. Spencer provide an Escrow iri the atoount
determined by City Engineer Neil Smith for the improvements
boarding his property.
Pete Russell 2nd the motion.
Motion
carried.

ADJOURNMENT:

5:55 P.M.

Submitted

by,

Gloria H. Jenkinsf Recorder

November 5, 1993

Mr Kenton P Barker
Pleasant View Board of Adjusments
Dear Kenton
Again we find, upon research of Pleasant View City public records, letters
that have been filed, that require a response from us, as they affect
the development of our property that boarders Cherrywood Manor.
We refer now to your letter dated February 18 1993, and addressed To
Whom It May Concern.
Points that need clarification are:
#1 - In paragraph #2, you state, "See copy of the final plat declara
tion of covenants, conditions and restrictions letter which is attachment #1," We were unable to obtain this at the city offices, please
supply us with same.
#2 - You also state "see attachment #2" please supply us with same.
#3 - Your postscript says, "see attachment #3", please supply
us with copy of same.
#4 - Your last paragraph states, "This is the way I remember the
conditions at the time." Please clarify when you reportedly had these
conversations with Mr Spencer & Mr Parker and the time elapsed between
then and Feb 18, 1993.
Also I would like to "jog" your memory further, as you stated Mr Spencer
and Mr Parker apparently made the exact response. I would like to
remind you that my response was as follows: We had already attempted
to negotiate with Mr Johnson, for the sale of our property. We agreed
to trade our 2/3 acre lot for equity in a Cherrywood Manor condo for
fair market value of both. Mr Johnson did not accept this offer and to
complicate matters, stated we would not receive compensation for our
lot until Cherrywood Manor was completed and all liens satisfied. I
think you would agree this would have been folly, as Cherrywood Manor
problems still exist to this date.
It appears that Pleasant View City is attempting to saddle us and our
neighbors with Cherrywood's problems. We find this totally unacceptable
and request a speedy response to this letter as time is of the essence.
Sincerely,//

Dennis V and Linda S Spencer^
cc: To all Pleasant View Officials

,_

lA!^^

Q
September 19, 1994

Mayor D.
Pleasant
885 West
Pleasant

Brent Hales
View City
Pleasant View Dr.
View, Ut 84414

Dear Mayor Hales :
Again, we find it necessary to write to you concerning our building
lot, located in Pleasant View City. We and our adjoining neighbors
continue to receive harassment and lack of cooperation, from Cherrywood
Manor, which borders our property.
As you are aware, we and our neighbors are in possession of a 60'
right of way, at the northern border of said Cherrywood Manor.
When said Cherrywood Manor was first developed, Pleasant View City
ignored our right of way and to this time has been uncooperative in
the development, of our property, for residential use. Again, we
appeal to you to renew our building permits, accessed by the existing
private road. This appears to be the only logical solution, as Cherrywood has refused to participate in a public road.
Hopefully your response will be swift and comprehensive, as we have
reached a point where drastic measures must be taken.

Dennis V Spencer
1450 North 400 East #125
Ogden, Ut 84404
cc:'

Mel Rogers, Pres Cherrywood Manor
John & Lola Parker
Vernon Perkins
Leon & Juanita Fowers
Clair Knight
Lillie Amidan

RAYMOND B. ROUNDS
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2650 WASHINGTON BLVD., SUITE 102
OGDEN, UTAH 8440!
(801) 621-4015

October 8, 1996
Richard W. Jones
Heigesen, Waterfall & Jones, P.C,
America First Building
4768 Harrison Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84403-4 305
Re:

Dennis Spencer v. City of Pleasant View

Dear Richard:
After our meeting on September 24, 2 996, I received copies of
the Pleasant View City ordinances dealing with subdivisions, storm
sewer and zoning applicable to the issues at hand* I have reviewed
such documents and have again consulted with my client regarding a
building permit that he would desire on land owned by him.
The first contention of the City appeared to me to revolve
around the ability of Dennis Spencer to have adequate access to
utilities to service a proposed building on his lots, I will, break
down the issues into categories and then address the resolution of
those questions.
1. First, I direct your attention to a quitclaim deed dulyrecorded with Weber County at Book 1424, Page 2443, wherein Paul B"
Cragun Investment Company, a Utah Limited Partnership, as signed by
Paul B. Cragun, General Partner, deeded to Dennis V. Spencer and
Linda S. Spencer the right-of-way which ..s in question. I direct
your attention to the beginning of the metes and bounds description
of the right-of-way itself wherein the right-of-way includes "a
non-exclusive right-of-way for purposes of ingress, egress and
UTILITY INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE over and across the following
described tract of land, to wit:" (emphasis added) According to
my reading of this right-of-way there would be no need for Dennis
Spencer to access any private property exclusive of his right-ofway in order to connect to appropriate utilities. All discussions
about gaining permission from private land owners on the nortih or
south of the right-of-way are therefore pointless.

Richard W. Jones
October 8, 1996
Page 2
2, gi;linary Waterlines. Apparently as far back as May 16,
1977, when Lot No. 0025 was developed by James G. Laughter and John
and Janet Malmberg, the issue of waterlines running along the
northern edge of that property became a question. According to
Exhibit B, attached for your perusal there was an agreement between
affected parties on improvements, which included water.
The
document was duly recorded at Book 1213r Pages 27, 28, 29 and 30 at
the Weber County Recorder's Office. Particularly, when John and
Janet Malmberg purchased the property from James G. Laughter, there
were agreements as to cost of extension of the wateriine to the
western boundary of that property- As you recall from our personal
investigation of the property, the Malmberg properties' west
boundary is directly across the street from the Spencer property.
Apparently the Malmbergs were required to pay one-half (1/2 i of the
cost of extending the wateriine to the west end of their property
and Elmer K- and Melba M, Bailey were required to pay the other
one-half (1/2) of the cost of extending the wateriine to the west
end of the Malmberg property. This document was duly signed by all
of the parties involved and recorded. Mr. Spencer, being aware of
this particular situation, tells me that the clear intention of the
parties during the negotiation of this process was to extend
utilities to the wast end of the Malmberg property anticipating the
possibility of development on the north side of the road and rightof-way. The wateriine does extend under the roadway to the west
end of the Malmberg property and then continues on under the rightof-way to service Cherrywood Condominiums.
This is not an
exclusively owned waterpipe by Cherrywood Condominiums, the
Malmbergs, or their predecessors in interests, or the Baileys, but
simply a wateriine to access properties around this area. Mr*
Spencer therefore has access to culinary water within an acceptable
distance from the lot in question.
3. Storm Sewer Improvement. Mr- Spencer indicates to me that
storm sewer improvements have been made to the land in order to
deal with runoff both on property to the north of his and for the
Cherrywood Condominiums. Mr. Spencer states that the runoff that
would come through his lots has been improved to deal with movement
of water through the land, and there is a storm sewer collector on
the south end of the property which goes under the roadway and
moves water away from the condominiums- These improvements have
already been accomplished and I read nothing in the Pleasant View
ordinances, Chapter 13.08, which would prohibit a building permit
based on any criteria contained therein.
4

Sanitary Seyag.g. A survey of the land indicates that
there is a sewage line extending under Pleasant View's road and
under the roadway which ends inside of the property owned by Dennis
Spencer. Apparently the sewer system was put in place to deal with
sewage from buildings just north of the Spencer property and his
ability to access sanitary^sewer lines is not questionable.

Richard W, Jones
October 8, 1996
Page 3
5- Utilities. Electricity and telephone transmission lines
exist on a pole in the northwest corner of the Malmberg property.
There would be absolutely no problem accessing these utilities by
simply having them cross the right-of-way and enter into Spencers-'
property.
6. JLL££* There is a fire hydrant on 950 West Street, just
east of the Malmberg property, by which the fire department can
access all areas surrounding the right-of-way. Additionally, as I
recall, there is a fire hydrant on the west side of the right-ofway near Cherrywood Condominiums which would have direct access to
the Spencer property.
Despite Terry Cragun's assertions that this was never done,
Mr- Spencer states unequivocally that in 1993f when Pleasant View
City determined that Mr. Spencer was a one lot subdivider, Mr.
Spencer consulted engineers and surveyors at a cost of nearly
S3,000.00 to address the questions which now seem to be arising
again. Mr. Spencer appeared on the Saturday morning meeting of the
Planning Commission after having previously provided thirteen (13)
separate copies of all of the actions that he had done in order to
demonstrate utility hookups and compliance with the subdivision
ordinance of the City of Pleasant View. He gave all thirteen (13)
copies to Terry Cragun for dissemination to the Planning
Commission. Although the Planning Commission, for what reason 1
cannot discern, determined that they would not review the matters
presented by Mr. Spencer, the City of Pleasant view should have
copies of all of the actions he took regarding this matter, unless
they were discarded arbitrarily and capriciously.
It is interesting for me to note that after seven (7) months
of dealing with this case, I new learn that there is no explicit
prohibition in obtaining a building permit on a piece of property
simply because the property is fronted by a right-of-way and not bypublic access. After leaving ycu on September 24, 1996, I obtained
a copy of Title 17 of the Pleasant view city Ordinances entitled
Subdivisions. I read much to my surprise, as indicated by ycu in
ycur fax to me dated September 24, 1996, that Provision 17.16.040
allows a building permit on a piece of land on a private right-ofway i f:
1, The Planning Commission determines that it is impractical
to extend streets to ser^e .snen. lots;
2,
The area of the right-of-way shall be an addition to the
minimum lot area requirements of the zone in which the lot is
located;
3, The grade of any portion of the right-of-way shall not
exceed fifteen percent (15%);

Richard W. Jones
October 8, 1996
Page 4
4. Lots so created shall be large enough to comply with all
yard and area requirements of the zone in which the lot is located.
In the case at hand the Planning Commission has not extended
the public street to serve the lot. The RE-20 Zone would not be
violated by the building permit on the property owned by Dennis
Spencer.
The grade at no portion of the right-of-way exceeds
fifteen percent (15%) and any building can clearly be in compliance
with all yard and area requirements of the 2one. Having taken this
additional step of review, I see no reason whatsoever for denial of
a building permit to Dennis Spencer nor do I feel that a special
exception has to be granted him in order to accomplish this task*
Mr. Spencer can and has complied with all city ordinances and Utah
State law which I have reviewed on the matter.
Please review the materials provided to you and respond within
ten (10) days so that I can adequately advise my client as to his
next step.
If you have any questions or concerns regarding this matter
please contact me at the above-captioned telephone number or
address.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Very truly yours,
/

Raymond B. Rounds
Attorney at Law
RBR/zao
Enclosures

LAW M*?1<1

HZLGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES
KMWWOW lOUlIVARO
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October 21. 1996

Mr Raymond Rounds
2650 Washington B'vd #102
Ogd«a Utah 84401
RE Spencer v Pleasant View C'ty
Dear Raymond

#
^ W •,
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//i/ ^
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^

/ appreciated receiving '/cur letter of October 8, 1996, I wiiJ not attempt to comment on
\n* v^ nous contenders and points you made m your letter but will allow those matter*
to be reviewed by the proper C<ty persor.net. inctudinQ the planning commission, board
of adjustment, city council and city engineer.
Without knowjngjhe entire history of this matter, it *s my understanding Mr Spencer has
)/u<*4 — never reqjjesjgdaSaildinq permit crfth'SpVoperty n Pleasant View City I believe ha
^
has in the oass unsuccessfully scugnt subdivision approval aid still nseds to obtain
subdivision approval s^nce ne has divided the property a number of times during the
jirfj.n/a— oastjew years Assurn/ng he meets the criteria contained in the City subdivision
i
ordinance, zoning ordinance and other relevant ordinances ft appears for Mr Spencer^
j&$oi\fa fits access problem t*e planning commission womd first have to determine thaP"
(Trsjnot prectlcjino^ifend the rraei that serves"hl^propertyj then he~would neea to
seek a variance from the Poard of aajustment pursuani toTFie provisions of Pleasant
View Code §17.16.04C and ary other relevant law c'eal>ng with variances I suggest
mat Mr Spencer submit the necessary documents to fne apprcpngte Ctfy departments
and personnel They will then jndergo the appropr-ate review, approval and input
process
It seems to me tnat even though W S^ancsr r,cs a'n ^a&* ment to access hts property,
under Utah law he cannot enlarge that access td! *Wrva property other than the property
to which the easement original ran nor can he enfege ttv use of the easement It cJ/La^ a ^x
may be wise to commun cate and work out apy neo*Sf SjfVi* greements with Cherrywood
^J
Condominiums since Mr Spencers subdiv»cmg!anlr instruction may require him to
ms'a'l Improvements across Che-rywood's pnvdie>y owned property Even though ^e
apparently *as an easement over Chemywood's property, I do not believe Utah law
permrts him to improve or change Cherrywood's property without Cherrywood's
consent. Unless you understand the scope of Mr. Spencer's easement to Pe different or
3

Sc* oCC^irK
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r'l fy'

^

-AiV upfU F

Mr. Raymond Rounds
October 21 1996
Page 2
£ " o ^
- c o m ™ , to the City that the ,«ues
Cherr
approval being granted VZ hZ^rl
>
™ * * * * Mr Spencer prior to
since ,t seeris f i ^ ' n j T 0t r ^1 ^ 9 r 0n r t ^ ^ r0P
« * *nV
> » *t 0• 9 "^
Mr. Spencer
3 , n a c c e s s t0
Property, tf C t m ^ ^
^
^ ?
^h E
*
»*
a m not
or power the C . t y ^ o 0fce rhem *n c1o * ° e*r a T
'
^
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V
Mm***
•ssue ft I am w r o £ D i e e s ^ ? f ~ i
° ^ t 9 *»<h Mr Spencer to clanfy the eccss,
wro, .g pieaso hofp ne understand why you mSht fee! differently
assume Mr Spencer „ , , foiicw the course coffin* aoove unless | hear diffe ,ently from
you.
Very truly yours,

RWJ/IQC

cc. Pleasant V*ew Oty
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MINUTES OF THE PLEASANT VIEW CITY PLANNING

COMMISSION

REGULAR MEETING HELD NOVEMBER El, 199b AT 5:35

P.M.

Vice Chair in an Lynn Smith called the meeting to order at 5:35
with the following present
MEMBERS PRESENT:
Lynn Smith, Vice Chairman
Mike Humphreys
Bill Dodgson
John Shepherd
Frank Maughan
R u s s Ch a t e 1 a i n

P.M.

VISITORS PRESENT:
Robert Hyde
Mi ke Variden berg
•James Poulsen
Dennis S p e n c e r
Paul Mack 1e y
Jim Fisher

THE AGENDA CONSISTS OF THE FOLLOWING:
INVOCATION:

Russ Chatelain

Minutes of the meetings field October- 17. 1996 were approved
amended on a notion made by Lynn SwithMotion was s e conded
Frar.U Maughan.
Voting was unanimous in favor.

as
bv

BUSINESS:
(I; PcAil Mack ley
- Request
bo
set
Public
Hearing
to
co.-zider amending the
Master Ro^d Plan
in the MP-1 Zone.
Paul
Mack ley told the Planning Commission
that he had been approached
\DV Mike Vandenberg
bo u*:.y art easement
for WorldCom to put
in a
r e g sr. e r a ':• i o n s t at i o n.
Mr . M a c k 1 e y told t hi e c o m n\ i s s i o n t h a t h
o w n s a b o A t f o u r a c r e s a n d c u r r s n 11 y h a s 5 £i s t o r- age
un i t s and
T/•• s.i s s we 11 Manuf act ur i ng. He said that at t h e t ir:e Tr u s s well was
built the city engineer told hi^ not to do the detention pond for
bhi ay-ea until the county decided if they were going to
build on
o r " c t,
Mr. M ack 1 e y s a i d h e n e v er h e ard f'r o z\ t h e c i t y an d wh e n
Worldcom
approached
hin, he
sold
then: an
easement
on
the
s o •-'. t h w est c o r n e r
:• -•- r i s p r ope r ty.
After
the
sale
of
the
easement, Mr. Mack ley said the city notified him that the city's
naster road plan
went along the west
side of his property.
He
said he is working things out with
WeridCen, but would
like to

the
P l a n n i n g Co mm i s s i on t h e i r
c o n c e r n s about being
delayed any
l o n g e r for ths "regeneration . station.
The Planning
Commission
t o l d their: that t h e y had r e c o m m e n d e d to t h e C i t y C o u n c i l a p p r o v a l
of t h e r e g e n e r a t i o n s t a t i o n , and it w a s t h e C i t y C o u n c i l that h a d
d e n i e d t h e r e q u e s t , so t h e y n e e d t o go back t o t h e C i t y C o u n c i l
•with r e v i s i o n s or w h a t e v e r t h e c o u n c i l r e q u i r e d them t o doP a u l M a c k l e y also told t h e P l a n n i n g C o m m i s s i o n that he w a s
g o i n g t o d o a b u i l d i n g e x p a n s i o n on t h e p r o p e r t y to t h e n o r t h o f
h i s s t o r a g e unit and asked w h a t s t e p s n e e d e d t o be t a k e n ?
He w a s
t o l d h e n e e d e d t o bring p l a n s a n d a plat p l a n into t h e city
and
r e q u e s t a Conditional Use Permit
f o r an e x p a n s i o n a n d go t h r o u g h
t h e p r o p e r s t e p s , i.e., P u b l i c H e a r i n g , e t c .
(£') D i s c u s s i o n ar\d/or
a c t i o n t o set a P u b l i c H e a r i n g
to
c o n s i d e r c h a n g i n g t h e M P - 1 Zone t o a CP Z o n e .
L y n n S m i t h said that h e felt r e z o n i n g t h e M P - 1 Z o n e to a C P
Z o n e 'would be an asset to t h e c i t y .
H e s a i d B r i l l might o b j e c t
t o h a v i n g to i n t e r f a c e w i t h t h e C P Z o n e .
D i s c 1.1 ssion f o l l o w e d .
Mike Humphreys
made a m o t i o n to set a P u b l i c
Hearing for
- r97<
dQ~7
inc
t
h
e
M
P
—
1
Z
o
n
e
tc
to
rov:ider
• J a n u a r y .-.
r e z o,
Zone.
Motion
was seconded
by F r a n k
Maugha
was
u n a n i m o u s in
favor.
2THER

BUSINESS:

Dennis Spencer

appealed

«.- ,- .C ... ....

(- -,7

J. |_. #_.

j_; ^

:• n e
<=

-l_ ... .-<w, ,

Worth
a n d ISStf
.toe at appro* 1 mat 1
'.*;.?st«
He
told the commission that
f o - t h r e e y e a r s h e ! ~as b e e n
t-yi:\g t u d e v e l o p h i s p r o p e r t y a n d h a s a l w a y s c o m e t o a d:,*c e n d .
filed
a claim acainst
the city.
He said
the c \ t v
s*
a i1 H
h i m a v en ue s
get
o proceed
witi i sc
he
:-:'CCr-n e y 'i a s g 1 v •
c
i
ty
;
e
l
d
by
going
on
hi
go b e f :
t h e P1 a n n i n q C 0 m m i
they
and s e e
*= i 11 •- -• K l e
t o put
a :-.p ,\ i, bK 1 -. .-. t - o e t t h r o u g h h i s p r o p e r t v.
h
a
s
h
ad b u i l d i n g p e r m i t s
g r a n t e d for two
Spencer
claimed
the lots,
one g r a n t e d
bv
the Planning
Commission and
on:
;
h
e
B
o
a
r
d
'.:
f
a
d
j
u
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
.
^•r&~
M—
was* approached - by
said
cnat
in
• wo od c o n d o m i n i um s t hat th ey wo u Id like t o use Mr. ; e n c e r 1 s
•5- h * v w e n t
t n •? 71
p r o p e - t y a. 1 d c as <- 1 m
I;s* bankrupt
He s a i d
1

r "-

r-. ,

"» 3. I- -. •-
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;h?y (Cherry-wood)
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52C West Eiberta Drive, Pleasant View, Utah B4414

31 March .1998
Dennis Spencer
5993 N. 2250 East
Eden, U T 84310
Dear Mr. Spencer:
We appreciate rece
f
u
mo
recent drawing of your
proposed subdivision pro }£- ° eV °v e*r a d *t
t0 t h e
City office by Reeve
and Reeve Engineering on il f j ^
requirements found in March 17, i298. it has been reviewed for
Requirements) as well as City Ordinance 17.12 ( Final Plat
number of items that are other applicable ordinances. There arp a
included in the drawing required by ordinance that have not been
City s ordinances that . Attached you will find a'copy ot the
engineer's use.
apply to subdivisions for you and your
Additionally, ordinance 17.16.010 (A) states " 9 n •. •, • •
required by this ordinance shall be e x t e n d tctte prope^tv linf
The street arranqement mr*r h* <si^u ** *
> property line.
<
%

^ . " e - a p p r e ? i a t e y o u r efforts and hope the copies wil' be helnfni
to you in moving your project along.
helpful
Sincerely
TERRI CRAGUN Q
Community D e v e l o p m e n t / T r e a s u r e r

cct

Craicr Pall

^^Jl

£'2>&'~72 /Z?

V

885 West Pteasanr View Drive, Pleasant Viev*. uian 84414

February 17, 1997
Dennis Spencer
5993 N. 225C E««t
Eden, UT 84310
RE: Spencer Acres
Mr. Spencer:

plans

included in Spencer Acres.

there ie

no dedicated

Sincerelv,
TERRI CRAGUKP
Community Development
end:

City Ordinanc e # 1 7 . I S

PLEASANT VILW HUCOMCS

YOU

AT THf FOOT OF BIN LOMOND

road

520 West Eiberta Drive, Pleasant View, Utah 84414

31 March 1998
Dennis Spencer
5993 N. 2250 East
Eden, UT 84310
Dear Mr. Spencer:
We appreciate receipt of your most recent drawing of your
proposed subdivision project delivered to the City office by Reeve
and Reeve Engineering on March 17, 12 98
It has been reviewed for
requirements found in City Ordinance 17,12 ( Final Plat
Requirements) as well as other applicable ordinances. There are a
number of items that are required by ordinance that have not been
included m the drawing. Attached you will find a 'copy ot the
City s ordinances that apply to subdivisions for you and your
engineer's use,
Additionally, Ordinance 17.16 010 iA) states *.,.all utilities
required by this ordinance shall be extended to the property line.
The street arrangement must be such as to cause no unnecessary
hardship no owners of adjoining property when ,thev plat- tneii* owr,
IsndLaod ae&V to provide for c8ftv-fexiYeetfacce.se
We'appreccat* vtou'~ cifcitaf ana hope the cop:es will be helptul
to you in moving yo.: project along.
Sincerely*
TERRI CHAGUN Q
CoTimumty D e v e l o p r r e n t / T r e a s a r e r
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Reeve & Associates. lac,
Cn / tstgintcrtng *,}/»iic'uraJ Engineering
Survepixz • LandPlanmnz

July 18,1997
Mr, Dennis Spencer
5993 North 2250 East
Liberty, Utah 84310
fie- Spender Acres Detention Ponds
Dear Mr. Spencer,
Per your request, I have reviewed th* response letter from Mi 0 Neil Smith, P.E regarding the
detention basms for the above referenced project In general I do not agree with Mi. Smith's
comments, and I believe uii this proiecL his geneial summarization is in error
A local minor detention facility is denned as a facility '"wvmg hydrologic basins smaller than
or equal to 20 acres, and we designed to mitigate the impact of increased runoff due to
development The outlet capacity is b.^cd on pt t -developn.em hydrology and downstream
conveyance system capacir,r The d^ign of your astern complies with this criteria
Secondly, the comment was made that the flows being concentrated mto a single stream could
create erosion damage . T in: statement ^ ir. ero" Another advantage of a detention basin is that
it captures the storm nm-off over the aviation ot the entire btorm, and ;eleases it at a constant and
steady flow The run-ofHr *m a sto rn i that is net detained ' ^ne^ m intensity. The discharge of
the btorm at it's peak time ot concent, alien will ! e :ai m e> ;CNS of the constant metered flow dial
the detention basin will release. The detention ba:> n actuall> improves the erosion potential
downstream These factor* are major -^ason* that detention basins are designed and constructed.
In addition, Pleasant View City has required rhat ihe detention basins be designed for a storm
that would ha\e an intensity and the odds, of occ amng onlv once every 100 years Even with
ihi5 design, the iraount of .vatcr bei*u released i'om the tw o detention basins is 0 19 c.f.s. and
0 31 c f s, whicn in engineering terms are extremely small. Ba^cd on mv understanding of
drainage law and standard practices ::>r engineering, it is m> opinion that the addition of the
detention basins will not „td\ersety \\\ * the existing drainage features of the existing ditch
within the Cherrywood Development

3670 Quincy Ave, Suite No I, Ogden, Utah 84403 fe! No (801) 621-3100, Fax. (801) o21-2666

c?
Michael 0. Leavitt
Governor
Ted Stewart
Executive Director
Craig M. Call
State Ombudsman

State of Utah
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
Office ot Private Property Ombudsman
1594 West North Temple, Suite 3710
PO Box 145610
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-5610
801-537-3455
801-538-7315 (Fax)

December 2, 1997

D. Brent Hales, Mayor
City of Pleasant View
885 W Pleasant View Drive
Ogden, UT 84414
Dear Mayor:
RE:

Dennis Spencer - Building Permit

Over the past few months I have been working with Dennis Spencer to resolve issues he has in
developing a one and one-half acre lot adjacent to the Cherrywood Manor project in Pleasant
View. I assume you are familiar with the property.
As an attorney for the State of Utah, acting as the Private Property Ombudsman, my job has been
to explain to citizens who call me what their rights are under state and federal constitutional
protections. When someone like Dennis calls me, I often do some checking around to see if there
are ways to resolve the issues in dispute. In this case I took the time to visit your city office, meet
with Terri Cragun, read the ordinances and parts of the file related to the Spencer property, call
Mr. Neil Smith, (who did some engineering for the city on Dennis's previous applications), and
call and visit with Michael Houtz, your city attorney. I sent him two letters to help clarify and
offer solutions to what appears to have been a previous empass. I have received no reply from,
Neil or from Mike
I have told Dennis that he need not pursue legal action. Although the subdivision standards for
Pleasant View are problematic when applied to his lot, if the city would allow him a building
permit for a home that could be accessed from the eastern side of his lot (which adjoins an
improved private street through which he has a deeded right-of-way), he could sell the property
and be finished with his involvement with the city. In my discussions with Mike, this approach
appeared to have some merit, but he is unable or unwilling at this point to respond to my calls or
my letter of November 4 (enclosed) outlining this proposal.
I understand that your ordinances allow such access to a homesite, with the approval of the Board
of Adjustment to use the private right-of-way for access. It appears that the Spencer lot has
sewer and water at the property line, and that the existing private lane is sufficiently wide to

accomodate emergency vehicles. It also appears that his right-of-way is in writing and recorded
and that this part of theright-of-wayis undisputed. The pavement even appears to extend
beyond theright-of-wayand onto his property.
While I had hoped to help resolve this issue, 1 can not do so alone. If the city has an interest in
my mediating the issues and helping with a resolution as a neutral third party, I would be happy to
do so. My conclusion at this point, absent any response from you, is that there is no such interest.
I certainly dislike telling a property owner who calls me that his only recourse is in the courtroom,
but there are situations, perhaps including this one, where that may be the case.
Please call me, or have Mike or Terri call me, if the city has any interest in attempting to work
things out.
Yoprs truly

Craig I\l Call
Private Property Ombudsman
cc*

Mike Houtz
Dennis Spencer

October 7, 1997

Michael Houtz, Attorney at Law
4768 South Harrison
Ogden, UT 84403
Dear Mike.
RE

Dennis Spencer Property - Pleasant View

Enclosed is a plat map of Dennis Spencer's 1 5 acres (give or take) in Pleasant View I have
indicated there the already completed access road that serves the adjoining PUD - Cherrywood
My job as a state official is to advise private property owners on issues that relate to government
regulation of, use of and impact on private property rights As I have visited with Dennis, he has
asked me to inquire about the options available to him for sale and/or development of his
property I advised him of the ordinance providing that access to a building lot can be had across
a private right-of-way if that is approved by the Board of Adjustment I have advised him that he
may very well be able to obtain that permission to use his entire property for one residential lot
This would not involve the use of any property for access that is not now already developed as a
roadway Since his land fronts onto the curb built as part of that roadway, and he would not
develop the property as more than one residence, he would not be creating a subdivision or using
antiquated subdivision lots, so would not need to go through the procedures associated with
subdivision approval
He has told me that he has a legal, recorded right-of-way over the parcel of property where the
curbing exists over which his access would be located He would therefore have the required
permission of his neighbors to use the roadway to access his lands
Do you see any legal issue that would cloud the approval of access to this land with the existing
road for a single family residence? Would there be any legal obstacles to obtaining a building
permit for a single family residence on this lot once that access were approved by the Board?

I would appreciate your consideration of this matter and advice on how I might respond to
Dennis's request to advise him on how he can best use his property.
Thanks for your assistance.
Yours truly,

Craig M. Call
Private Property Ombudsman

.cc:

Dennis Spencer

c?
Michae\ O. Leavitt
Governor
Ted Stewart
Executive Director
Craig M. Call
State Ombudsman

State
of
Utah
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
Office of Private Property Ombudsman
1594 West North Temple, Suite 3710
PC Box 145610
Salt Lake City" Utah 84114-5610
801-537-3455
801-538-7315 (Fax)
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November 4, 1997

Michael Houtz, Esq.
4768 S. Harrison
Ogden, UT 84403
Dear Mike:
RE:

Pleasant View - Dennis Spencer property

With this note is a copy of a survey that Dennis Spencer had completed for his property and
surrounding lots. It was done some time ago — please do not prejudice the document because it
says "subdivision" on it. I don't know why it does — it only shows the existing East lot the way it
is already drawn at the courthouse, as I understand it.
At any rate, the drawing does show four things*
1.

The right of way adjoins Spencer's lot.

2.

The road curbing, as built, encroaches on the lot.

3.

The sewer line comes from the East and terminates at the lot, with no connection
to Chenywood Manor.

4.

The water line, which does continue to Chenywood Manor, goes past the Spencer
lot.

The lot located to the South of the right of way and to the East of the Northeast corner of
Chenywood Manor is shown on other records as belonging to, or once belonging to John
Malmberg. The Agreement on Improvements enclosed shows that the Malmbergs paid the cost
of half the water line to the West side of their property, a point farther West than the East side of
the Spencer lot. This would tend to indicate that the water line was not a private improvement
devoted solely to Chenywood Manor. Absent another showing, it would appear appropriate for
the city to assume that Spencer can connect to the water.

Memorandum
* 3 A T C H CIVIL
To:

Tern Cragun - Pleasant View City
Development Service^ Coordinator

From:

Mark T. Miller P.E.
Consulting City Engineer

Date:

May 14, 1998 Owu Sf[S\°[%

Subject:

Spencer Estates Subdivision

(£y

^.

&^i

We have reviewed the re-submittals of the Spencc Estates 3'jbdivls;on It appears that two
options have been proposed Option No 1 indicess a one Ic\ subdivision which, in o^r opinion,
can not occur. If land is bene divided, w 3re than one lot wi I result, thus the smallest
subdivision possible is two lots We can only assume then U *; Option No 2 is what Mr
Spencer intended to submit Reference is made to our men .Q ii March 11,1998 Page 2 of
that memo details in a seven step procedure w!-et our reconrvndatiors are for obtaining
subdivision approval No rew tnformat j n has cone to light s.rce that '-me that woJd alter the
recommendations made in that memc. If item no. 1 has no! been completed, we do not see the
need to proceed with item no. 2 cv* c*ta> ^ ^ £ ~ V I \ i |3 q ? O ^ ^ ^ V A ^ ^ C ^
The problems with subdividing the proposed property as they relate to the Subdivfs.on
Ordinance are as follows*
1.

Each lot does not front on a public street, (Section 1 7 16.040).

2.

It does rot appear that water service can be provided to each lot without obtaining an
easement from the neighboring property Owner, (Section 17 20.010 (A)).
Sewer service to the proposed lot 2 may not be poss.b'e. Lateral sewer lines need a
minimum slope of 2%, Running the lateral from the exiting clean-out to a future home
on lot 2 would require more than a 4 foot rise in elevation, It is also rhy understanding
that the Uniform Plumbing Code requires sach dwelling un*t to have its own sewer
sen/ice lateral. The proposed sewer for lot 2 connects to the lateral stubbed to lot 1.
The subdivision sewer system must be approved by the City Council and City Engineer,
(Section 17.20 010(B)),

4.

Irrigation lines must be provided to each lot, (Section 17 20.010 (D)).

5

Fire hydrants shall be installed, (Section A7 20 010 (L))

6.

Subdivides shall reimburse the city for any and all attorney fees and engineering fees
and other professional fees and costs incurred by the City in relation to the subdivided

TerrI Craguh - Pleasant View City
Spencer Subdivision
page 2

(6. Cont.)

2 / jjjqo
r^\ <*

subdivision Said reimbursement shall be made within thirty days of receipt of
notice from the City of such fees. Failure by the subdivlder to reimburse the City,
shall be grounds for denial, (Section 17.20 021).

We recommend rejecting the proposed subdivision because \i does not comply with the above
mentioned Subdivision Ordinance requirements.
If you have any questions, please call

®
Michael O Leavttt
Governor
Ted Stewart
Executive Director

State of Utah
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
1594 West North Temple, Suite 3710
Box 145610
Salt Lake City. Utah 84114-5610
801-538-7200
801-538-7315 (Fax)
801-538-7458 (TDD)

May 19, 1998
Mayor Jim Fisher
City of Pleasant View
885 West Pleasant View Dr.
Ogden, UT 84414
VIA FACSIMILE: (801) 782-0539
Dear Mayor Fisher:
RE:

Spencer Subdivision

Dennis Spencer shared with me a memo given him by Terri Cragun related to the permit approval
process that has been the subject of some previous conversations between us. It is dated May 14,
1998 and shown as being from Mark T. Miller of Wasatch Civil. I have compared it to a memo
from Mr. Miller dated March 11, 1998.
There has been a suggestion in the past that the City has not been forthcoming with consistent
answers to Mr. Spencer's requests for review. Prior to receiving this memo, I have always been
reticent to believe that the City might be constructing barriers to this approval, and have worked
in good faith to encourage him to deliver to the City the information that it reasonably needs to
grant him permission to build. While I understand that there must be some conversation about
what the shortcomings of any given project may be, my impression is that these memos go beyond
that.
Our previous discussions have included the concept of his using his land for one building lot, and I
have told him that the city would have difficulty denying his using his land for one building lot.
The memo now indicates that, at least in the opinion of your engineer, that it is impossible to use
the land. You are advised to not approve building on one lot because it isn't a subdivision nor a
subdivision because of other problems. The engineer notes that it is impossible to approve a
subdivision that is not a lot split, but communities around us do that regularly, including your own
if I remember our conversation with Ms. Cragun.
He also says that access cannot be obtained across a private lane These conclusions appear to be
counter to your own ordinances, and his own memo of March 11, which references the Board of
Adjustments process for approving access across private lanes.

Mayor Jim Fisher
May 19, 1998
Page 2.

As a matter of law, the City cannot deny Mr. Spencer all economic use of his property unless the
city is willing to purchase the property for its fair market value. Having been somewhat familiar
with the matter, I have not yet seen the valid public purpose in denying him any chance to build.
The memo of the engineer has that effect, and if it reflects the City's policies in this matter, it may
be an unconstitutional restriction on his private property rights.
As you would expect, it is discouraging to have to cover the same ground several times in order
to make progress in this matter. For example, the engineer says that the Spencers need an
easement for utilities, but the City has seen several times, I believe, the right of way he has that
allows for access and utilities. He also lists such things as fire hydrants and irrigation lines that
can appropriately be conditions of approval rather than reasons for denial.
I have told Mr. Spencer that I cannot arrange for arbitration in this matter without his first
obtaining a final denial by the City. I cannot be that arbitrator, because I have been too intimately
involved in this case. The statute that I derive my authority from provides, however, that I have
a duty to "identify state or local government actions that have potential takings implications and,
if appropriate, advise those state or local government entities about those implications."
If the planning commission denies a single-lot application based on the lack of access to a public
street or the lack of a utility easement, without findings that substantiate the public purposes and
legitimate government interests in doing so, I believe that such an action would have the
implication of a taking without just compensation under the Utah and US Constitutions and could
be a violation of due process of law. I can state that if a denial were based on the list of reasons
that are shown in this memo, the City would have difficulty proving that your reviews are fair and
impartial.
As an independent third party, I do not understand why Mr. Spencer's right of way does not meet
the requirements of a private access that the Board of Adjustment can approve. Further, I do not
know on what basis they would reasonably deny it. I do not understand why all the discussions
we have held about the subdivision approval process for one lot would have proceeded only to
have the staff say that a one-lot subdivision approval is inappropriate.
As I said above, I have not previously been inclined to believe that the City would go out of its
way to frustrate the resolution of the problems in this matter, but if I needed evidence to persuade
me that this may be the case, the memo is enough to accomplish that. I have no personal interest
in this case. As an independent state official, and as it is my duty to do under statute, my letter is
meant to notify you that the City actions in this matter, if they continue on the present course,
may be inappropriate and have the implication of a taking of Mr. Spencer's property without just
compensation.

Mayor Jim Fisher
May 19, 1998
Page 3

If I can be of help in resolving this matter I remain eager to do so
Y^urs^truly,

Craig m. Call
Private Property Ombudsman
cc:

Dennis Spencer

P L i ^ S / ^ I VOEW (SOW
520 West Eiberta Drive, Pleasant View, Utah 84414

PLEASANT VIEW CITY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
"AMENDMENT" NOTICE OF DECISION
NAME:

Dennis Spencer
5993 N. 2250 East
Eden, Utah 84310

CASE #:

98-1

DATE:

July 28, 1998

You are hereby notified that your appeal to request a variance for
a lot or lots, not having frontage on a street, as required by the
zoning title for the zone in which the subdivision is located, but
upon a right-of-way, was heard by the Pleasant View City Board of
Adjustment in a Public Hearing held on July 16, 19 98, after due
notice to the general public and specifically to adjacent property
owners.
The Board of Adjustment has given consideration to your appeal
relative to the merit, circumstances, and conditions affecting said
property and hereby renders the following decision:
Your appeal to the Board of Adjustment is:

X

GRANTED
DENIED
GRANTED SUBJECT TO:

REASON FOR DECISION:
1.

Pleasant View City Subdivision Ordinance 17.04.010, section B,
states, "Any proposed subdivision and its ultimate use shall
be in the best interests of the public welfare and the

neighborhood development of the area concerned and the
subdivider shall present evidence to this effect when
requested to do so by the Planning Commission." The Board of
Adjustments felt Mr. Spencer did not support that by not
sustaining that evidence.
2.

Pleasant View City Subdivision Ordinance 17.16.010, section B,
states, "New subdivision streets including all utilities
required by this ordinance shall be extended to the property
line. The street arrangement must be such as to cause no
unnecessary hardship to owners of adjoining property when they
plat their own land and seek to provide for convenient access
to it. Half streets along the boundary of land proposed for
subdivision will not be permitted." The Board
of Adjustment decided there were no physical restrictions on
why a dedicated public street could not be built on Mr.
Spencer's land and not cause unnecessary hardship on other
property.

If you wish to appeal the decision of the Board of Adjustment, you
must petition the District Court within 3 0 days after the Board of
Adjustment's decision is final.
Sincerely,

y

—p->.

Debbie Jones
Board of Adjustment Secretary

Ct: Wi ri^n^

MINUTES OF A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE
PLEASANT VIEW CITY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
HELD JULY 16,1998 AT 6:00 PM

Meeting commenced at 6:05 PM with the following present:
MEMBERS PRESENT:
Timothy Blackburn, Chairman
Wynn Phillips
Carl Bruce
Gary Rhees
Norma Rae Liston
Debbie Jones, Secretary

VISITORS PRESENT:
Dennis Spencer
Kirby Rice
Clair Knight
Owen Eastes
Frank Maughan
Juanita Fowers
Cordell Hatch
Bob Gehrig

Chairman Timothy Blackburn called the meeting to order and welcomed those present.
Chairman Blackburn also welcomed new Board of Adjustment members, Carl Bruce and Norma
Rae Liston and welcomed Wynn Phillips, who has served the Board as an alternate, as a
permanent member.
MINUTES: The minutes of the previous meeting were not available at this time to approve.
BUSINESS:
Dennis Spencer appeared before the Board of Adjustment to ask for:
Approval for a lot or lots, not having frontage on a street as
required by the zoning title for the zone in which the subdivision
is located, but upon a right-of-way.
The property is located at approximately 3650 North 1000 West in Pleasant View.
Tim Blackburn turned the time over to Mr. Spencer to make his presentation. Mr.
Spencer showed the Board of Adjustments Option 1 and Option 2 of his proposed subdivision.
He showed a 60 foot right of way on his drawings, that he said Paul Cragun deeded to him in the
early 1970's. Mr. Spencer said that when Cherrywood Condominiums was built,, then it was
impossible for a public road to go in in front of his property. Mr. Spencer said he is proposing
using a portion of the right of way for access to his two lots. He said it was in his best interest to
have two lots there instead of just one large lot. Mr. Spencer said that all the utilities are
available. He also stated that he didn't understand why his proposal was called a subdivision,
because the property hadn't been divided in years. He said he wanted the property approved for
building lots.
Norma Rae Liston asked Mr. Spencer where the road would go to access hi? nroperty?

Mr. Spencer said he would not encroach on Cherrywood's property. He showed the right
of way going halfway into the second lot on the plat on option 2. He said the right of way has
been established and used for years.
Tim Blackburn asked Mr. Spencer if Paul Cragun intended the right of way for everyone
or for just the property owners to have access to the property.
Mr. Spencer said that he has the right to let whoever he wants use the right of way.
Carl Bruce referred to the Quit Claim Deed issued to Dennis Spencer from Paul Cragun
in May of 1983. Mr. Bruce quoted the last paragraph in the deed, "This right of way shall
terminate, for purposes of ingress and egress, when there is a dedicated road abutting property of
the grantee along the North line of said right of way." Mr. Bruce said he interpreted that
sentence to show that Mr. Cragun assumed there would be a road there at a future date.
Mr. Spencer said that he, himself, had that sentence added. He said that Cherrywood
built in violation of the Pleasant View City code.
Tim Blackburn asked Mr. Spencer why he couldn't use more of his property and put in a
60 foot dedicated public road?
Mr. Spencer said he chooses not to do that.
Carl Bruce asked Mr. Spencer if he plans to use the Cherrywood private road to access
his property?
Mi. Spencer said, "absolutely5'.
Mr. Bruce asked if Mr. Spencer had paid Cherrywood anything to be able to do that?
Mr. Spencer said, "no".
Tim Blackburn asked Mr. Spencer to explain to him why there is an unreasonable
hardship to his property?
Mr. Spencer said that Pleasant View City has allowed encroachment onto his property.
He said there was no advantage to him to put a thoroughfare to that property.
Carl Bruce asked Mr. Spencer if he had sold some of that property to other people? Carl
Bruce told Mr. Spencer that he needs to provide access to other's property.
Dennis Spencer said yes he had sold property. He said that in 1983 he was given a
building permit for that lot. He said the League of Cities and Towns told the city to get off
Dennis Spencer's back.
Wynn Phillips asked Mr. Spencer how the property owners to the west (Mr. Tafoya and
Mr. Hales) will be able to get frontage on a public dedicated street?
Mr. Spencer said he did not understand the question.
Wynn Phillips asked what are the best interests, in this case, for the public welfare?
Mr. Spencer said that the city has 1 2/3 acres of property receiving taxes of $300.00 a
year on that property. He said if he put homes there it would be of monetary value for the city
rather than a weed patch. He also said no public road will go through there.
Wynn Phillips asked Mr. Spencer what benefits are there to the neighborhood
development?
Mr. Spencer said the neighbors would be glad to see the weeds go away.
Norma Rae Liston said that she has talked to a few neighbors and they said as long as it
doesn't affect them, they don't care what happens.
Tim Blackburn turned the time over to the audience for questions or comments.
Bob Gehrig 3584 N. 1000 West, said he is the President of Cherrywood Homeowners
Association. He said he acknowledges that Mr. Spencer has a non-exclusive right of way at the

north of property, which Mr. Spencer can let anybody use who he wants. Mr. Gerhig says the
intent was for Mr. Spencer to use the land as pasture, not to subdivide. He says the wording
shows that in the Quit Claim Deed. Mr. Gehrig said that Dennis Spencer wants to use
Chenywood's private road to access his proposed lots. Mr. Gehrig said the homeowners for
years have maintained and paid for their private road. He said Chenywood , at one time, offered
some land to help Mr. Spencer put a road in and they weren't able to do that because they didn't
have enough property. - S*+ £*-#**- £**-« cjc b&a<?o <*** /y
Carl Bruce said that Mr. Spencer does have a right of way, but it doesn't say he has to
maintain the right of way. Mr. Bruce asked Mr. Gehrig if Chenywood's road encroaches on Mr.
Spencer's property. Mr. Gehrig said according to Mr. Spencer's engineer it does, but only a little
piece. He said if that bothers Mr. Spencer, then Chenywood hire a surveyor and cut out that
little piece.
Clair Knight, 3556 N. 1000 West said the city ordinance states you have to have 100 foot
frontage on a public dedicated street to build. Mr. Knight said that Mr. Spencer wants a private
road there to use. Mr. Knight said Mr. Spencer has abused the right of way. He said the lawn
has ruts in it. He said he is against the proposal.
Juanita Fowers said the question has been asked 'what hardship has been placed on Mr.
Spencer?' She said this property has been exploited more than any property in the city. She said
the property in it's original form in 1976 was planned to have a road there.
Cordell Hatch said he purchased a home in the area less than a year ago. He said the
realtor told him the property behind him was landlocked and couldn't be built on. He said he
tried to purchase the property from Dennis and Dennis told him it was tied up in court. Mr.
Hatch said he would like to see the properly stay as is.
Mr. Gehrig asked Mr. Spencer how he would access his second lot?
Mr. Spencer said they would use part of Chenywood's grassy area that is on
Chenywood's property. Mr. Spencer said he had the opportunity to sell his property to the
Cragun family on their terms for the Chenywood development. He said those terms were not
satisfactory to him.
Owen Eastes, 3654 N. 1000 West, said that if the proposed roadway will take some of
Chenywood's property, then Chenywood would not be in conformance.
Tim Blackburn said that the Board of Adjustments does not have the power to let Dennis
Spencer take property.
Kirby Rice, 3634 N. 1000 West, said the right of way is at the top end of Chenywood.
He said if Dennis Spencer wants a road up there with Chenywood to take care of, then there's no
way that will happen. He said Mr. Spencer has enough property to put a road in and conform to
the ordinances.
Mr. Gehrig said the ordinances are there for a purpose. He said the Fower's (property
owners to the west of Chenywood) were required by ordinance to build a dedicated road for their
subdivision, and now he is asking is the city going to let Mr. Spencer build homes without
having to put in any street? He said he is against that. He said that Mr. Spencer has enough
property to put a road in.
Dennis Spencer said that if he wanted to make a p^of t then he wouki havf *done that
years ,^Qn He said i&Cherrywoad would m v< half for a road, tnen ne would vqf ULti. He said
that hefrvftcj tfji? s o u s e d a prbbleSTJUtftt fcikft.
U'atH &tii£b sa!id tna: Unerrywood is noncbriiorming already and the city cannot make

Cherrywood more nonconforming.
Tim Blackburn told Mr. Spencer that there were two things that bothered him about Mr.
Spencer's request and he would like Mr. Spencer to clarify them for him.
1)
Tim said he doesn't understand why Mr. Spencer cannot put a 60 foot road on his
property and dedicate it to the city? Tim told Mr. Spencer that would solve his problem.
Mr. Spencer said that he chooses not to install a road built to city standards in his
subdivision and he feels so strongly about it he'll settle in court if he has to.
2)
Tim told Mr. Spencer that in order for the Board of Adjustment to grant a
variance, they have to determine that there is an unreasonable hardship on his property. Tim said
Mr. Cragun's right of way shows that the intent was to eventually have a road go through Mr.
Spencer's property, which was landlocked at the time Mr. Spencer bought it.
Mr. Spencer said that Paul Cragun asked him to write the right of way verbage so that
when the road goes through, then the right of way would terminate.
JuanitaJEowgl^-^aidjhat Paul Cragun did say that the right of way will be a road someday.
Carl Bruce asked Frank Maughan, as a member of the Planning Commission, in his
opinion, would it be impractical to put a road on Mr. Spencer's property?
Mr. Maughan said that from a Planning Commission standpoint, he didn't think he
should say. (He had not been asked to come as a representative from the Planning Commission).
Mr. Maughan said that from the City Subdivision Ordinances, it's a requirement for development
to put a road in. He said that economically speaking anybody who buys raw ground and develops
it, then building a road is going to be a cost to the developer. Mr. Maughan said that Cherrywood
pays for their road continually, with repairs and snow removal. He said the owners have
assumed a problem of a road not built to standard and would not qualify for a public road.
Carl Bruce said that in the Pleasant View City Ordinances, Section 17.16.040, that the
Planning Commission must determine it is impractical to extend streets to serve lots. Mr. Bruce
asked Mr. Maughan if the Planning Commission deemed it impractical for Mr. Spencer to put a
road on his property?
Mr. Maughan said that depends on the definition of impractical. He said if a huge
boulder was in the middle of the street and it was physically impractical to put the road in, then
yes, that would be impractical. He said he felt the code was not written for economic impractical
but for physically impractical.
Wynn Phillips moved to deny Mr. Spencer's request for a variance for options 1 and 2 for
approval for a lot or lots not to have frontage on a street, but upon a right of way. as shown on
his subdivision plat. The motion was seconded by Carl Bruce.
Tim asked Mr. Phillips to state the reasons for the denial.
Mr. Phillips stated:
1) Pleasant View City Subdivision Ordinance 17.04.010, section B, states "Any
proposed subdivision and its ultimate use shall be in the best interests of the public welfare and
the neighborhood development of the area concerned and the subdivider shall present evidence to
this effect when requested to do so by the planning commission." Mr. Phillips said he felt Mr.
Spencer did not support that by not sustaining that evidence.
2) Pleasant View City Subdivision Ordinance 17.16.010, section B, states "New
subdivision streets including all utilities required by this ordinance shall be extended to the
property line. The street arrangement must be such as to cause no unnecessary hardship to

owners of adjoining property when they plat their own land and seek to provide for convenient
access to it. Half streets along the boundary of land proposed for subdivision will not be
permitted." Mr. Phillips said there were no physical restrictions on why a dedicated public street
couldnot be built on Mr. Spencer's land and not cause unnecessary hardship on other property.
Voting was unanimous in favor.
Meeting adjourned at 7:15 PM.
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JODY K BURNETT (A0499)
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Defendant Pleasant View City
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P. O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Phone (801) 521-5678
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DENNIS V SPENCER AND LINDA S.
SPENCER,
Plaintiffs,

DEC ? ' 1999
NOTICE, TENDER OF
PERFORMANCE AND
SUGGESTION OF MOOTNESS

v.
CITY OF PLEASANT VIEW, a Utah
municipality, CHERRYWOOD MANOR,
INC., a Utah corporation, CHERRYWOOD
MANOR HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC., a Utah corporation, JOHN AND JANE
DOES I-XX, individual defendants in their
private capacities,

Civil No. 980905386PR
Judge W Brent West

Defendants.
Defendant Pleasant View City hereby notifies the Court and other parties, including
the Spencers, that it has agreed, as a good faith gesture in order to resolve the pending
litigation, to issue two building permits to the Spencers which will allow them to proceed
with the construction of one residence on each of the two parcels as depicted on and
consistent with the parcel sizes and technical specifications in the Reeve Engineering
Proposal of April 8 and 13, 1998, subject to the following terms and conditions:
(1)

The private driveways for the two parcels shall utilize the existing

paved portion of the non-exclusive right-of-way over the Cherrywood property to

access these two parcels, but otherwise the private driveway will be located on the
two parcels as depicted on the April 13, 1998, Reeve Proposal;
(2)

Buildings shall be set back a minimum of 40 feet from the front

parcel line; and
(3)

Compliance with other applicable requirements of Pleasant View City

for building permits, including normal and customary fees.1
The tender of said building permits renders moot the appeal from the decision of
the Board of Adjustment, which lies at the heart of this action. All of Plaintiffs3
remaining claims are subject to a motion for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
This is a land use action, the essence of which is a statutory appeal from the
July 16, 1998, Board of Adjustment denial of an application to permit construction of
two residences on a private right-of-way. Because this matter is an appeal of that decision
under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-708 and not a de novo review of Spencers3 application to
the Board of Adjustment, the appropriate remedy if Spencers were to prevail is to remand
the matter to the Board of Adjustment. The City recognizes that under its ordinances, a
properly framed application to the City may possibly result in permission to build on the
two Parcels facing a private right-of-way. The City has concluded that, for reasons of
economy and fairness, there is no purpose to be served by either a reconsideration on
remand or evaluation of a new, properly framed request. It has, therefore, decided to
]

There is no express requirement under the Rules of Civil Procedure to notify the
trial court of a change of circumstances affecting the litigation. However, because this
action is effectively an appeal of a Board of Adjustment decision, Rule 37, Utah RApp.P.
appears to apply: Therefore, in compliance with that rule, the City is notifying the Court
of its action "which render[s] moot one or more of the issues raised."

grant Spencers permission to build on the two Parcels and to obtain the necessary7
building permits upon submission of appropriate and sufficient applications.
The City acknowledges that this unilateral determination does not resolve the
remainder of Spencers3 claims in this matter. To that end, it expressly reserves any and all
defenses and denies any implication that the grant of permission to build on the two lots
arises from any legal duty to Spencers under the facts surrounding the allegations in the
Complaint. Spencers, likewise, have made no offer of consideration for the City's action
and have not waived any of the issues in their litigation.
The City also recognizes that, though it is not legally obligated to approve
Spencers5 application as presented to the Board of Adjustment or under any of the facts
presented in this litigation, granting permission to build on the two Parcels moots this
Court's review of the Board of Adjustment decision of July 16, 1998, by giving Spencers
the remedy they seek regardless of whether that remedy is appropriate as a matter of law.
In other words, the appropriate remedy—remand to the Board of Adjustment—would be
unnecessary as a result of the City's grant of the building permits. Because the review
under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-708 is moot, it is appropriate for the Court to dismiss the
challenge to the Board of Adjustment decision.
DATED this

of December, 1999.
WILLIAMS & HUNT

By_

^%A^t~
Jody/K Biyfnett
Attorneys for Defendant
Pfeasant View City

76200.1

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

Beverly Riemann, being duly sworn, says that she is employed in the law offices of
Williams & Hunt, attorneys for defendant Pleasant View City herein; that she served the
attached NOTICE, TENDER OF PERFORMANCE AND SUGGESTION OF
MOOTNESS in Case No. 980905386PR before the Second Judicial District Court,
Weber County, State of Utah, upon the panies listed below by placing a true and correct
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Counsel for Plaintiffs
Matthew Hilton
1220 North Main Street, #5A
P. O. Box 781
Springville, UT 84663
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the 17th day of
December, 1999.

W^
Beverly Biematm
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO befor^me this 17th day of December, 1999.

Notary Public
>kn«yPubll? Wm " 1
287 Eat 200 Sou*. S»fe 500
Sett L*» Cite Utah 84111
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DENNIS V. SPENCER and
LINDA S. SPENCER,,
Plaintiffs,

DECISION

vs
CITY OF PLEASANT VIEW,
a Utah Municipality, CHERRYWOOD
MANOR, INC., a Utah Corporation,
CHERRYWOOD MANOR HOME
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a
Utah Corporation, JOHN and JANE
DOES I-XX, individual defendants in
their private capacities,
Defendants.

Case: 980905386
Judge: W. Brent West
Clerk: Pamela Allen

There are a number of motions and issues that need to be addressed. Even though there
may be some overlap, the Court will address each motion and each issue separately.
The first and most important motions to address are the Plaintiffs' and Defendant Pleasant
View's, mutual Motions for Summary Judgment.
The first issue, in both motions, is the Plaintiffs' request for the issuance of two building
permits. Since the Defendant has agreed to issue the requested building permits, that issue is now
moot.
The second issue, in both motions, is the Plaintiffs' claim that their constitutional rights
have been violated. The Court agrees with the Defendant and finds that the statute of limitations
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and 'laches' are applicable and these causes of action are barred. See Section 10-9-1001 and
Section 78-12-25(3) Utah Code Annotated. In particular, the Plaintiffs' had thirty days, after any
adverse decision, to appeal that adverse decision and they failed to do so. In addition, the Court
finds that the constitutional claims are premature and have no factual or legal basis to support
them.
The third issue, related to the above constitutional issue and found only in the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment, is the alleged violation of the Plaintiff Dennis V. Spencer's
constitutional right of free speech. The Court finds, as a matter of law, that the Plaintiffs freedom
of speech was not infringed upon. At a public meeting, relating to the issuance of the above
discussed building permits, the Plaintiff spoke. He was not prohibited from speaking or voicing
his opinion. Apparently, the Plaintiffs comments irritated and angered some of the public officials
who were present at the meeting. Those public officials, who disagreed with the content of the
Plaintiffs comments, voiced their disagreement. Some even requested that the Plaintiff be
censured for his comments.
Freedom of speech works both ways. People who express opinions, at a public meeting,
should expect that those who disagree with those opinions, will also be allowed to express their
disapproval. That is what occurred here.
The fourth issue, found only in Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, is that the
Plaintiffs' causes of action for false arrest and malicious prosecution are barred. The Court agrees.
These claims are barred by governmental immunity. See Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-1,
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et seq. In particular, the Defendant has not been given the statutory notice of claim required to be
given, before one can file a lawsuit against a governmental entity.
The fifth issue, again, found only in Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, is that
there is no private cause of action or property right created by the Municipal Ethics Act, the Rules
of Professional Conduct, or Article XI Section 5 of the Utah Constitution. The Court agrees.
The sixth issue, found only in the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, is that the
Plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment has not been established. Again, the Court agrees. The
Plaintiffs have not established all the elements of unjust enrichment.
The seventh issue, common to both Motions for Summary Judgment, is Plaintiffs' claim
for slander of title. The Court finds, for several reasons, that no slander of title exists. First,
slander of title is barred by the Governmental Immunity Act. Again, see Utah Code Annotated
Section 63-30-1, et seq. Second, no factual or legal basis for slander of title has been established,
by the Plaintiffs. Finally, the property, at issue, involves an easement, not title to any real
property. No slander of title can occur when there is no title.
The eighth issue, raised in Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, is that the Plaintiffs
were inappropriately required to pay $1,260.00 in attorneys fees on behalf of the Defendant. The
Defendant, although critical of Plaintiffs' scarcity of proof on the issue of payment and receipts,
has agreed to reimburse the Plaintiffs the $1,260.00. Therefore, the issue is moot.
The next motion addressed, is the Plaintiffs initial Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
The issues raised in that motion were later merged with the Plaintiffs second, more general,
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Motion for Summary Judgment. Since those issues were addressed above, the Court will not
address the Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment separately.
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery has not been addressed by either party and so the
Court also declines to address the issue.
In light of the above Rulings, the Defendant's Motion for a Discovery Protective Order,
the Defendant's Motion for a Stay of the Protective Order and a Renewal of that Protective Order
and the Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Dennis Spencer are all rendered moot and
will not be addressed by the Court.
Defense counsel for Pleasant View will please prepare Findings of Facts, Conclusions of
Law and a Judgment consistent with this Ruling.
Dated this 2nd day of October, 2000.

Judge W. Brent West
Second District Court

JODY K BURNETT (A0499)
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Defendant Pleasant View City
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P. O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Phone (801) 521-5678
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DENNIS V SPENCER AND LINDA S.
SPENCER,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
ORDER OF DISMISSAL,

Plaintiffs,

CITY OF PLEASANT VIEW, a Utah
municipality, CHERRYWOOD MANOR,
INC., a Utah corporation, CHERRYWOOD
MANOR HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC., a Utah corporation, JOHN AND JANE
DOES I-XX, individual defendants in their
private capacities,

Civil No. 980905386PR
Judge W Brent West

Defendants.
This matter came before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable W Brent West
presiding, for consideration of various pending motions including defendant Pleasant View
City's Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
defendant Pleasant View City's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Dennis Spencer, plaintiffs'
Motion to Compel Discovery and various motions by defendant Pleasant View City
regarding protective orders. The Court heard oral argument on July 12, 2000. Plaintiffs
were represented by Matthew Hilton. Defendant Pleasant View City was represented by

Jody K Burnett and defendants Cherrywood Manor, Inc. and Cherrywood Manor Home
Owners Association, Inc. were represented by Joe Cartwright.
Following the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under
advisement, and having reviewed the legal memoranda, affidavits and exhibits submitted
by the parties and having considered the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised,
issued its Decision dated October 2, 2000, granting defendant Pleasant View City's
Motion for Summary Judgment. Pursuant to that Decision, it is hereby ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Defendant Pleasant View City's Motion for Summary Judgment on all of the

remaining claims or theories asserted against it in the plaintiffs' Complaint is hereby
granted for the reasons more fully set forth in the Court's Decision of October 2, 2000.
2.

The plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied for the

reasons more fully set forth in the Court's Decision of October 2, 2000.
3.

Based on the Decision and disposition of the other motions as set forth

above, the plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery, defendant Pleasant View City's various
motions with respect to protective orders and defendant Pleasant View City's Motion to
Strike Affidavit of Dennis Spencer are all rendered moot, and it is not necessary for the
Court to further address those issues.
4.

Plaintiffs' Complaint, including all of the claims and legal theories asserted

therein against defendant Pleasant View City, is hereby dismissed as against defendant
Pleasant View City, with prejudice and upon the merits.
5.

The plaintiffs' claims against defendants Cherrywood Manor, Inc. and

Cherrywood Manor Home Owners Association, Inc. remain pending and are unaffected
by this order.

DATED this <31 -" day of

iVjftvlU ^ \ , J ^

2000.

BY THE COURT:

to.
W Brent West
Distria Court Judge /
83547.1
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
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Beverly Purswell, being duly sworn, says that she is employed in the law offices of
Williams & Hunt, attorneys for defendant Pleasant View City herein; that she served the
attached proposed SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL in Case
No. 980905386PR before the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, State of
Utah, upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an
envelope addressed to:
Counsel for Plaintiffs
Matthew Hilton
5152 N. Edgewood Drive, SuitelOO
Provo, UT 84604-5681
Also By Facsimile

Counsel for Defendant Cherrywood Manor, Inc. and
Cherrywood Manor Home Owners Association
Lowell V Smith
SMITH & GLAUSER, PC.
Parkview Plaza
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the 12th day of
October, 2000.

Beverly Pursw&fl
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 12th day of October, 2000.
HAWCWAftDELL
WIWPUBUC'STAIZotUW
»7E20088TE30e
•ALTLAKECITYUrwIII

Notary Public

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DENNIS V. SPENCER and
LINDA S. SPENCER,

DECISION

Plaintiffs,
vs
CITY OF PLEASANT VIEW, a
Utah municipality, CHERRYWOOD
MANOR, INC., a Utah corporation,
CHERRYWOOD MANOR HOME
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a
Utah corporation, JOHN and JANE
DOES I-XX, individual defendants in
their private capacities,
Defendants.

Case:
980905386
Judge: W. Brent West
Clerk: Pamela Allen

The plaintiffs have filed a motion, pursuant to Rule 59(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, asking the Court to "reconsider" its previous ruling on the parties' cross motions for
summary judgment. The plaintiffs raise several issues and the Court will address each one
separately.
Spackman v. Board of Education Analysis
First, the plaintiffs allege that subsequent to oral argument, but prior to memorializing the
Court's decision, the Utah Supreme Court issued an opinion in Spackman v. Board of Education
of Box Elder County. 16 P3d 533, 2000 UTAH LEXIS 148 (Utah 2000) that provides further
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clarification about when constitutional claims can be brought under the Utah Constitution.
However, as pointed out by the defendant, City of Pleasant View, the Spademan decision adds
nothing new and is not material to this Court's ruling on the constitutional claims. "The crux of
the Spademan decision is that the Due Process and Open Education clauses of the Utah
Constitution are self executing. Spademan sections 5, 14, 16 P.3d 536." The defendant did not
argue that the Due Process clause was not self executing and the Court did not base its decision
on that principle of law. This Court reviewed the plaintiffs' constitutional arguments on their
merits and concluded that there was no "factual or legal basis to support them." (See this Court's
previous decision at page 2.)
In addition, the denial of due process and the denial of equal protection claims made by
the plaintiffs, arose out of the City of Pleasant View's refusal to issue building permits to the
plaintiffs. In its earlier opinion, this Court also stated that with the issuance of the building
permits, the plaintiffs' constitutional claims were now premature. (Again, see this Court's
previous decision at page 2). Since the City of Pleasant View offered to issue the permits to the
plaintiffs, there was no evidence alleged that would support a finding that the plaintiffs had been
otherwise damaged.
Finally, the plaintiffs sought, among other remedies, equitable relief. They wanted the
Court to order the defendant to issue the building permits. They claimed that the defendant was
denying them due process and equal protection by refusing to issue those permits. Once those
permits were issued, those claims became moot.
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The plaintiffs now argue that they specifically plead and argued that their due process
rights were violated, a provision that the Utah Supreme Court, in Spackman. found to be selfexecuting and merited damages in the event equitable relief was not applicable. This argument has
merit and needs to be addressed.
As stated by the plaintiffs, on page three of their memorandum, under the Spademan
decision, in order to establish a claim for damages under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution dealing with the due process clause, three criteria must be met.
First, a plaintiff must establish that he or she suffered a
'flagrant'
violation of his or her constitutional rights. . . . In essence, this means that a
defendant must have violated 'clearly established* constitutional rights 'of which
a reasonable person would have known. \ . . To be considered clearly established,
'the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.'. . . The requirement
that the unconstitutional conduct be 'flagrant' ensures that a government
employee is allowed the ordinary 'human frailties offorgetfulness, distractability,
or misjudgment without rendering [him or her]self liable for a constitutional
violation.'
In reviewing all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the City of Pleasant View's
refusal to issue the building permits, the evidence, as submitted, simply doesn't rise to the level of
being a 'flagrant' violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. There were legitimate legal and
practical concerns about the issuance of the permits, (e.g. the plaintiffs had to obtain variances on
the property before the permits could be issued.) The fact that there was a legitimate issue over
the issuance of the permits, that both parties dug in their heels and took hard line positions, and
that the City of Pleasant View later relented and issued the permits does not mean that the
plaintiffs' constitutional rights were 'flagrantly' violated.
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Second, a plaintiff must establish that equitable remedies do not address
his or her injuries.
In this instance, equitable remedies addressed the plaintiffs' injuries. The permits were
obtained. There is nothing, submitted to the Court, in plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment,
that establishes that the plaintiffs suffered any economic damage as a result of the delay in issuing
the permits.
Third, a plaintiff must establish that equitable relief such as an
injunction, was and is wholly inadequate to protect plaintiffs rights or redress his
or her injuries.
Finally, there has been no showing of this criterion, by the plaintiffs.
Even if the Spademan case is considered and applied, it does not change the Court's
original ruling.
Other related Spademan issues that were raised and need to be addressed, include the fact
that the City of Pleasant View did argue that the plaintiffs did not have a private cause of action
under the Supremacy clause Article VI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution because that clause is
not self-executing. See Utah Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden City, 58 P.2d 1 (Utah 1936). The
Spademan decision does not alter this Court's previous holding.
Finally, the plaintiffs argue that there is no governmental immunity for constitutional
violations. The City of Pleasant View did not raise governmental immunity as a defense to the
plaintiffs' alleged constitutional violations. However, ordinary false arrest and malicious
prosecution are common law claims, not constitutional claims, and are barred by governmental
immunity as this Court previously held.
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Thirty Day Ordinance to Appeal. Statute of Limitations fe Laches
The second issue raised by the plaintiffs concerns the interpretation of the provision in
state law that sets out a thirty-day period to appeal any adverse decision made by the city council
or city planning commission. See Section 10-9-1001 Utah Code Annotated. The defendant, City
of Pleasant View has analyzed this issue correctly. The four-year statute of limitation contained in
Section 78-12-25(3) Utah Code Annotated applied to all claims arising four or more years prior
to the initiation of the action. The thirty-day limitation contained in Section 10-9-1001 Utah Code
Annotated applied to the decisions of the City of Pleasant View that were complained about by
the plaintiffs. Finally, laches applied to the other claims of plaintiffs. This Court did not apply the
thirty-day limitation to the plaintiffs constitutional claims. It doesn't apply.
Part of the difficulty with plaintiffs claim is that many of their complaints would be barred
by the above restrictive statutes. For whatever reasons, the plaintiffs sat on their rights. They did
not appeal decisions that, at one time, were readily appealable and could be addressed at a level
other than at a constitutional level. Instead, they have tried to couch their complaints in
constitutional terms to avoid application of the above limiting statutes.
In the above context, the thirty-day restriction is not unreasonable or unconstitutional. The
statute simply provides that people who feel that they are aggrieved by decisions of a municipality
have thirty days to appeal those decisions to a Court of law. Failure to file a timely appeal usually
results in an end to the litigation. The record, here, reflects that there are instances where the City
of Pleasant View made decisions that were not timely appealed by the plaintiffs. This Court held
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that these statutes barred the applicable claims that were not of a constitutional nature.
Plaintiffs' Claims for False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution
The plaintiffs' claims that they are asserting constitutional claims for false arrest and
malicious are legally unsupported. They are unsupported for several reasons. First, there is
nothing in the complaint that supports a constitutional claim for these alleged wrongs. Ordinary
false arrest and malicious prosecution are common law claims, not constitutional claims. Keeton,
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, (5 ed. 1984) Section 11 at 47 (false arrest is a "lineal
descendant of the old action of trespass"); Section 119 at 885 ("Malicious prosecution is closely
related to a number of claims, both common law and statutory . . .")
Second, the plaintiffs did not name or serve Chief Cragun or any other City employee as a
party to this action. The defendant City of Pleasant View cannot be liable under a Section 1983
claim on a theory of respondeat superior for injuries allegedly inflicted by its agents or employees.
Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037, 56 L.Ed.611 (1978).
Accord, Bd. Of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown. 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382,
1388, 127 L.Ed. 626 (1997) ("We have consistently refused to hold municipalities liable under a
theory of respondeat superior.")
Finally, the plaintiffs' constitutional claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution can
only be established by an adequate showing of a policy or custom of the City which caused the
alleged constitutional violation. There is no such allegation in the plaintiffs' complaint. These two
claims are barred by the Governmental Immunity Act.
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Claims Regarding Alleged Variances
The plaintiffs also allege that this Court failed to address, in its first decision, the impact of
the statutory protections, applicable to the variances, issued to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs refer to
this as a "core issue." (See plaintiffs' memorandum, page 8.) The applicability of those variances
was mooted by the City's issuance of the permits. (Again, see this Court' previous decision page
1.) This Court also ruled that there was no factual or legal basis to support plaintiffs'
constitutional claims and thus there were no constitutional claims to be addressed that arose from
the variance issues. Finally, Article XI, Section 5 is not self-executing and provides no remedy for
the alleged statutory violation. These issues do not need to be addressed again.
Plaintiffs Attorneys Fees Pursuant to Section 1983 or 1988
The plaintiffs claim for attorney's fee is denied for two reasons. First, the plaintiffs are not
the prevailing party. See Harper v. Summit County. 2001 UT 10, paragraph 34, 414 Utah Adv.
Rep. 21. Second, the "catalyst theory," upon which they rely, was specifically rejected by the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Buckhannon Bd. And Care Home. Inc. et al v. West
Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, et al 2001 WL 567728 (U.S.)(2001).
Defense counsel will please prepare an order consistent with this ruling.
Dated this 28th day of September 2001.

teQ:
Judge W. Brent West
Second District Court
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decision to the parties as
follows:
Jody K. Burnett
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Ut 84145-5678
Matthew Hilton
1220 North Main Street #5A
P.O. Box 781
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Dated this 28th day of September, 2001.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DENNIS V SPENCER AND LINDA S.
SPENCER,

FINAL ORDER

Plaintifis,

CITY OF PLEASANT VIEW, a Utah
municipality, CHERRYWOOD MANOR,
INC., a Utah corporation, CHERRYWOOD
MANOR HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC., a Utah corporation, JOHN AND JANE
DOES I-XX, individual defendants in their
private capacities,

Civil No. 980905386PR
Judge W Brent West

Defendants.

This matter came before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable W. Brent West
presiding, for consideration of plaintifiV Motion to Revise Summary Judgment Granted in
Favor of City of Pleasant View, which was styled as a request under Rule 54(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the trial court to reconsider its prior ruling on the
parries' cross-morions for summary judgment.
A Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal was signed on November 27, 2000,
and filed with the Court on November 28, 2000, dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint as
. f - J-__ ni

. \r.„*, rinr with nreiudice and upon the merits. At that time,

the plaintiffs' claims against defendants Chcrrywood Manor, Inc. and Cherrywood Manor
Home Owners Association remained pending and were unaffected by that Order.
By stipulation and motion of all parties, axi Order of Dismissal With Prejudice of
Claims Against Cherrywood Manor, Inc. and Cherrywood Manor Home Owners
Association, Inc was signed on March 26, 2001, and entered with the Court on
March 27, 2001.
A Notice to Submit was filed with the Court on the plaintiffs' motion to revise
summary judgment, and none of the partiesrequestedoral argument* Having reviewed
the legal memoranda and materials submitted by the parties, and being fully advised, the
Court issued its Decision dated September 28, 2001, in which it separately addressed each
of the issues raised by the plaintiffs and denied the plaintiffs5 motion to reconsider.
Pursuant to that Decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

Plaintiffs* Motion to Revise Summary Judgment Granted in Favor of City of

Pleasant View is hereby denied for the rtasons more fully set forth in the Court's Decision
of September 28, 2001.
2.

With the entry of the Order dismissing the plaintiffs' claims against

Cherrywood Manoc, Inc. and Chcrrywood Manor Home Owners Association, Inc, this
constitutes the final order of the Court adjudicating and disposing of all of the claims and
rights and liabilities of all of the parties.
DATED this \9^

day of Q i n ^

2001.
BY THE GO
vO*
W Brent West
District Court J]

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

.)
: ss.
)

Beverly PursweiL, being duly sworn, says that she is employed in die law offices of
Williams & Hunt, attorneys for defendant Pleasant View City herein; that she served the
attached proposed FINAL ORDBSL in Case No. 980905386PR before the Second Judicial
District Court, Weber County, State of Utah, upon the parties listed below by placing a
true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Counsel for Plaintiffs
Matthew Hilton
P. O. Box 781
Springville, UT 84663
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the _4* day of October,
2001.

Beverly Purswqjf
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this _4^_ day of October, 2001.

Notary Public
NOTAfcrruBUC
PENNTLEDWAADS
257E.300So.#fQ0
S.UL.VT M i l l _ .
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